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FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW OF PLANS
Jay Conison*
BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM
I. ERISA AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")' is the
repository of law and policy concerning private employee benefit plans.' State
law is largely irrelevant, since ERISA preempts virtually all state laws that
relate to such plans.3 And no other federal law regulates these plans in any
systematic way.'
* Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law. B.A., 1975, Yale University;
M.A., 1978; J.D., 1981, University of Minnesota.
I received very helpful criticisms of earlier drafts from Norwood Beveridge, Nancy Conison,
Peter Dillon, Edward Eberle, Michael Gibson, John Langbein, and Joseph Weeks.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (sub-
stantially codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) and in various
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code).
2. ERISA does not regulate governmental plans (as defined in ERISA § 3(32), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(32)). Among private plans, ERISA exempts from coverage certain church plans (as defined
in ERISA § 3(33), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)); plans "maintained solely for the purpose of complying
with applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insur-
ance laws"; certain foreign plans; and unfunded excess benefit plans (as defined in ERISA §
3(36), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36)). ERISA § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b). The conclusions reached in
this Article are not necessarily applicable to plans that are not subject to ERISA.
ERISA divides all employee benefit plans to which it applies into two categories: pension benefit
plans, which provide retirement income, ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2); and welfare benefit
plans, which provide medical and other forms of current benefits to employees, ERISA § 3(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1).
Pension benefit plans are further divided into two main kinds: defined benefit plans, in which
retirement benefits are determined by a formula, usually dependent on compensation and years of
service, ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35); and defined contribution plans (or individual
account plans), in which an individual's retirement benefit is determined by the amount contrib-
uted over time to his individual account in the plan, and to the investment performance of the
funds in that account, ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34).
3. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). State laws that relate to employee benefit plans are
preempted, whether or not they interfere with ERISA's provisions and policies, unless they fall
within one of the narrow statutory exceptions. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, I I S. Ct.
478 (1990). See generally Jay Conison, The Federal Common Law of ERISA Plan Attorneys, 41
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1049, 1083-98 (1991) (discussing preemption of state law under ERISA). The
exceptions are set out at ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b).
4. Other federal statutes that deal with limited aspects or special problems of benefit plans are
section 302(c)(5) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988); section
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Yet ERISA is often no more than the starting point for legal analysis be-
cause it makes federal courts primarily responsible for developing much of
benefit plan law. ERISA treats many subjects with such excruciating detail
that little room remains for judicial interpretation or clarification. But other
subjects-indeed, some of the most fundamental and most important
ones-are treated only through announcement of general principles that must
be refined and elaborated in judicial decisions.' Nor is this the only way that
ERISA leaves matters to the courts. For still other subjects, ERISA ousts
state law on a wholesale basis without itself supplying any rules to fill in the
gaps. In these latter areas, the extrapolation of ERISA's principles and the
development of gap-filling rules has been left entirely to the courts, with little
or no express statutory direction.6
There are two reasons for this deference, indeed delegation of lawmaking
authority, to the courts. One is that ERISA, while ambitious in its goal of
righting plan-related wrongs, is a statute largely without precedent. Congress
had determined that employee rights to anticipated benefits were woefully un-
derprotected and concluded that the threats to employees' interests demanded
an expansive and thorough legislative response.7 Yet Congress had few legisla-
tive models to draw on as guide to the problems' solution because, prior to
ERISA, the law of plan-related matters had been developed mainly by the
courts. In the Ninety-third Congress, which enacted ERISA, various regula-
tory approaches were proposed that ultimately were pieced together into the
4 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988); section 703 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 105-108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-77; and section 541(c)(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, II U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988). In addition, some regulations issued under other
statutes deal with specialized matters concerning plans. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1990)
(noting exemption from insider trading rules for certain transactions involving benefit plans).
5. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (stating that
ERISA's fiduciary principles are to serve as basis for common law development).
6. See, e.g., Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1990), where the court
stated:
To determine whether estoppel is applicable to ERISA actions, our first resort
would ordinarily be to the statute itself. In this case, the statute is silent. This is not
so much a question of statutory interpretation as a question of public policy. Is it
better to allow estoppel in employee benefit cases or to bar them?
Id.
7. See. e.g., S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in I SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 587, 599 (1976) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY], and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4849 ("[T]he nature and extent of the problems deter-
mined to exist required one omnibus legislative proposal which would embody essential and indis-
pensable reforms."); S. REP. No. 127, supra, at 15, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra,
at 601, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4851 ("[AII of the problems in the private pension field ...
are so interrelated that they cannot be resolved without a comprehensive legislative program.").
See generally Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in SENATE COMM. ON
AGING. THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE, S.
REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-25 (1984) [hereinafter Gordon].
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final bill. Much of ERISA was intended to be experimental, to consist of regu-
latory first approximations, later to be refined through experience and in the
courts.' Congress wished the federal courts to work out the ramifications and
details of the statute's principles and approaches, so that it could learn how
subsequently to improve the statute and make it more effective.9
The second reason for Congress' deference to the courts is its recognition
that the law of benefit plans had long been a part of the common law. ERISA,
of course, was intended to provide benefit plan law with a statutory grounding.
Yet Congress was very much aware of the traditional role of courts in develop-
ing the law of plans, and nothing in the statute or its legislative history sug-
gests any intent that that role should be eliminated." The impact of ERISA
8. 120 CONG. REC. 4278 (1974), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 3369
("It is a modest bill. It does not purport to solve every problem. Further study and deliberation by
our own committee and by other committees of the Congress will be necessary." (remarks of Rep.
Perkins)); see also, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 29,929 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 7, at 4736 ("If patterns of age discrimination appear to develop through the use of this
[vesting] formula, we will, of course, want to consider appropriate amendments to this legisla-
tion." (remarks of Sen. Williams)).
The statute itself makes clear that it is neither comprehensive nor the last word on the subject
of benefit plan regulation. In it, Congress provided for many different groups to study ERISA's
effects and to report on the need for further legislation. See ERISA §§ 512, 513, 3021-3022,
3031, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1142, 1143, 1221-1222, 1231.
9. A clear expression of this intent can be found in Congress' sweeping decision to preempt
state laws. It was not until the Senate and House bills emerged from the conference committee
that the section on preemption was amended so that it would have its current expansive language.
HR. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 7, at 4357, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5162. The purpose of the amendment was
explained as follows by one of ERISA's sponsors:
Although the desirability of further regulation-at either the State or Federal
level-undoubtedly warrants further attention, on balance, the emergence of a com-
prehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of uniformity with respect
to interstate plans required-but for certain exceptions-the displacement of State
action in the field of private employee benefit programs.
120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 4771
(remarks of Sen. Javits).
Congress recognized that such a novel, sweeping provision could generate unexpected results
and that those results would have to be evaluated subsequently. Thus, ERISA provides that the
Joint Pension Task Force, created by the statute, should study the consequences of the preemption
provision. ERISA § 3022(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(5). As was explained to the Senate:
The conferees-recognizing the dimensions of such a policy-also agreed to assign
the Congressional Pension Task Force the responsibility of studying and evaluating
preemption in connection with State authorities and reporting its findings to the Con-
gress. If it is determined that the preemption policy devised has the effect of preclud-
ing essential legislation at either the State or Federal level, appropriate modifications
can be made.
120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 4771
(remarks of Sen. Javits).
10. E.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 9, at 302, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY, supra note 7, at 4569, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5083 ("The conferees expect that the
courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the
special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans."). For a discussion of congressional intent
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on the common law character of benefit plan law is less profound than is often
assumed. Certainly ERISA contains meticulously detailed provisions that
leave little room for judicial refinement-tax provisions, vesting standards,
funding standards, and disclosure requirements, for example-and these provi-
sions have been committed to administrative agencies for any needed elabora-
tion."1 But these detailed rules and standards are mainly preventive, not reme-
dial. They were not, and never could have been, developed through the
common law process. Remove them and what remains is a statute that informs
courts, but only in general terms, how they should accommodate the various
policies and interests that bear upon plans and employee rights under plans.
Subject to any statutory redirection, courts are to proceed largely as they have
before.
Thus, even after ERISA, the law of benefit plans remains in substantial part
a body of common law.12 The broadly framed protective provisions, such as
the fiduciary and enforcement rules, are now being given increasingly precise
meaning through case law development.' 3 And in the gaps created by the
broad preemption of state law, federal courts have supplied rules and bodies of
rules to govern statutorily unaddressed topics such as restitution", and liability
of nonfiduciaries for participating in a fiduciary's breach.' 5
This developing common law of plans is federal common law. The fact that
it is federal common law is analytically significant, because any body of fed-
eral common law necessarily is directed common law. Largely because federal
courts must take care to respect principles of federalism and separation of
powers in their development of rules to supplant state laws, any body of fed-
eral common law must be informed and guided by the statute that identifies
the subject of lawmaking as a matter of federal concern. 8 In the case of bene-
fit plans, of course, ERISA is the statute that makes the area one of intense
(indeed exclusive) federal concern, and so the federal common law of benefit
that courts should have substantial discretion in developing a fiduciary and remedial law for plans,
see Conison, supra note 3, at 1117-19.
11. For delegations of rulemaking authority to the Secretary of Labor, see ERISA §§ 403, 505,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1133, 1135.
12. For a similar perspective on ERISA, see STEPHEN S. BRUCE, PENSION CLAIMS: RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS 3, 299-303 (1988).
13. See generally BRUCE, supra note 12; Robert N. Eccles, Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA:
1975-1988, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 679 (1988); Daniel C. Knickerbocker, Jr., Trust Law
With A Difference: An Overview Of ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 633 (1988); James A. Ray & Samuel W. Halpern, The Common Law of ERISA, TRIAL,
June 1985, at 20.
14. E.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 992-94 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, I ll S. Ct. 512 (1990); Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund,
618 F. Supp. 943, 949-50 (D. Del. 1985).
15. E.g., Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1089
(1989); Freund v. Marshall & llsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
16. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642-43 (1981); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 & n.5 (1972); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69
(1966).
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plans must be a common law that furthers the policies of that act.
II. THE PROBLEM
What policies the common law of plans must further can partially be deter-
mined from the face of the statute. ERISA clearly instructs courts, in develop-
ing plan-related law, to treat as paramount the goal of protecting employee
rights and expectations relating to benefits from plans. 17 Hence, plan-related
common law must further the policy of protecting employee benefit rights and
expectations.
Yet this conclusion is of little help in deciding hard cases. There are many
ways to protect employee rights and expectations, and many ways to accom-
modate the policy of protecting them with other policies and interests involved
in plans. Courts very often have difficulty determining how to accommodate
ERISA's employee-protective purpose with other policies and provisions found
in the Act. For example, they have had substantial difficulty reconciling
ERISA's protective policy with the requirement that employee rights under a
plan be specified in writing. 8 This difficulty has led to uncertainty about im-
portant questions, such as the enforceability of claims to benefits based on oral
representations 9 and the effect of a plan provision giving a fiduciary discretion
in deciding claims. 0
Other examples abound of uncertainty as to the proper reconciliation of pol-
icies. Many difficulties arise in the effort to accommodate the employees' inter-
est in protection of their benefit expectations with the employer's interest in
establishing and using a plan to serve its own business needs. Many cases deal-
ing with this problem of accommodation strike the balance almost reflexively
in favor of the employees, for example, by holding an employer-fiduciary liable
for using a plan to serve its own ends, even if it causes no pecuniary loss to the
plan.2 Some commentators have strongly criticized this approach.22
How, then, should a court select the policy or policies to be implemented in
any given case? How should courts resolve competing policies and principles so
17. See, e.g., ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (stating Congress' findings that "many em-
ployees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits"); ERISA §
2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (stating that the policy of ERISA is "to protect . . . the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans").
18. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l).
19. Compare Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1990) (allowing recovery
under law of plans for oral representations) with Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.
1989) (denying recovery under law of plans for oral representations), cert. denied, I ll S. Ct. 579
(1990).
20. See, e.g., Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, Ill S. Ct. 712 (1991); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d
1048 (7th Cir. 1987).
21. See Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1984).
22. E.g., John H. Langbein, The Conundrum of Fiduciary Investing Under ERISA, in PROXY
VOTING OF PENSION PLAN EQUITY SECURITIES 128, 131-33 (Dan M. McGill ed., 1989).
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as to further the aims of ERISA? These are the problems we address in this
Article.
III. THE SOLUTION
To answer them, we propose to take seriously the fact that benefit plan law
has been developing since well before ERISA. We propose to treat ERISA as
a statute that self-consciously places itself within the course of that develop-
ment and that aims to guide its further progress. This approach differs from
the currently prevailing one. The prevailing approach is ahistorical, and treats
both ERISA's guiding principles and the post-ERISA common law of plans as
created largely out of a vacuum. ERISA is viewed as a free-standing source of
policy and guidance whose common law background is substantially irrelevant.
By contrast, the approach taken here will place ERISA in its historical and
conceptual context: as a statute, influenced by seventy-five years of common
law development, that sought to make the common law more effective as an
instrument for protecting employee rights. As we shall emphasize, ERISA
neither began nor terminated the judicial development of the law of plans. It
simply redirected it.
This Article, then, will proceed as follows. The first part will carefully ex-
amine the conceptual evolution of plan common law.23 We will first ascertain
what plans are and what functions they have been developed to perform. We
will then determine what problems pre-ERISA common law dealt with, how
the problems were treated, and what inadequacies there were in that common
law treatment.
The second part will examine the text and legislative history of ERISA. The
goal here is to understand the statute's relationship with prior law. We will
determine what parts and features of the traditional law of plans ERISA
adopts and what parts it rejects; and what general guidance it gives for further
development of the law.
Finally, the last part of this Article will show how the conclusions drawn in
the first two parts can be used to clarify current questions in the modern law
of plans. The two most important topics addressed are foundational: how
ERISA permits the accommodation of employer interests in plans and what
23. Our study will focus on the conceptual evolution of pension plan common law because it is
the body of common law that most influenced ERISA and the body of law whose inadequacies
ERISA was most concerned to rectify. A separate, pre-ERISA common law of welfare plans
existed, some of the features of which we shall note as appropriate. However, ERISA largely
disregards this body of law. Congress chose simply to have welfare plans governed by the same
principles and priorities it chose to govern pension plans. Many think this was a mistake, but it is
not our concern here to evaluate its wisdom.
Our study will also be concerned principally with defined benefit plans, see supra note 2 and
accompanying text; in particular, noncollectively bargained defined benefit plans. The conclusions
reached here are generally applicable to defined contribution plans and to collectively bargained
plans. However, when applying these conclusions to problems involving the latter kinds of plans,
adjustments may sometimes have to be made to take into account additional factors peculiar to
them.
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kinds of activities ERISA is designed to regulate.
Among the most important conclusions we reach in this Article are
following:
The Nature of Plans. Plans have two aspects: they are both parts of the
employer's business and systematic sources of employee expectations.
The Nature of Benefit Plan Law. These two aspects of plans give rise, re-
spectively, to employer and employee interests and rights in plans. Much of
the law of private benefit plans is a matter of working out an accommodation
between employer and employee rights and interests.
Plans as Contracts. Plans should not be treated by benefit plan law simply
as if they were contracts. The history of benefit plan law before ERISA dem-
onstrates the futility of such a treatment, and ERISA itself rejects the con-
tractual model of plans in favor of a sui generis approach to protecting em-
ployee benefit expectations.
Employer Interests in Plans. Although ERISA is focused almost exclusively
on the protection of employee interests in anticipated benefits, it still permits
the accommodation of employer interests in their plans. ERISA is not the en-
tirety of benefit plan law, and its rules and principles do not deal with all
aspects of plans. Out of the domain of plan-related activity, ERISA carves an
area in which employee interests are paramount. However, it leaves other ar-
eas for the expression and protection of employer interests in plans; indeed,
areas in which employer interests may be paramount.
Pensions as Deferred Compensation. Although the notion of pensions as de-
ferred compensation has long found expression in the law of plans, it is a con-
cept that so far has been of only minor importance for the determination of
legal rights and relationships, Before ERISA, it was a wholly empty concept,
having no legal significance for any important issue in the common law of
benefit plans. ERISA relies on the concept, but only as a secondary factor in
justifying and determining the scope of benefit plan regulation.
BACKGROUND TO ERISA
I. THE EMERGENCE OF PLANS AS INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMS
Pensions as isolated grants to individuals are probably as old as civiliza-
tion, 4 and grants of pensions by governments to favored individuals or classes
of individuals have long been part of the American political tradition. 5 How-
24. ABRAHAM EPSTEIN, FACING OLD AGE: A STUDY OF OLD AGE DEPENDENCY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND OLD AGE PENSIONS 213 (1922); I MURRAY W. LATIMER. INDUSTRIAL PEN-
SION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 17 (1932); 17 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA Social Welfare 432-35 (15th ed. 1990).
25. The most favored group has been war veterans. A 1636 decree of the Plymouth Colony
settlers provided that "any man sent forth as a soldier and returned maimed should be maintained
by the colony during his life." See SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER, SOCIAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES ON
PRESERVING THE SYSTEM 7 (1982). For laws concerning pensions granted to Revolutionary War
veterans, see An Act further to Provide for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United
1992]
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ever, systematic, employment-based programs for the grant of pensions to old
or infirm former employees did not begin to appear until the latter part of the
nineteenth century and did not become common until after 1910.26 It is easy
to understand why. Private pension programs are voluntary on the part of em-
ployers and are established to address specific business needs. But until the
period around the turn of the century, the character of business enterprises
and the structure of the economy were such that a systematic pension program
would have fulfilled no useful function for an employer. Until around the turn
of the century, few people worked for others long-term,27 and fewer still
worked long enough to grow old in their jobs.2 8
If a business owner did choose to provide financial support of some kind to
the isolated elderly employee who was no longer able to perform useful work,
the owner could provide the employee with a sinecure, without fear of harming
the efficiency or profitability of the enterprise. 29 As one scholar of early pen-
sion plans described the relevant features of the pre-pension plan economy:
[B]usiness enterprises were dependent on the life and fortune of one person
or at most of a few families. Not many of them appear to have existed over
any considerable period of time. Persons who worked for others were rela-
tively few and the relationship frequently was of short duration. While un-
doubtedly many proprietors maintained a paternalistic attitude toward their
employees, and supported them in their old age, the growth of the West and
constant migrations probably tended to take out of work in the industrial
centers many who in similar circumstances at the present time would be
compelled to remain. It is not unreasonable to infer under these circum-
stances that the proportion of persons in the employment of a single enter-
States, I Stat. 129 (1790); An Act Providing for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the
United States, I Stat. 95 (1789). See also Walton v. Cotton, 60 U.S. 355 (1856) (discussing
pension benefits provided to families of deceased Revolutionary War veterans).
26. WILLIAM GRAEBNER. A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT 133 (1980); 1 LATIMER, supra note 24,
at 20-60; Alfred Epstein, The Problem of Old Age Pensions in Industry, in SELECTED ARTICLES
ON OLD AGE PENSIONS 56 (Lamar T. Beman ed., 1927). Latimer was able to identify only 66
formal plans established between 1874 and 1910, but 101 were established in the next five years. I
LATIMER. supra note 24, at 42 (tbl. 4).
27. On the general problem of labor turnover in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
see Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract Law,
1986 WIs. L. REV. 733, 737-40. On turnover in the railroad industry before the 1880s, see WAL-
TER LICHT, WORKING FOR THE RAILROAD: THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 213 (1983) ("The number of railway workers who survived, succeeded and were pro-
moted, and stuck to railroading was small.").
28. Louis D. BRANDEIS, Our New Peonage: Discretionary Pensions, in BUSINESS-A PROFES-
SION 65-66 (1914); Epstein, supra note 26, at 48. One reason was that voluntary withdrawal by
the elderly from business life was encouraged by society. W. ANDREW ACHENBAUM, OLD AGE IN
THE NEW LAND: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE SINCE 1790, at 22-23 (1978); GRAEBNER, supra
note 26, at 12-13. Another reason was that families were accustomed to and were commonly able
to care for their older nonworking members without financial assistance from others. ACHENBAUM,
supra, at 75-80. Many states had laws to make individuals responsible for support of family mem-
bers. Id. at 76.
29. 1 LATIMER, supra note 24, at 19.
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prise for a long period was small. The problem of providing for aged em-
ployees was, therefore, somewhat exceptional .. ..
Why private pension plans emerged when they did, in the form they did, is
a complex tale of economic and social development.31 For present purposes, it
suffices to emphasize two key points, namely that (a) systematic programs for
the grant of pensions developed in association with the newly emerging prac-
tice of systematically retiring older employees from business enterprises, and
(b) the "older employees" who were systematically being retired and pen-
sioned were employees who were no longer wanted, not because of infirmity,
but simply because they had reached a specific age. Let us deal with these
points in turn.
A. Retirement and the Expansion of Informal Plans
Plans and retirement evolved toward modern form together. Retirement, of
course, is now taken for granted as an integral and inevitable feature of both
the management of business and the cycle of working life. Yet it is a new
institution, and began to appear only in the late nineteenth century3 in re-
sponse to deep changes in industrial organization and in the composition of the
workforce. One of the changes that unquestionably contributed to the emer-
gence of systematic retirement was the sheer increase in the number of older
employees. This increase, though, was not an isolated demographic phenome-
non; it was part of the overall increase in the number of persons employed by
others-of the fact that, in Brandeis' words, "America had become largely a
nation of employees." '33
The increase in number of older workers contributed to the development of
retirement plans in a straightforward way. Older workers who could no longer
fully perform their assigned tasks had always been a problem for the em-
ployer, particularly in cases where the employee had long served the enterprise
and had no other means of financial support. So long as the number of such
workers in an enterprise remained very small, it was possible for an employer
to deal with the problem through informal, unsystematic methods. As noted
above, older workers might be assigned lighter or easier work, perhaps moving
by stages to progressively less demanding tasks the older and more infirm they
30. Id. at 17-18.
31. For careful studies of the development of pension plans, see LATIMER, supra note 24, pas-
sim; GRAEBNER, supra note 26, ch. 5.
32. "No profession, industry, business, craft, or trade organization prior to 1860 required peo-
ple to leave the labor force because they had reached a predetermined chronological age."
ACHENBAUM, supra note 28, at 22.
33. BRANDEIS, supra note 28, at 65-66. Many factors contributed to the increase in the
workforce. The principal ones were increased immigration, lessened opportunities for self-employ-
ment, and expanded opportunities for employment in large enterprises. Demographic factors, such
as the increase in the proportion of older persons in the population as a whole, probably were
secondary. Cf. ACHENBAUM, supra note 28, at 89-106 (reviewing old age demographics of
workforce and general population).
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became. 4 Alternatively, they could be discharged from the enterprise and, in
exceptional cases, pensioned on whatever terms the employer deemed appro-
priate. 5 But as the number of older workers unable to perform their tasks
increased, the employer's room for choice diminished. It became infeasible to
keep all older workers employed in the enterprise because there were not
enough easy jobs to satisfy the increased demand. Discharge for old age thus
became increasingly common.
Those employers who were concerned that the workers discharged for old
age not face destitution in their remaining days could adopt or expand the
practice of granting pensions to retired employees who were considered deserv-
ing. 6 But, as expanded, the practice of pensioning retired employees de-
manded regularization, both for administrative control and for assurance that
the retirees were treated fairly and uniformly. There was a natural evolution
from the informal practice of occasionally pensioning an older, deserving em-
ployee to more structured arrangements for the retirement of older workers
with pensions.37
Of course, not every business regularized its retirement-and-pension ar-
rangement through just this evolution. Yet many of the early plans did bear
unmistakable imprints of having developed from, or of having been influenced
by, still earlier informal practices. Among such imprints: an emphasis, in the
stated purpose of the plan, on retiring workers who, because of old age, were
incapable of useful work; provisions in the plan for discretionary decision mak-
ing by the employer, at least as to whether an employee had reached the stage
where he should be retired; and use of the pension primarily to provide old-age
relief to deserving retirees.38
B. Retirement Plans and Industrial Efficiency
Yet these were not modern retirement plans, and, indeed, modern retire-
ment plans did not develop as simple elaborations of these kinds of arrange-
ments. The plans just described were structured to deal with problems caused
by the inability of individual employees to perform in the business. For mod-
ern plans to develop, the programs had to be modified so they could deal with
a new and very different industrial problem.
These were the formative years for the evolution of large, professionally
34. See, e.g., GRAEBNER, supra note 26, at 121-22.
35. Id. at 11-12, 121-271; LATIMER, supra note 24, at 19.
36. See GRAEBNER. supra note 26, at 124-25.
37. See STUART D. BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM 103-05 (1976).
38. An early railroad retirement plan, for example, provided that "[any male employee who
shall have been in continuous service for not less than twenty-five years . . . and who, in the
opinion of the board of pensions, shall have become unfit for duty, may be retired and pensioned
by the board of pensions." Fickling v. Pollard, 179 S.E. 582, 582 (Ga. App. 1935); see also I
LATIMER, supra note 24, at 65-87. For a discussion of some of the early railroad plans that pro-
vided pensions only to those too old or infirm to continue work, see Emory R. Johnson, Railway
Departments for the Relief and Insurance of Employees, 6 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
64 (1895).
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managed business enterprises. The profitability of these enterprises depended
on their ability to achieve and maintain high-speed, high-volume, low-cost op-
eration. 9 This critical dependence of the success of the enterprise on opera-
tional efficiency necessarily transformed relationships between the enterprise
itself and those whom it employed. The changes in relationships were
profound, for both managerial employees and laborers.4 0
One such change is important for the present inquiry: There was an increase
in demand for those who could work rapidly and efficiently and who could
adapt to the new methods and new technologies of the enterprise. Even more
important is the converse of this fundamental change: a reduction in demand
and lessened tolerance for those persons who did not possess, or who had lost,
these now highly valued characteristics. The impact of this latter change was
probably slight on employees who, because of age, were genuinely unable to
perform any but the easiest work. They were not valuable to the large indus-
trial enterprise, but they had not been valuable to the small shop either. By
contrast, the impact of the change was very great on those older workers who,
while still able to perform substantial work, were considered as a group to be
slow, inefficient, and unable to adapt to the new business methods."1 The
transformation of business and the increasing importance of industrial effi-
ciency now rendered these older but not infirm workers less valuable to the
enterprise than the younger workers, and so, for the sake of profitability and
efficiency, it was thought desirable to replace them with younger workers. This
transformation of the status of older but not yet infirm workers began with
industries-such as railroads, public utilities, steel and oil companies-that
39. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLU-
TION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (discussing the development of the new forms of business
organization).
40. At the same time the transformation in the nature of business enterprises was precipitating
development of systematic pension plans, it was inducing yet a broader development in industrial
relations, of which the emergence of pension plans was only a small part. As noted above, the
working class in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries expanded enormously. Methods
were needed to help ensure that the employees would work productively and efficiently. In addi-
tion, methods often had to be devised by the employer to help satisfy basic living needs of employ-
ees. A response to the problems was welfare capitalism, which has been described as "any service
provided for the comfort or improvement of employees which was neither a necessity of the indus-
try nor required by law." BRANDES, supra note 37, at 5-6. Forms of welfare capitalism included
not only pension plans but also education programs, company housing, company hospitals and
medical care, company sporting teams, and company sponsored YMCAs and churches. Id. pas-
sim. The general development and systematization of welfare capitalism in many respects paral-
lels the more particularized development of pension plans, with respect to the industries first af-
fected the underlying business purposes, and the increasing level of systematization with time. For
a review of comprehensive programs of nineteenth century railroads that one now would consider
benefit plans, see Johnson, supra note 38. One major difference between pension plans and most
other forms of welfare capitalism is that the institution of pension plans has survived to the pre-
sent, whereas most other forms of welfare capitalism, and indeed the welfare capitalism movement
itself, have disappeared.
41. ACHENBAUM, supra note 28, at 47-50; EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 3, 8-21; GRAEBNER,
supra note 26, at 18-35.
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first evolved into the large, professionally administered enterprises that are
prototypical business forms today. But the transformation spread rapidly be-
yond. It soon was taken as "common knowledge that there is an industrial old
age . . . an economic human obsolescence, entirely distinct from the evening
of life,""' and that, for the sake of the enterprise, workers who have reached
industrial old age must cease to labor in the business.
Observe that the problem created for the new forms of business by this
emergent personnel category of "industrial" old age was very different from
the problem that physical old age had created for the earlier forms of business
enterprise. The new problem was an efficiency problem; it was the problem of
how best to prune the workforce of employees thought to be economically ob-
solete.43 By contrast, efficiency had been a lesser concern, if a concern at all,
for the earlier forms of business enterprise; the problem that older workers had
presented was largely the humanitarian one of dealing with persons no longer
able to function because of their physical and mental condition. Although the
problems differed, the solutions were facially similar: arrangements for retire-
ment with a pension.
Yet it is important to recognize that the solutions were only similar; beneath
the surface they differed radically. For while the older arrangements had been
designed to solve isolated problems caused by old and infirm individuals, the
newer arrangements were designed to treat problems caused by a newly de-
fined group. The fundamental difference was that the older arrangements had
been concerned largely with providing pensions in appropriate cases, while the
newer arrangements were concerned mainly with retiring those who presump-
tively were no longer worth their cost." The older and newer arrangements,
42. Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., I I N.E.2d 878, 879-80 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937); see also
LICHT. supra note 27, at 213 ("The real significance of the B. & 0. plan lies in its establishing a
definite date at which men could retire. For B. & 0. employees a new stage of life was thus
created, for there now existed a formal distinction between a man's working and postworking
life.").
43. One report framed the problem as follows:
What to do with the worn-out workers,-that is the essence of the pension problem.
To carry them on the pay roll at their regular employment means waste and disorgan-
ization of the working force; to turn them adrift is not humane. In the past, large
employers of labor have tried to meet this difficulty in piecemeal fashion, by retiring
aged employees in certain cases, or giving them light work, each case being provided
for separately, on its own merits; now they are beginning to deal with the problem in
a systematic fashion, by adopting a uniform method of retirement with pension.
BRANDEIS, supra note 28, at 67 (quoting MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION ON OLD AGE PENSIONS,
REPORT (1910)).
44. See, e.g., 3 Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2426-27 (1942) [hereinafter Revenue Revision Hearings] (testimony
of Robert S. Gordon):
National Dairy started its plan only in 1942 .... We have about 37,500 employees.
We made a study and found out that we were spending a great deal of money on
retirement of superannuated employees. We also found that we had a great number of
employees, far beyond 65, still serving, still drawing down salaries, which they had
achieved in their best years, and we thought that their services were not measuring up
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thus, had very different orientations, and the difference in orientations led to
fundamental differences in plan structure. The group orientation permitted,
indeed required, the plan and its processes to become highly depersonalized.
Case-by-case evaluations of the appropriateness of an individual's retirement
were not necessary, and a simple chronological standard could uniformly be
applied. Similarly, there was no need for discretionary judgments as to
whether an individual was entitled to a pension and, if so, in what amount;
formulas based on years of service and salary could be used instead. And since
the main purpose of the plan was to eliminate inefficient workers rather than
to provide old age relief, the program did not have to be structured to provide
pensions for everyone who was retired. Pensions could be made available only
to the extent needed to satisfy the employer's needs or concerns. And so the
entire process of retiring workers became bureaucratized and transformed into
a program for the benefit of the employer rather than for the benefit of the
retiring employees. Pension and retirement plans became tools of industrial
efficiency.4 5
It is striking how much even the earliest of the efficiency-oriented plans re-
semble modern pension plans. These early plans normally were reflected in a
document that set forth the purpose of the plan, the formula for calculating
benefits, and the conditions that would have to be satisfied by an employee
before benefits would be granted. Most also relied on a specified funding pro-
cedure by which money to pay the benefits was to be supplied, and they often
established a separate fund or trust to hold the contributions and to pay out
benefits. Usually the plan was administered by a committee that had responsi-
bility for determining entitlement to benefits and the amount. Very commonly,
the determination of the committee was made final.4
to what they had been.
We wanted to figure out a plan to replace informal arrangements which were in
effect here and there, depending upon the man, depending on the conditions under
which he retired; but we are in a competitive business and we were stopped pretty
much by how much we could spend on this plan ...
We wanted to get an orderly plan for retirement of our people at 65 or some such
age . ..
Id. See also the testimony of John Evans:
The Armstrong Cork Co. is 82 years old and, prior to 1937 when the general retire-
ment program was inaugurated, retired its employees on an informal basis, the
amount of retirement income being determined by the needs of the particular individ-
uals retiring. This procedure favored the spendthrift and penalized the more thrifty
employees, and in too many instances delayed necessary retirements, with the result
that it failed to solve the company's problem respecting the superannuated employees,
and to correct this condition, the company in 1937 adopted the present general retire-
ment program.
Id. at 2432.
45. See GRAEBNER, supra note 26, at 13-14, 18-35. For a comparable (albeit nonhistorical)
explanation of the relationship between contracts of adhesion and bureaucratic firm organization,
see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173,
1222-25 (1983).
46. See generally LATIMER, supra note 24, passim. For examples in reported decisions, see,
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C. The Role of Pensions in Efficiency-Based Plans
A basic aspect of these plans may seem puzzling in light of their purpose. If
the problem addressed was that of pruning a class of employees from the
workforce, a systematic arrangement for mandatory retirement alone would
appear to solve the problem. Why, then, did employers continue to couple re-
tirement with at least the possibility of a pension in their formal plans? Good-
heartedness may have been a factor, but it is unlikely that employers who
were establishing plans to promote industrial efficiency were altruists, offering
pensions only because they provided old-age relief. What is the explanation for
the grant of pensions to some retirees?
The explanation lies in the fact that plans were not only granting pensions,
they were also making promises and representations about them. The promises
and representations might be explicit in the plan document or implicit from
the actual operation of the plan. Those promises and representations about
pensions, like any promise or representation, tended to create expectations.
And those plan-induced expectations about pensions had the power to induce
reliance and responsive conduct on the part of the employees. Indeed, the con-
duct induced could be conduct over a very long term, perhaps over the entirety
of an employee's working life.
Just as employers came to realize that retirement-and-pension arrangements
could be used to prune the less efficient older workers from the workforce, they
also came to realize that the prospect of a pension-of a source of old-age
support-might be used to attract the younger and more efficient workers that
were preferred in place of older ones. They also realized that, by making the
pension conditional on long-term good behavior, dedicated service might be
encouraged and turnover might be reduced. 47 Thus, the systematic promise, or
e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944); Fickling v. Pollard, 179 S.E. 582 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1935); McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98 (App. Div. 1898), affd mem., 60
N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901).
47. One court quoted the secretary-treasurer of a large pharmaceutical company as follows:
The object of the corporation expending its money for pensions is continuity of ser-
vice, or increasing the continuity of service, decreasing the turn-over of employees,
making it an object for them to stay with us. That does not appeal so much to the
younger employee, or the employee that has only been with us a short time, as it does
to the employee that reaches the age of 40 years, after which he begins to think of
what he is going to do after he is unable to work longer, and he stays with the job. In
my opinion it is an economic advantage to the company in providing this pension
system for our employees; that is our real reason for setting aside the funds and mak-
ing the expenditure for the pension. I believe the pension produces greater faithfulness
on the part of the employee. The question of labor turn-over is an item of considerable
expense to an industrial concern; it is very much to the advantage of the company to
have the employees in continuous employment. We look upon the pension as compen-
sation for long service.
Bowler v. Nagel, 200 N.W. 258, 260 (Mich. 1924); see BRANDES, supra note 37, at 105-06;
GRAEBNER, supra note 26, at 127-30; de Roode, Pensions as Wages, 3 AM. EcON. REV. 287, 287
(1913). For a contemporary perspective on this function of plans, see generally DENNIS E. LOGUE.
LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCES ON CORPORATE PENSION PLANS (1979).
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at least prospect, of a pension could serve as a complement to systematic re-
tirement. While retirement would eliminate the undesirable workers, the pros-
pect of a pension would attract, motivate, and help retain the desirable
younger ones.48 The pension plan, in this way, could be rendered a more com-
plete tool of industrial efficiency. It became an integral component of the em-
ployer's business, a feature of the employer's overall program for building an
efficient workforce.' 9
II. PRE-ERISA TREATMENT OF INTERESTS IN PLANS
And so plans developed, not as employee savings programs, not as old age
relief programs, but as industrial programs designed to affect employee con-
duct for the benefit of the enterprise. Yet as such they raised questions about
the employees' interest in the plan. In particular, they generated the following
questions. Should a plan be understood to give rise to any employee rights to a
pension? If so, what should be the scope and character of those pension rights?
These were subjects of extensive common law development.
There is a virtually canonical account of how pre-ERISA common law dealt
with these questions. According to that account, courts initially answered the
questions by treating pensions provided through plans as "gratuities"-as no
more than gifts from the employer. As a result, an employee had no enforcea-
ble claim to a pension from the plan. However, the account continues, the
judicial understanding of plans and pensions evolved; courts eventually at-
48. In the early period of systematic plans, some writers argued that employers who used plans
to improve the character of the workforce were engaged in wishful thinking. Latimer argued that
the evidence was inconclusive to show that pension plans actually provided the industrial-relations
advantages claimed for them. 2 LATIMER, supra note 24, ch. 16. And, as Epstein pointed out, "In
view of the (business] considerations, the number of industrial concerns in the United States that
have established such systems for their superannuated employee is amazingly small." EPSTEIN,
supra note 24, at 148. For judicial doubts, see Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150, 159 (III.
1928).
Recent economic analysis shows that defined benefit plans can reduce labor mobility, at least
where vesting requirements are not unduly stringent. However, the same analysis shows that high
levels of vested benefits can increase voluntary departure rates of workers who are between 40 and
60 years old. See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 140-44
(1986); Barry McCormick & Gordon Hughes, The Influence of Pensions on Job Mobility, 23 J.
PUB. ECON. 183 (1984); Bradley R. Schiller & Randall D. Weiss, The Impact of Private Pensions
on Firm Attachment, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 369 (1979).
49. EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 148-56; GRAEBNER, supra note 26, at 127-32; 2 LATIMER, supra
note 24, at 894-902.
Pension plans traditionally have had a wide variety of uses for employers. Among the more
commonly cited ones, in addition to facilitating the orderly retirement of superannuated employ-
ees: helping to reduce turnover, especially among mature employees; helping to attract desirable
employees, especially managers and executives; helping to maintain stability of the workforce in
depressions; maintenance of high morale and the promotion of loyalty; helping to make available
opportunities for advancement in the organization; inducing desirable characteristics, such as
thrift, in employees; and helping to create a favorable public image for the enterprise. See, e.g.,
DAN M. MCGILL & DONALD S. GRUBBS, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 21-23 (6th ed.
1989); JAY V. STRONG, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS IN OPERATION 1-9 (1951).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tained wisdom and the law came to treat pensions as contractual entitlements.
Under this contractual regime, employees might or might not have enforceable
rights, depending on the character and terms of the "contractual" plan. Fi-
nally, the account continues, the evolution in legal understanding culminated
in the recognition of pensions as compensation, over and above wages, given by
the employer in exchange for the employees' labor. Yet, it was a peculiar form
of compensation, because it was deferred until the employee's retirement. In
summary, then, the legal evolution before ERISA supposedly was one that led,
by progressive stages, to a theory of pension plans as contracts for deferred
compensation.5"
Though widely accepted, this tale of conceptual evolution is factually over-
simplified and heuristically useless. Ultimately, it explains nothing about the
judicial treatment of pensions and plans because it fails to account for the
industrial and legal problems that courts were addressing. It fails to consider
why courts chose to use the words "gratuity," "contract," and "deferred com-
pensation," and it fails to consider even what those terms were supposed to
mean. In the end, the received account confuses judicial rhetoric with judicial
resolution-or, more often, evasion-of the fundamental problems of pension
plan law identified above.
Let us carefully examine the pre-ERISA perspectives on pensions and pen-
sion claims, and attempt to understand why courts answered the fundamental
questions of pension plan law as they did.
A. The Plan as Employer Property
A pension plan established by an employer could plausibly be viewed as the
employer's property-indeed, as property in which the employer alone had a
legally cognizable interest.51 Invariably, there was little if any opportunity for
employees to help determine a plan's content, to participate in its administra-
tion,52 or to make use of the plan (as opposed to the pensions that might be
50. See, e.g., Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125, 133 (N.D. Ill. 1955), aff'd, 234
F.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 918 (1956); Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171
N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1960); Timothy J. Heinsz, Note, A Reappraisal of the Private Pension System,
57 CORNELL L. REV. 278, 282-85 (1972); Robert D. Wieck, Note, Pension Reform Act of 1974:
An Alternative to Contractual Theories of Preserving Retirement Benefits, 14 J. FAM. L. 97
(1975); Comment, Consideration for the Employer's Promise of a Voluntary Pension Plan, 23 U.
CHI. L. REV. 96 (1955) [hereinafter Comment, Consideration]; Note, Legal Status of Private
Industrial Pension Plans, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1375 (1940) [hereinafter Note, Legal Status); Note,
Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 916-22 (1970); W.
E. Shipley, Annotation, Rights and Liabilities as Between Employer and Employee with Respect
to General Pension or Retirement Plan, 42 A.L.R.2D 461 (1954).
51. Some early businesses established instead of plans so-called "relief departments." A relief
department was an employer-sponsored membership organization run as an administrative unit of
the employer's business. Relief departments were established primarily to make available disabil-
ity and death benefits. Some, though, offered pension benefits as well. See Johnson, supra note 38.
52. Except to the extent that some plans, by the grace of the employer, did provide for em-
ployee representation on the administrative committee. See 2 LATIMER, supra note 24, at 621.
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granted under it) for their own ends. Certainly no employee could individually
bargain for a plan or bargain over the terms of the employer's plan. If an
individual did bargain for a pension as part of his compensation, the bargain
and the pension would be specific to that employee and would form no part of
any systematic plan.
Labor organizations might have been able to bargain for plans funded by
employers, but for a long time they avoided doing so. Unions were distrustful
of employer-sponsored pension plans, recognizing that their purpose often was
to induce loyalty and bonding to the employer and, in many cases, to deter
union membership and organized employee activity.'3 This distrust of em-
ployer-sponsored plans often led unions to oppose them."
Thus, the form and content of employer-sponsored plans were determined
wholly by the employer, and the employer was left free to use the plan in
whatever way and for whatever purposes it wished. As if to emphasize that the
plan should be deemed their exclusive property and completely within their
control, employers commonly stated in the governing document that the em-
ployees had no rights to a pension, or to anything else with respect to the
plan." Some went so far as to characterize the pensions to be provided as
gratuities or gifts.
Many courts were receptive to this proprietary outlook and accepted the
proposition that a plan established by an employer was the employer's prop-
erty, with which the employer could do as it wished.' 6 In the very first re-
ported case to deal with (and reject) an employee's assertion of pension rights
under a plan, the court practically begged the question, beginning its analysis
with this supposed axiom:
It must be conceded at the outset that a person or a corporation proposing to
give a sum for the benefit of any person or any set of persons has the right
53. ACHENBAUM, supra note 28, at 83; BRANDEIS, supra note 28, at 73 (noting that "[tihe
system is in effect a form of strike insurance"); GRAEBNER, supra note 26, at 131-32.
54. 2 LATIMER, supra note 24, at 758. Interestingly, some unions, recognizing the power of
pension plans to induce loyalty and bonding to the sponsoring entity, themselves established pen-
sion plans for their members. EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 194; GRAEBNER, supra note 26, at 138;
WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 40-42 (1976).
55. 2 LATIMER, supra note 24, at 719-21.
56. Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944) (holding that "benefits were, as
declared in the plan, gratuities," and that the company "had the right ... to condition its bounty
in such manner as it saw fit"); In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 49 F. Supp. 405, 406 (E.D. Mo. 1943)
(stating that "it was competent for the company to make its bounty subject to whatever conditions
it chose"); Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150 (I11. 1928); Fernekes v. CMP Indus., 195
N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 1963); Dolge v. Dolge, 75 N.Y.S. 386, 387 (App. Div. 1902) (noting that "[iut
was simply a benevolent plan proposed by [the employer], and it was solely within his power and
discretion to carry it out or not"); McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98 (App. Div.
1898), afid mem., 60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901); Going v. Southern Mills Employees' Trust, 281
P.2d 762 (Okla. 1955); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Butler, 86 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935);
Spiner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (stating that "[t]he
fund . . . constituted a charitable enterprise"); see also Gott v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192
S.E. 905, 905 (N.C. 1937) (relating to a disability plan).
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to fix the terms of his bounty, and provide under what circumstances the gift
shall become vested and absolute.57
Other courts, on the basis of the same proprietary rationale, regularly dis-
missed employee challenges to plan-related decisionmaking by the employer.
For example, courts upheld plan provisions that denied employees any enforce-
able right, even to the continuation of a pension annuity that had begun to be
paid, and upheld the right of employers to terminate their plans at will, irre-
spective of the impact on present or future retirees.5 8
The courts that reached these conclusions were not just applying old rules to
new facts. At bottom, they were applying social and economic policy to the
new phenomenon of private pension plans. Yet in making such policy choices,
these courts were not concerned with issues of social welfare. Few if any re-
ported decisions before ERISA considered private pension plans to have any
bearing on major social problems, such as that of old-age poverty. Rather, the
courts had a much different concern-that an individual's property was some-
thing over which he should have substantially unlimited discretion and con-
trol. 9 As one court casually but tellingly commented, while upholding the
right of an employer to stop paying an annuity to a retired employee, "The
Master in the Parable of the laborers quotes the employer as saying: 'Is it not
lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?' ,6o
Unfortunately, what courts actually were doing about pension claims tends
to be obscured by what they said they were doing, and it is largely for this
57. McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 99 (App. Div. 1898), aff'd mem., 60 N.E.
1115 (N.Y. 1901).
58. Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150 (11. 1928); Wallace v. Northern Ohio Traction &
Light Co., 13.N.E.2d 139 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937); see Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co., 165 A. 205
(Conn. 1933).
59. On this principle, see, e.g., JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 8-9, 23-26 (1956); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Con-
tract, 18 YALE LJ. 454, 461 (1909).
The period in which the employer-property view of plans emerged was also the period in which
courts were regularly invalidating legislation concerned with the terms and conditions of employ-
ment, essentially on grounds of a preference for laissez faire economic policy. See, e.g., Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Pound, supra; Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract. 6 COR-
NELL L.J. 365 (1921). In fact, the principle that employers should be free to do as they wish with
their plans is but one aspect of the laissez faire attitude so influential in judicial lawmaking of the
time.
It is interesting to note that, around the time systematic pension plans were developing and
courts were permitting employers to do with them much as they wished, courts were also begin-
ning to accept the principle that the employment relationship was presumptively terminable at
will. This development, too, was rooted in the attitude that employers should have maximum free-
dom from interference with the conduct of their business affairs. See Jay M. Feinman, The Devel-
opment of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); Finkin, supra note
27; Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 NC. L. REv. 631
(1988). We shall occasionally point out parallels between judicial approaches to pre-ERISA em-
ployee rights in pension plans and the contemporary "implied contract" or "employee handbook"
exception to the employment-at-will rule.
60. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Butler, 86 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
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reason that the conventional history of pension plan law focuses on a supposed
evolution from gift to contract. It is true that some courts, accepting the view
of plans as employer property, purported to justify their refusal to enforce
pension claims by accepting the characterization of the pension as a gift. 6' It is
also true that still other courts, again accepting the view of plans as employer
property, purported to characterize the pension relation between the employer
and employee as a contractual relation, albeit one of a "peculiar na-
ture" 6 2-"peculiar" because the employer unilaterally selected the terms of
the supposed contract, could change its terms at will, and was the arbiter of all
disputes arising under its terms; and because the supposed contract frequently
specified that the employee had no legal rights in the contract's subject mat-
ter.6 3 And it is also true that use of contract terminology became more preva-
lent over time (although it never completely replaced the gratuity terminol-
ogy). But the labels "gift" and "contract" were simply after-the-fact
rationalizations, used to justify in comfortable jargon the prior policy determi-
nation not to allow employees to pursue claims for pensions under a plan.
The labels "gift" and "contract" were inappropriate to characterize the
practice of offering and granting pensions through plans. This is self-evident
for the "gift" characterization. To call pensions "gratuities" is to ignore their
context. Plan-based pensions are offered and granted on a systematic basis
through a permanent, carefully detailed, and methodically administered pro-
gram that is intended to serve the employer's business goals. They are gener-
ally made available to an indefinite number of people for an indefinite period.
It hardly makes sense to characterize something of this kind as legally indis-
tinguishable from a birthday present. It is not surprising that the "gratuity"
metaphor for pensions, although it long flourished in New York, never became
the predominant way for courts to talk about pensions.
Yet the alternative "contract" metaphor was just as inappropriate. The
scope of the legal category of contract"' is determined by the concerns of con-
61. See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944); In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 49
F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Mo. 1943); Fickling v. Pollard, 179 S.E. 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935); Hughes v.
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 117 N.E.2d 880 (I11. App. Ct. 1954); Stewart v. Wisconsin Steel
Co., 210 S.W. 479 (Ky. 1919) (death benefit plan); Molumby v. Shapleigh Hardware Co., 395
S.W.2d 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Dolge v. Dolge, 75 N.Y.S. 386 (App. Div. 1902); McNevin v.
Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 386 (App. Div. 1898), aff'd mem., 63 N.E. I115 (N.Y. 1901);
Spiner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (death benefit and
disability plan).
62. Clark v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 N.E. 348, 350 (Mass. 1918).
63. Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150 (i11. 1928); Twiss v. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co., 287
N.W. 620 (Neb. 1939); Fernekes v. CMP Indus., 195 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 1963); Wallace v.
Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 13 N.E.2d 139 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937); Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Butler, 86 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); see 2 LATIMER, supra note 24, at 696.
64. It is extremely important that the reader not misunderstand what kind of statement we are
making when we say that the contract metaphor is inappropriate. Legal literature abounds with
debates over whether various institutions, entities, and things are contracts (or contractual). Prob-
ably the most vigorous such debate concerns the nature of the corporation. See, e.g., Victor Brud-
ney, Corporate Governance. Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
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tract law, and contract law is primarily concerned with business transactions."5
The prevailing legal theory in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
(and still an important theory today) was that contracts were the atoms of
legal and economic activity and were freely entered into by the parties for
mutual self-advantage. The law of contract was seen as "roughly coextensive
with the free market [and the] parties could be treated as individual economic
units which, in theory, enjoyed complete mobility and freedom of decision."6"
1403 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416 (1989); Thomas L. Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (And Market) Failure,
and Moral Values, 69 NC. L. REV. 273 (1991). Yet there are many others. Compare, e.g., Rich-
ard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (treating at-
will employment as a contractual relationship) with Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At Will
Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323
(1986) (arguing that a new legal framework is needed to deal with the employment relationship).
In these debates one can identify at least three distinct meanings to the proposition "X is a
contract." One meaning is that, for purposes of economic modeling and analysis, X is of such
character that it may be treated as a contract. For example, some recent economic studies treat
the employment relationship as if it were governed by implicit bargains between employer and
employees, rather than by impersonal market forces alone. See, e.g., Costas Azariadis, Implicit
Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria, 83 J. POL. ECON. 1183 (1975); Sherwin Rosen, Im-
plicit Contracts: A Survey, 23 J. ECON. LIT. 1144 (1985); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Coming of Age in the Corporate Law Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Pat-
terns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 569, 579 (1989). A second meaning of "X is a contract" is that X is
a form of private ordering of the kind that (at least from a libertarian perspective) ought to be left
substantially unregulated by government. Most of the debate over whether a corporation is con-
tractual relies on this meaning. Finally, "X is a contract" may mean that X is so much like things
governed primarily by contract law that it, too, ought to be governed primarily by contract law.
The three meanings of "X is a contract" are related. For example, many who argue that corpo-
rations ought to be substantially unregulated (second meaning) rely, in part, on economic charac-
teristics of corporations (first meaning). See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting
Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990);
Fred S. McChesney, Contractarianism Without Contracts? Yet Another Critique of Eisenberg, 90
COLUM. L. REV, 1332 (1990). However, the meanings must ultimately be kept distinct, since they
are concerned with different kinds of questions to be answered by different methods of analysis.
The first meaning is concerned with empirical fact and economic modeling, the second with politi-
cal and philosophical theory, and the third with categories of legal rules.
Our concern in this article is with "X is a contract" in its third sense. When we say that the
contract metaphor for plans is inappropriate, we mean that plans are not the sorts of things that
ought to be governed primarily by the law of contracts. For this reason, we will focus on the
adequacy of contract law as a primary body for the treatment of legal questions concerning plans.
This is not to say that the questions "Can a plan usefully be treated as a contract for purposes of
economics?" and "Should plans be left substantially unregulated?" are not interesting or impor-
tant. Plans have usefully been treated by economists as involving implicit contracts, see, e.g.. IP-
POLITO, supra note 48, and the proper scope of governmental regulation of plans has long been an
important topic of discussion-one that regularly emerges in connection with proposals to amend
ERISA. But to focus on those other meanings would transform this into a completely different
article.
65. E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 576 (1969); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629-630 (1943); lan R. Macneil, The Many Fu-
tures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
66. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE
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The paradigm was the bilateral executory contract, 6 the negotiated deal be-
tween the free economic units. But it is far from clear that a pension plan fits
this paradigm. A pension plan is an arrangement in which one supposed
party-the employer-may dictate the terms unilaterally, and in which there
is no bargaining between it and the other supposed party-the employee or
pension recipient. 6 8 Of course, the carefully detailed plan document may look
like a carefully negotiated contract and sway a court in its choice of legal
analogy. But to confuse a document with the transaction, practice, or thing
that the document reflects is pure fallacy. Putting aside the document reflect-
ing it, a plan does not resemble a negotiated deal.
The obvious response, of course, is that many arrangements other than bi-
lateral executory contracts do fall within the category of "contracts" and have
been found to be governed quite well by contract law. Indeed, plans have often
been characterized as unilateral rather than bilateral contracts. But a mere
change in label does not resolve the question, for the new label still draws a
conclusion about the applicability of contract law that needs to be justified.69
Nonparadigmatic arrangements are categorized as contracts only for good rea-
son. They are properly deemed contracts only when they share with the para-
digm material characteristics that justify application of the principles, policies,
and rules that make up contract law. Those material characteristics include
the limitation of the arrangement to two (or at least a very small number of)
parties; temporal and subject matter limitation of the arrangement to a single,
defined transaction; a commercial context for the arrangement; the exchange
of value between the parties; some degree of bargaining over terms; and some
STUDY 20-21 (1965); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860 ch. 6 (1977); HURST, supra note 59, at 11-14.
67. P.J. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 11-13 (1986); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 293-94 (1881).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54; cf Arthur A. Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U.
L. REV. 131 (1970) (arguing that so-called contracts of adhesion may best be considered some-
thing other than contracts for purposes of legal treatment); Rakoff, supra note 45 (so-called con-
tracts of adhesion should not be governed by contract law because generalizations about parties'
interactions that underlie contract law are inapplicable).
The fact that plans are now sometimes established pursuant to the terms of a corporate acquisi-
tion, merger, or other transaction, or pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, does not
affect the point made in the text, for a contract to establish a plan is not the same as the plan
established. In any event, even today, most pension plans are unilaterally established by the em-
ployer. With respect to plans established pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, it also is
worth noting that good reasons exist for considering the collective bargaining agreement as itself
something very different from the paradigmatic bilateral executory contract, and to understand
labor law as something other than a specialized branch of contract law. See, e.g., 6A ARTHUR L.
CORBIN. CONTRACTS § 1420, at 343-44 (1962); ROBERT A. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 540-41 (1976); Archibald Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement,
69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956); David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973); Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor
Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 (1955).
69. See Samuel J. Stoljar, The False Distinction Between Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts,
64 YALE L.J. 515 (1955).
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degree of deliberation by the parties regarding entry into the arrangement.7 0
These characteristics are at best highly attenuated in the case of pension plan
arrangements. Pension plans are temporally open-ended and by no means lim-
ited to what may be considered a single transaction. They involve a potentially
unlimited number of parties-the employer on the one hand, and present and
future employees on the otherY.7 They are not bargained for by those parties.72
And there is no necessary deliberation on the part of the employees and retir-
ees who purportedly enter into the arrangement. 3 The prima facie case for
classifying a plan as a contract thus appears weak.
In the period when courts first began to label plans as contracts, there was
yet a deeper objection. Classical and much of modern contract theory relies on
the presence of an express or implied promise as a necessary condition for the
existence of a contract .7  The Restatement, for example, defines a contract as
"a promise or set of promises . . . the performance of which the law in some
way recognizes as a duty, ' 75 and a promise itself as a "manifestation of inten-
tion to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so as to justify a promisee
in understanding that a commitment has been made."'76 Similarly, Corbin
states that "[t]hat portion of the field of law that is classified as the law of
contracts attempts the realization of reasonable expectations that have been
induced by the making of a promise. '7 7 But as we have seen, among the terms
included in the plan document by the employer were very commonly terms
that expressly limited, even eliminated, employees' and retirees' rights of en-
forcement, as well as terms that manifested the employer's determination not
to promise anything and a determination not to be bound. In this additional
way do plans differ materially from the contract paradigm.
The point made here should not be misunderstood. We have shown that the
characterization of plans as contracts is not persuasive, but it is unlikely one
could ever show the characterization unequivocally to be wrong. Contract law
70. See ATIYAH, supra note 67, at 6-7 (describing the .central characteristics of contract in
classical theory); Leff, supra note 68, at 137-38; Macneil, supra note 65, at 737-41.
71. Cf Brudney, supra note 64, at 1406 (arguing that dispersed stockholders' relationship to
corporation tells against treating corporation as contract). This characteristic has itself led to
other conceptual confusions. "The fact that an indefinite number of persons may qualify for bene-
fits under an 'open-end' pension plan (one prescribing qualifications for future participation and
not yet terminated or suspended) has led some writers and even judges to refer to the trust created
by such a plan as a 'charitable trust.' However, this view is clearly erroneous." EDWIN PATTER-
SON, LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PENSION EXPECTATIONS 45 (1960).
72. Cf Hazen, supra note 64, at 299-301 (reviewing objections to contract treatment of corpo-
rations based on shareholders' lack of bargaining and consent).
73. To be sure, some persons may carefully consider the terms of a plan before accepting em-
ployment where the plan is offered. But this does not contradict the point made in the text.
74. See I CORIN, supra note 68, §§ 1, 193; CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981);
Farnsworth, supra note 65.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
76. Id. § 2.
77. 1 CORBIN, supra note 68, § 1.
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is an evolving body of doctrine.78 Modern law has relaxed the strictures of
classical theory, and the meanings of "contract" and "contract law" have
changed from what they were under classical doctrine. No doubt some re-
cently developed principles of what is now called "contract law"-promissory
estoppel, unconscionability, and the implied covenant of good faith, for exam-
pie-could be adapted to plans so as to give employee benefit expectations
more of the protection we now think they deserve.79 But even so, the basic
question still remains: All things considered, is it worthwhile to consider the
law governing enforcement of plan-based expectations a part of contract law?
In the next section of this Article, we shall examine the historical results of
trying to subject pension plans to the regime of contract law and see why the
answer is "no."
A simple example, though, may suggest how far the concept of "contract
law" would have to be stretched to yield the results that common sense would
want pension plan law to reach. Consider two similarly situated employees of a
given company. They join the company on the same day, hold identical jobs at
all times, and retire on the same day. Suppose, though, that one employee
learned of the company's pension plan and its terms at the time he was hired
and remained with the company expecting to receive a pension, while the other
never learned of the plan until he was pleasantly surprised to receive his first
benefit check. A contract analysis would examine the respective promises and
representations made to the employees, the employees' respective expectations
about pensions, and other individualized factors, and would probably conclude
that the first but not the second employee has an enforceable contractual right
to his pension.80 Yet one's intuition, and the approach of benefit plan law, is
that both employees should have enforceable pension rights.
"Gift" and "contract" thus are doubtful metaphors because they disregard
fundamental characteristics of plans. The question they purport to resolve is
that of employee entitlement to pensions that the employer, through the plan,
had led employees to believe they might receive. But by labelling pensions
"gifts" or plans "contracts," courts permitted themselves to consider only the
relations between employer and individual employees in isolation. The trouble
with this approach is that plans are relationships with the workforce as a
whole or with substantial parts of it. The expectations on which pension
claims are based do not arise from an individualized relationship between each
employee and the employer, or from anything the employer specifically said to
78. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
79. In fact, a recent article suggests, as the new step in the evolution of contract law, the
principle that "[a] promise is enforceable when made in furtherance of an economic activity."
Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the
"Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 930 (1985). This principle is similar (although
not identical) to the one we urge below as a rationale for protecting plan-based expectations of
benefits.
80. Cf Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts. 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 579-83 (1983)
(attempting to justify contract-based enforcement as to both employees, but concluding that "the
promise principle [must be] supplemented by notions of equity and administrative convenience").
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the employee. Rather they arise systematically, and not necessarily in the
same way for each employee, through the pension-and-retirement program of
the employer. Plans are group oriented, and the plan, as source of the genera-
lized expectations, is the source of the pension-entitlement problem. Yet to
solve the problem, courts taking the proprietary perspective simply disregarded
this group-oriented, expectation-inducing character of plans. 8'
Courts may well have suspected that their theories were badly flawed, be-
cause it is doubtful that any court completely embraced either the proprietary
theory or the view that employees had only such rights concerning pensions as
the employer from time to time was willing to allow. To the contrary, from the
very earliest cases dealing with pension rights courts unquestioningly accepted
the rules that proof of bad faith on the part of the employer might vitiate a
decision to deny a pension, 2 and that an employee might have an equitable
claim against an employer who was wasting a pension fund."' These proposi-
tions, with their recognition of some employee rights in plans, were inconsis-
tent with the proprietary theory and its attendant gift and contract metaphors.
No court ever tried to explain or justify these latter propositions. No court
even suggested that they needed explanation or justification. They were just
additional, albeit inconsistent, axioms to be applied in any given case. Yet they
constitute the only way in which many courts were willing give the plan a role
in the determination of employer-employee relations concerning pensions. For
these courts, if the employer used the plan abusively, the plan had legal signif-
icance. But otherwise, for purposes of analyzing employee rights to pensions,
the plan might as well not exist.
B. The Plan as a Source of Employee Expectations
Yet the plan did not have to be treated only as if it were employer property.
8 1. A contemporary parallel to the problem of employee rights under pension plans is the prob-
lem of employee rights under the employment "plan" announced in an employee handbook. An
especially important issue in that area is the right of employees to job security, or to security from
arbitrary termination, based on retention and dismissal policies as stated in the handbook. Increas-
ingly, courts have been willing to deem the policies set out in the handbook as terms "incorpo-
rated" into the employment contract. See, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley Community Hosp., 688 P.2d
170 (Ariz. 1984); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich.
1980). This approach raises the same objection as does the view of pension plans as contracts.
Some courts, however, have been careful to note that the relationship between employer and em-
ployees to which the manuals give rise, even if contractual in some respects, needs to be distin-
guished from the individual employment contract relationship. Those courts also note that con-
tract doctrines hostile to the enforcement of the terms of such manuals ought not to be applied.
See. e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J.), modified, 499 A.2d 515
(N.J. 1985),
82. Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944); Clark v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
118 N.E. 348, 350 (Mass. 1918); Wallace v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 13 N.E.2d 139
(Ohio Ct. App. 1937); Dowling v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 85 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Butler, 86 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
83. McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 100 (App. Div. 1898), aff'd mem., 63 N.E.
1115 (N.Y. 1901).
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It could instead, or in addition, be treated as a source of employee expecta-
tions about the pensions to be granted. This approach potentially had far-
reaching consequences.
1. How Plans Constitute Sources of Employee Expectations
To begin, we need to understand more fully what it means to treat plans as
sources of employee expectations about pensions.
We have seen that one of the features of a pension plan that made it so
valuable to employers was its capacity to induce employees to join the enter-
prise, work loyally, and remain long term. How does this inducement work?
Not simply through the occasional grant of pensions. Rather, the plan induces
through the prospect of a pension; a prospect that is systematically held out to
the workforce by promises, representations, overt employer conduct, consistent
practice, or otherwise. These promises, representations, or courses of conduct
create expectations about pensions, expectations that motivate the workers to
behave in desired ways. A plan, by its very nature, must be something commu-
nicated to the workers whose conduct it is intended to affect.84 A secret pen-
sion plan would be self-contradictory, as it could not be used as a tool to at-
tract and retain an efficient workforce.8 5
The expectation-creating character of pension plans, then, is an essential
characteristic. Indeed, because plans are established as employer programs for
industrial efficiency rather than as programs for the benefit of employees, this
expectation-creating character of plans arguably is more fundamental than the
obvious one of conferring pensions. It is conceivable that a plan could create
84. As one book written mainly for business executives advised:
It would appear that an employer should endeavor to create and maintain em-
ployee interest, understanding and appreciation of his entire benefit program by the
means best adapted to his organization. If such a course is not pursued, particularly
in connection with a retirement plan, that plan will fail in the same degree to exert
its possible beneficial influence upon employee morale and efficiency.
STRONG, supra note 49, at 124.
85. It is not surprising that no court ever had to deal with the issue of employee rights in a
secret pension plan. The closest approach is Molumby v. Shapleigh Hardware Co., 395 S.W.2d
221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). In that case, an employer sold the assets of its business and dismissed
all its employees. Afterwards, some of the employees discovered that the employer had, years
before, taken steps to establish a pension plan. A plan and trust agreement had been executed, a
trustee had been engaged, and contributions had been made for several years. However, no com-
mittee had been appointed to administer the plan, no notice of the plan had been given to employ-
ees, no qualification letter had been sought from the Internal Revenue Service, no pensions had
been paid, and, eventually, the employer stopped making contributions. The court held, under an
employer property analysis, that the employees had no rights under the plan. The court also sug-
gested that, as a matter of law, an undisclosed plan could not be enforced, but the undisclosed
character of the plan in question made no material difference to the outcome or analysis.
The conclusion reached by the court in Molumby seems right, but a sounder basis for the result
would be that no plan was established by the employer, that the record showed only preliminary
and incomplete steps to establish one. Cf Rose City Transit Co. v. City of Portland, 525 P.2d
1325, 1348-50 (Or. Ct. App. 1974), modified, 533 P.2d 339 (Or. 1975) (stating that evidence
failed to establish that pensions paid pursuant to Board resolution were paid pursuant to a plan).
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expectations about pensions, yet never grant one. But a plan would not, and
probably could not, grant pensions without leading employees to expect that
they might some day receive one.
2. The Potential Impact on the Legal Treatment of Pensions
The treatment of plans as systematic generators of pension expectations
makes a great deal of difference for the legal treatment of pensions and of
employee rights to them. Consider the employee expectations created by a
plan. Expectations, if reasonable (and, especially, if acted upon), may well be
enforceable, and disappointed reasonable expectations, if unjustifiably disap-
pointed, may well be remediable.86 This principle is fundamental to law.
To be sure, not all expectations, and certainly not all expectations created in
connection with the employment relationship, are proper subjects of enforce-
ment through the legal process. 87 Principles of fairness, principles of justice, or
considerations of social policy must be called on to legitimate enforcement of
expectations of a given type and to make them reasonable. But because the
expectations with respect to pensions are created systematically, deliberately,
and for the benefit of the employer, and because they are designed to induce,
and very often succeed in inducing, long-term reliance, the considerations mili-
tating in favor of enforcement are extraordinarily strong.88
Thus, recognition that pension plans are essentially mechanisms for em-
ployee inducement and sources of employee expectations makes possible the
treatment of pensions held out through the plan as something to which em-
ployees may have enforceable rights. To help frame principles for the enforce-
ment of pension expectations and for the remedy of their disappointment, a
number of established bodies of law could be drawn on, even if only by anal-
ogy: trust law, property law, bilateral contract law, equitable estoppel and
promissory estoppel, law of misrepresentation, and law of unfair competition,
86. See generally ATIYAH, supra note 67, ch. 2; 1 CORBIN, supra note 68, § I; L.L. Fuller &
William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-
37) (pts. I & 2); C. Kaufman, The Scientific Method In Legal Thought: Legal Realism And The
Fourteen Principles Of Justice, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 77, 89-93 (1980).
87. See Joseph R. Weeks, Continuing Liability Under Expired Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments (pt. 1), 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. I, 182-83 (1990).
88. Compare the recent explanation given by a court to justify enforcing employee expectations
of job security:
While an employer need not establish personnel policies or practices, where an em-
ployer chooses to establish such policies and practices and makes them known to its
employees, the employment relationship is presumably enhanced. The employer
secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of
mind associated with job security and the conviction that he will be treated
fairly. . . . It is enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to
create an environment in which the employee believes that, whatever the personnel
policies and practices, they are established and official at any given time, purport to
be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to each employee.
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980).
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to name a few. 89 The law is replete with experience in implementing the fun-
damental goal of protecting expectations.
And so recognizing the plan as a source of employee expectations, and rec-
ognizing that there may be enforceable pension rights, demands rejection of a
strict proprietary view of plans as unrealistic. As one court explained in re-
jecting an argument based on a proprietary approach to plans:
It is argued at considerable length by the (employer] that the profit-shar-
ing plan ...was initiated by means of the passage of a by-law, and that
by-laws are made for the internal government and regulation of the corpora-
tion and its stockholders, and that third parties can assert no rights thereun-
der. .... If corporations desire to have their so-called "by-laws" affect only
the corporation and its shareholders, then they should refrain from exploit-
ing them to third persons, for the purpose of inducing such persons to act in
reliance thereon. 90
This is not to say, however, that courts would have to forgo all recognition
of a proprietary interest on the part of employers in the plans they set up.
Employers do establish, maintain, and fund plans as parts of their businesses,
and their proprietary interests in their own pension plans is an irreducible fea-
ture that the law must take into account. Rather, the conclusion is that any
view of plans that recognizes a proprietary interest on the part of employers
must be tempered by recognition of the intended impact of plans on employee
expectations and employee conduct. As a consequence, the law of pension
plans must be a body of law that properly accommodates both the employer
and employee interests in plans.
3. The Actual Impact on the Legal Treatment of Pensions
Practice, though, did not much conform to theory. Proper accommodation of
employer and employee interests was not achieved, because the tendency to
treat a plan as employer property was so strong that the inducing character of
plans was obscured and the presence of employee expectations disregarded. To
be sure, it was common knowledge that plans were used to induce desirable
worker behavior, but the insight was largely wasted. Courts for the most part
were either unwilling or conceptually unable to enforce pension claims over the
objections of an employer.9"
89. See, e.g., Stein v. National Bank of Commerce, 181 S.W. 1072 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916) (illus-
trating an example where employer admitted that "it was in the position of a trustee"); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766-774A (1979) (describing tort of interference with economic
expectations of another); ATIYAH, supra note 67, ch. 10; HOLMES, supra note 67, at 213; de
Roode, supra note 47, at 288 (suggesting equitable enforcement); Note, Legal Status, supra note
50, at 1378 (arguing that consideration should have been easy to find).
90. Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 137 N.W. 769, 772 (Wis. 1912).
91. Some employers took a pragmatic approach to the problem of employee pension expecta-
tions. One of the earliest plans, that of the Solvay Process Company, was the subject of 25 suits
for benefits by employees within a few years of its initiation. The company chose to terminate the
plan on the ground that "the class of workmen employed at Solvay are not yet ready to appreciate
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Of course some courts were willing, at least in principle, to enforce em-
ployee pension expectations in the face of employer resistance.9" They recog-
nized that a plan was a "daily inducement to continuation of service," 93 and
deemed it unfair, as well as bad policy, to permit employees to be led on for
years, only to have their expectations defeated in the end. As one court
explained:
A retirement program has become a basic part of an employee's remuner-
ation even as his wages are a part thereof ....
Clearly, under our present economic system, an employer cannot offer a
retirement system as an inducement to employment and, after an employee
has accepted employment under such circumstances, withdraw or terminate
the program after an employee has complied with all the conditions entitling
him to retirement rights thereunder."'
But merely because a court realized that the expectation-creating function
of a plan was intrinsic and legally significant, and on that basis admitted the
desirability of protecting employee expectations, it does not follow that the
court would actually be able to protect and enforce those expectations. The
court also had to have a framework within which it could use its insights about
plans and pensions to reach satisfactory results in individual cases.
a scheme of this character." I LATIMER, supra note 24, at 40 (quoting NICHOLAS P. GILMAN, A
DIVIDEND TO LABOR: A STUDY OF EMPLOYERS' WELFARE INSTITUTIONS 287 (1899).
The Solvay Company, though, may not have intended to give up entirely. The pension plan had
not been an isolated program of the company; it was initiated as part of an increasingly compre-
hensive program of welfare capitalism, BRANDES, supra note 37, at 17, that was designed in part
to change unsatisfactory worker attitudes. The company is reported to have stated that "our expe-
rience has been that the boys of our workmen grow up and take positions of various kinds in our
works, and the girls grow up and marry and become the wives, in many cases, of these boys ....
We, therefore, think that if we can train the children in the way that they should go, we will
improve our workmen." Id. at 35.
92. See McLemore v. Western Union Tel. Co., 171 P. 390 (Or. 1918); cf. Stein v. National
Bank of Commerce, 181 S.W. 1072 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916) (illustrating example where employer
admits to enforceability); McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 100 (App. Div. 1898)
(Green, J., dissenting), affd mem., 63 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901). For some cases enforcing pension
or similar claims, see Siegel v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 201 F. Supp. 664, 666 (E.D. Pa.
1961); Hunter v. Sparling, 197 P.2d 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co., 165 A.
205 (Conn. 1933) (death benefit); Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 249 A.2d 866, 868 (Del. 1969);
Psutka v. Michigan Alkali Co., 264 N.W. 385 (Mich. 1936); Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co.,
171 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1960); Mabley & Carew Co. v. Borden, 195 N.E. 697 (Ohio 1935) (death
benefit); Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 11 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937); Wilson v.
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 194 N.E. 441 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934); Schofield v. Zion's Co-op. Mercan-
tile Inst., 39 P.2d 342 (Utah 1934); Gilbert v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 171 S.E. 814 (W. Va. 1933);
Parsley v. Wyoming Automotive Co., 395 P.2d 291, 295 (Wyo. 1964).
93. Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 194 N.E. 441, 443 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934); see Heinz v.
National Bank of Commerce, 237 F. 942, 953 (8th Cir. 1916) (stating that pensions have "a
direct and reasonably necessary bearing upon . . . the class of employee likely to be obtained,
upon the character of the service likely to rendered, and upon the length of such service and the
loyalty of the employee").
94. Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ohio 1960).
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Courts acted on their insights about the expectation-creating character of
plans in two very different ways. One way, the more straightforward, was to
enforce pension claims on the ground that it was good social and labor policy
to do so. The other way, less straightforward, was analogical: it. was to treat
pension claims as matters of contractual entitlement, just as was done under
the employer-property perspective. The former approach was viable, although
not much used; the latter approach, although by far the more common, was an
analytical dead end.
The problems with the latter approach can easily be seen in McLemore v.
Western Union Telegraph Co.,9" the first reported case of judicial enforcement
of a benefit claim over the objections of the employer. In McLemore, the de-
fendant employer had established a comprehensive written plan to provide dis-
ability, retirement, and death benefits for employees and their survivors. The
plaintiff was the widow of an employee who had died while covered by the
plan. The employer had refused to pay the plaintiff any death benefits and in
the lawsuit tried to justify its refusal by reference to the plan document. That
document, like most plan documents, had been carefully drafted to avoid any
express promise of benefits. Under a strict proprietary approach to plans, the
employer's refusal to be bound should have ended the discussion. The court in
McLemore, though, was unreceptive to this approach and rejected the em-
ployer's argument out of hand.
In the court's view, the absence of any express promise of benefits in the
written plan document was of no consequence. The issue to be decided, as
framed by the court, was that of what the parties could reasonably be said to
have agreed to. The court found that the employer, notwithstanding the limi-
tations of the plan document, had offered "[i]n effect" that "[i]f you remain in
the discharge of your duties, those dependent upon you shall be entitled to
benefits in the event of your death, to the extent of the sums specified in this
plan." ' The court also found that the employee had "accepted" the offer and
had given "sufficient consideration to support the defendant's promise to pay"
by remaining in the employer's service. As a matter of elementary contract
law, then, the court concluded that there was an enforceable bargain. The
employer's argument that "the plan is a mere benefaction" was rejected97 in
favor of a view of the plan as a contract evidenced by the plan document.
This step alone would have yielded the plaintiff only those rights contained
in the employer's "offer," an offer subject to employer-imposed restrictions
designed to defeat or limit pension claims. The innovation in the case is that
the court proceeded further, ostensibly to construe the contract but in fact to
disregard one of the main proprietary restrictions imposed by the employer: a
provision limiting the employer's obligation to making payments when "the
committee" so ordered. This provision would have been a fatal bar to plain-
tiff's recovery under the proprietary approach, with its strict enforcement of
95. 171 P. 390 (Or. 1918).
96. Id. at 393. This was the court's inference and not a provision of the plan document.
97. Id. at 392.
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the employer's unilaterally imposed terms, since the committee had not acted
on the plaintiff's claim and had issued no order to the employer. But according
to the court, none of this mattered because the plaintiff's right to a pension
"arises by operation of law" and because the material facts relating to the
claim (which would have been the basis for the committee's order) were not in
dispute." According to the court, once the plaintiff had been found to have a
contractual basis for her claim, the only question for anyone to determine was
whether, based on the undisputed facts, the courts should enforce it." Com-
mittee action, thus, was not needed.
McLemore illustrates how courts willing to enforce pension expectations
needlessly placed obstacles in their own path and in the paths of other courts
that would follow their decisions. Perhaps because of the increasing dominance
of contract law as a fundamental model for all business relations, perhaps be-
cause of confusion about the nature of the plan documents, many courts be-
lieved that their decisions had to be rationalized using the concepts of consid-
eration, offer and acceptance, and other contract formalities and doctrines.
This led to amazing contortions. Even to begin the process of enforcing a pen-
sion claim within the framework of contract, courts had to find a contract by
somehow finding offer, acceptance, and consideration. Yet this alone achieved
very little-indeed, it led to results no different from the proprietary ap-
proach-because the putative contract to be enforced very often contained
terms limiting, even excluding, employee pension rights. Thus, to enforce pen-
sion expectations, courts had to find a way to read those restrictive terms out
of the contract that they had so creatively put together. 00 This is a highly
unnatural mode of legal analysis, and it is inconceivable that a court would
bother with it unless already convinced, on other grounds, that the pension
expectations in question ought to be enforced.
That certainly is what happened in McLemore. It is clear that the court had
antecedently reached a decision to enforce the claim, and that it had done so
based on an unexpressed policy determination that benefit expectations like
those involved in the case should be enforced. That such a policy determina-
tion was the true basis for decision can be seen by comparing the decision with
others in which courts less receptive to enforcing employee expectations
treated the same, or substantially the same, plan document as conferring few
if any enforceable rights to benefits. 10 1 The straightforward approach for the
court in McLemore would have been to acknowledge the policy basis for its
98. Id. at 393.
99. Id.
100. Cf. Kessler, supra note 65, at 633 ("Handicapped by the axiom that courts can only inter-
pret but cannot make contracts for the parties, courts had to rely heavily on their prerogative of
interpretation to protect a policy holder. . . . [M]any courts have shown a remarkable skill in
reaching 'just' decisions by construing ambiguous clauses against the author even in cases where
there was no ambiguity.").
101. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Robertson, 225 S.W. 649 (Ark. 1920); Clark v. New Eng. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 118 N.E. 348 (Mass. 1918); Spiner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934).
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decision and use it as a starting point for developing a body of rules to deal
with benefit expectations and claims. This, though, it felt constrained not to
do.
A few courts that were disposed to enforce pension claims abjured reliance
on contract rationalizations and, to varying degrees, openly rested their deci-
sions on considerations of policy. Their decisions show what the common law
could have achieved. One instructive case is Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer
Co.1 0 2
In Sigman, the employer had instituted a retirement plan for its employees
and had set out the conditions for the grant of pensions in an employee hand-
book. The purpose of the handbook was to encourage employees to loyal ser-
vice. As the booklet urged, "There is something on every page . . . that should
be of vital importance to you, that is, of course, if you desire to become suc-
cessful with the vast amount of opportunities before you."' 3 The court, disap-
provingly, concluded that "the whole effect is to produce a feeling of confi-
dence in the fairness and sincere concern of the company for the welfare of the
employee."''1 "
The plaintiff had worked for the employer for nearly thirty years. He was
dismissed at age fifty-two because his services were no longer wanted. He ap-
peared to have satisfied the plan's years-of-service criteria as stated in the
booklet, yet the employer refused to grant a pension. The basis for refusal was
an apparent limitation on pension grants to those persons no longer able to
work because of old age. The language of the booklet, which used the words
"when old age overtakes you" to describe when pensions might be paid, could
easily be read to support the employer's decision. The court, however, refused
to do so and read the asserted limitation out of the plan.
Ostensibly, the court's approach was like that in McLemore, and it too pur-
ported to base its decision on a principle of contract interpretation. 6 As the
court explained, to adopt the employer's proffered interpretation of the hand-
book would be to impute fraudulent intent to it, a result that the plan docu-
ment should be construed so as to avoid.'06 But this contact-based explanation
102. 11 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937).
103. Id. at 879.
104. Id.
105. It also stated that the plan "constituted a continuing offer . . . which was continuously
accepted by the employees who preserved their status with the company." id. at 878.
106. Other cases relied on a similar principle of interpretation. In Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co.,
165 A. 205, 207-08 (Conn. 1933), the court held that to give effect to a declaration in the plan
document that the plan confers no legal rights "would ascribe to the defendant an intention to
mislead its employees, to its advantage, by an inducement which was known and intended by it to
be entirely nugatory . . . which this record does not require us to attribute to it." Similarly, in
Psutka v. Michigan Alkali Co., 264 N.W. 385, 386 (Mich. 1936), the court held that a provision
in the plan document specifying that the employees had no legal rights was "intended to exclude
claims of inchoate rights under the plan, not to mulct the employees or their dependents of ac-
crued . . . benefits." In Russell v. Princeton Lab., Inc., 231 A.2d 800, 805 (N.J. 1967), the court
purported to apply the principle that "[a] contract should not be read to vest a party or his
nominee with the power virtually to make his promise illusory [especially] when a forfeiture will
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was given almost in passing, and the court ultimately rested its decision on
considerations of fairness to the employee and on a labor relations policy that
militated in favor of enforcing the employee's reasonable expectation of a pen-
sion. As the court explained:
[TIhe particular business carried on by appellant was of such a nature that
mature youth would be at a premium, and . . . the appellee had reached a
point where a younger man would serve the appellant much more satisfacto-
rily. When it becomes apparent that longer employment will be a detriment
to efficient service, and that the alternative is a pension, a discharge is the
most effective severance of the Gordian Knot. While effective and most ser-
viceable to the appellant, it results in a complete abrogation of the security
upon which appellee for twenty-seven and one-half years relied and had a
right to rely.
The appellant has made its election. It has concluded that he has reached
the point of industrial old age. It is to its interest to discontinue the payment
of the full wage. The employee must bow to the appellant's opinion and
edict. He, however, cannot be in good faith and justice denied the alterna-
tive held out as an inducement, for more than a quarter of a century, to
continue service with the appellant.10 7
Such a forthright approach to pension claim enforcement was uncommon.
Yet had more courts adopted it, and dispensed with contract-oriented rational-
izations, they might have developed a principled and coherent body of common
law rules for determining when plan-based expectations of receiving a pension
could be judicially enforced. 10 8 But this did not come to pass. Instead, courts
that were receptive to employee pension claims increasingly took the contract-
oriented approach suggested by McLemore but, in a crucial wrong turn, lost
sight of what the contract framework was rationalizing. Those courts took the
inquiry into offer, acceptance, and consideration more and more seriously and,
in the end, came to believe that the contract principles they were repeat-
ing-which were only a rationalization for results reached on other
follow," and so refused to defer to the plan committee's decision to deny a pension. The court, in
fact, demanded that the plan be read so as to avoid a "forfeiture of something [the employee] has
earned" if "any tenable view" would permit it. Id. at 803; see also Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer
Co., 194 N.E. 441, 443 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934) (construing plan so as to avoid "conclusion that the
[employer] was guilty of gross fraud and deceit").
107. Sigman, II N.E.2d at 880.
108. As noted, established doctrines for enforcing expectations could have been drawn on, but a
new area of law still would have to have been developed. Pension expectations are materially
different from the expectations dealt with by the other bodies of law. Pension expectations are
created impersonally in a large and changing group of persons. They are created through a sys-
tematic program that seeks to achieve business advantage from the creation of such expectations.
The expectations relate to something economically vital to the affected employee. And the expec-
tations relate to something to be provided many years later. Properly taking into account those
features would require development of new doctrines and rules specially adopted to the plan
relationship.
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grounds-were actually the complete legal explanation for those results.10 9
This confusion greatly interfered with the development of a workable plan
common law.110
The question addressed in McLemore was the genuine problem of whether
and when expectations of benefits under a plan should be enforced. But as the
contract approach to pension claims came to be applied mechanically, courts
were diverted to a very different question: that of when the employer's words
concerning pensions should be enforced. The trouble with changing the basic
issue in this way-and the reason it is a change in basic issue-is that expec-
tations of the employees might be at variance with the employer's words. This
surely could be the case (as it was in McLemore) where the employer had
drafted the plan document to try to eliminate employee rights by, for example,
stating that the employees have no rights or reserving to the employer substan-
tial discretion over whether to grant a pension. In such cases, as the experience
with the proprietary approach demonstrates, contract doctrine would be of lit-
tle use for enforcing reasonable expectations at variance with the document.
McLemore itself shows that some other set of principles would be needed to
help contract analysis reach the proper result; yet, because judicial attention
had been diverted to the supposed contract issues in pension claims, no such
body of principles ever was developed.
109. Cf Kessler, supra note 65, at 637-39 (discussing use of contract concepts to rationalize
decisions involving contracts of adhesion and thereby obscure principles on which determinations
actually were based).
110. A rare pre-ERISA effort to address explicitly the legal problems created by plan-created
expectations is PATTERSON, supra note 71. The author explains:
We are concerned here with the expectations reasonably created in the minds of
employees (and their prospective dependents) by the terms of private pension plans
and, to some extent, the expectations aroused by communications, from employers to
employees, regarding the favorable aspects of pension plans. Such expectations are
coming to play an important role in employer-employee relations. Many employers
have been motivated to establish pension plans by the belief that such a plan would
reduce labor turnover. Many young men, in the white-collar group at least, as they
inquire of employers about opportunities for employment, ask about the employer's
plan. Labor unions are becoming increasingly concerned with the inclusion of pension
agreements in the collective bargain. The expectations created by pension plans con-
tinue throughout the period of employment. Most employees probably do not fully
understand the security behind these pension expectations. Yet if after many years
the employee who reaches the prescribed retiring age finds that the expectations of
thirty years or more will not or cannot be substantially fulfilled, the bitterness of his
disappointment will be lessened only by the extent to which his social security benefits
and other resources are sufficient to keep him from starvation. Whether or not he
thinks about it, every employee covered by a private pension plan has an interest in
the security of anticipated benefit rights under the plan.
Id. at 4-5. Yet even this writer often lapsed into the habit of treating plans as contracts and
drawing conclusions on the basis of that treatment. See, e.g., id. at 63 (stating that "[tihe princi-
ple that contracts must be enforced as written is still a basic one and seems a sufficient justifica-
tion for the decisions [refusing to disregard the vesting terms of a plan in cases of employee
discharge]"); id. at 74 (stating that "[mlost of the legal duties arising out of pension plans and
their operation are contractual").
1992] 607
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Instead, mechanical, contract-based approaches to pension claims prolifer-
ated. Courts became obsessed with rules for plan-contract formation, in partic-
ular with rules for finding consideration, offer, and acceptance. To most
courts, the answer to the supposedly central question of when the employer's
words might be enforced"' was similar to that reached in McLemore: the em-
ployee's continuation in employment with knowledge of the plan served as con-
sideration binding the employer; it also served as acceptance of the employer's
offer."1 Other courts took a slightly different approach and deemed considera-
tion to have been given and the employer bound only when the employee had
completely fulfilled the required term of service and any other precondi-
tions."' For still other courts, the employer was bound only when the commit-
tee that administered the plan had expressly determined that benefits were to
be paid."'
And so, unfortunately for employee rights, the perspective on plans as
sources of employee expectations was diverted by reliance on contract formal-
ism to yield much the same result as did the view of plans as employer prop-
erty. The practical difference between the employer-property and expectation-
creation perspectives on plans narrowed greatly. "Contract" came to be the
preferred metaphor to characterize the pension relationship. Regardless of
whether the court emphasized the character of the plan as employer property
or as a source of employee expectations, the contract was a "peculiar" one and
the rights created remained limited to whatever the employer decided they
should be." 5 To choose contract formalism as a vehicle for enforcement of
S111. "The central issue is whether or not consideration can be found for the employer's promise
of a pension plan." Comment, Consideration, supra note 50, at 96-97. For a thorough review of
the wooden rules that were developed to handle the issue, see generally Note, Legal Problems of
Private Pension Plans, 70 HARV. L. REv. 490 (1957).
112. "Pension plans are offers ... to employees as an incentive to continuing better service and
loyalty. The offer is accepted by the employee remaining in the employment, which is sufficient
consideration to support the employer's promise to pay benefits." Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp.,
249 A.2d 866, 868 (Del. 1969); see also, e.g., Hunter v. Sparling, 197 P.2d 807, 814 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1948); Jacoby v. Grays Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 468 P.2d 666, 669 (Wash. 1970).
113. E.g., Hardy v. H.K. Porter Co., 417 F. Supp. 1175, 1183 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Wallace v.
Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 13 N.E.2d 139, 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1939).
114. E.g., Schofield v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 39 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1934).
115. "Whatever rights were acquired by the pensioners ... were acquired under the (written]
rules." Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150, 154 (111. 1928); see also Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 136 F. Supp. 125, 144 (N.D. III. 1955), affid, 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
918 (1956) (stating that plaintiffs had "not an irrevocable right to a specific sum of money, but a
right to receive a pension determined in accordance with the provisions of the Plan"); Hughes v.
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 117 N.E.2d 880, 882 (111. App. Ct. 1954) (stating that if plan were
treated as a contract, "it [would be] unenforceable by its express terms"); Molburg v. Hunter
Hosiery, Inc., 158 A.2d 288, 289 (N.H. 1960) (stating that plaintiff could not " 'extricate himself
from the conditions of employment'...." (quoting Muir v. Leonard Refrigerator Co., 257 N.W.
723, 724 (Mich. 1934))); Bailey v. Rockwell Spring & Axle Co., 175 N.Y.S.2d 104, 106 (Sup.
Ct. 1958) (noting that even if plaintiffs continued in service in reliance on benefits provided for in
plan, "their rights must be determined by the provisions of the plan"; no obligation to continue
plaintiffs' employment until benefit vested); cf. Evo v. Jomac, Inc., 289 A.2d 551 (1972) (stating
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employee pension expectations in effect revised the principle that reasonable
employee expectations should be enforced by adding a corollary rule that no
expectation of a pension was reasonable unless it was consistent with the writ-
ten terms of the plan. " 6 As one court explained, in rejecting a claim for bene-
fits by employees who were terminated before vesting:
The appellants urge upon us certain equitable considerations, as, for ex-
ample, their reliance upon the plan, and contend that a court of equity
should fashion a remedy to prevent the injustice which it is claimed will
result if they are denied participation in the fund. But, as the court below
stated, there is no justification for a court "to twist the Plan into something
it clearly is not." Whatever reliance the appellants may have placed upon
their expectation of future pension rights, the terms of the plan clearly indi-
cate that all interest in the pension fund ceases when the employment rela-
tionship is severed."'
Thus was the pre-ERISA law of plans institutionally incapable of protecting
pension expectations on any but an ad hoc basis.
4. The Failure of the Contract Approach
The contract approach to protecting employee pension expectations did not
work because plans are materially different from contracts. The expectations
to be protected and enforced do not (as they would in the case of an individual
contract for a pension) derive from individualized employer-employee dealings
and do not necessarily arise from employer promises. Rather they derive from
the plan, from the ongoing and systematized activities of the employer for
dealing with pensions and retirement. The rationale for enforcement has noth-
ing to do with the various economic and political theories about promising that
underlie the doctrines of consideration, offer, and acceptance. Instead, the ra-
tionale lies in the self-serving and systematic character of the process of creat-
ing expectations. The contract metaphor obscures the true character and
source of pension expectations by focusing attention on a supposedly contract-
like plan document-which the employees most likely never see-and on the
fictional acceptance of it and the discovery of consideration. The contract ap-
proach is simply beside the point.
As the contract mode of treatment became prevalent, the plan document
that employer could have reserved unlimited right to amend plan so as to impose forfeiture but
failed to do so).
116. See, e.g., Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150 (I11. 928) (stating that since the promise
of a pension from a fund does not impose obligation of employer to contribute money sufficient for
fund to satisfy promises, employees had no rights other than what was contained in the written
plan document); Wallace v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 13 N.E.2d 139, 143 (Ohio
1937) (noting that although "[e]ach employee of the company knew that the inducement to con-
tinued service was a pension," he should have considered the possibility of the "general abandon-
ment of the plan").
117. Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1958) (citation
omitted).
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came to be confused with the plan. The plan came simply to be treated as a
standardized contract, " 8 and courts often framed the issue to be decided as
that of whether there had been an offer of a pension plan and the acceptance
of it by the individual plaintiff or plaintiffs.11 9 In the end, the legal treatment
of rights under pension plans came to be little different from what it would be
if courts had been dealing with an employer's use of preprinted forms in pen-
sion transactions with respective individual employees.
And so reliance on the contract perspective ultimately drove out of law the
basic and necessary insight about the purpose and effect of plans. The only
vestige of the systematic, group-oriented character of the plan was the uni-
formity in the schedule of benefits, conditions of eligibility, and other supposed
contract terms offered to the respective employees. What was lost by conflat-
ing the plan with a contract-indeed by conflating it with a standardized con-
tract-was the opportunity to develop a principled approach to enforcing pen-
sion expectations, created systematically by a plan, at variance with the self-
serving terms of the plan document. By conflating plans with contracts, the
plan was transformed from a source of expectations into a source of terms,
into little more than a form contract of adhesion fictitiously "offered" sepa-
rately to each employee.
C. Pensions as Deferred Compensation
In the period after about 1950, courts increasingly used "deferred compen-
sation" and substantially equivalent phrases to characterize pensions. Since
this notion plays a role in pension plan law and policymaking today, it is im-
portant to understand what it meant and what problems it purported to
resolve.
Surprisingly, in the pre-ERISA common law of private pension plans, the
notion of pensions as deferred compensation resolved no problems and meant
very little. One reason is that, before ERISA, there never emerged a clear and
unequivocal meaning for the notion. The idea of private pensions as deferred
compensation remained inchoate. It also had at least five largely independent
sources, none of which had anything to do with the key issue of pension plan
law, namely employee entitlement to plan-based pensions.
Another reason for the limited value of the concept is that it was incompati-
ble with the prevailing, contract-based way of reasoning about plans. As a
result, despite the frequency of references to pensions as deferred compensa-
tion, the concept was empty and contributed little to the development of pre-
118. See, e.g., Siegel v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 201 F. Supp. 664, 667-68 (E.D. Pa.
1961); Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 249 A.2d 866, 868 (Del. 1969).
119. E.g., Delaware Trust Co. v. Delaware Trust Co., 222 A.2d 320 (Del. Ch. 1966); Dolan v.
Heller Bros. Co., 104 A.2d 860, 863 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1954); Comment, Consideration,
supra note 50. A further consequence was the blurring of any distinction between the law of
pension plans and the law of individual pension contracts. See, e.g., Murrell v. Elder-Beerman
Stores Corp., 239 N.E.2d 248, 255 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1968) (applying pension plan concepts to exec-
utive pension contract).
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ERISA plan common law.
1. The Sources of the Notion that Private Pensions Are Deferred
Compensation
Let us examine the five sources for the notion of private pensions as deferred
compensation.
One was the law of public pensions. Many state constitutions prohibited
payment of public money for services not rendered. To uphold pension systems
for public employees, courts often had to find that their state constitutional
prohibitions were not violated.120 Many of the courts that faced the issue up-
held the validity of challenged public pension systems, reasoning that pension
annuities granted under them were deferred compensation for services ren-
dered and thus not gratuitous.121 This form of treatment of public pensions
had no obvious relevance to any issue concerning private pensions. Nonethe-
less, some courts relied on these public pension cases as authority for consider-
ing private pensions to be forms of deferred compensation. 22
A second source for the treatment of pensions as deferred compensation was
corporation law. Shareholders sometimes challenged corporate pension or
profit-sharing plans on the ground that the grants of benefits involved were
ultra vires or waste of corporate assets . 2 3 Generally, challenges of this sort
were raised to executive compensation plans, which were very generous, rather
than to retirement plans for hourly or mid-level employees. The judicial re-
sponse to such challenges was similar to the judicial response to attacks on
public pension plans: The pensions or other benefits were deemed deferred
compensation. They were then tested for validity under the rule of corporation
law that executive compensation must bear a reasonable relation to the ser-
vices rendered. Usually, application of the principle led to a finding of valid-
ity; 24 occasionally it did not.' 25
A third source was social and economic literature dealing with labor rela-
120. See Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1947).
121. E.g., Greene v. Gray, 87 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. 1956); People ex rel. Kroner v. Abbott, 113
N.E. 696, 698 (I11. 1916); Bowler v. Nagel, 200 N.W. 258, 260 (Mich. 1924); Bergerman v.
Murphy, 105 N.Y.S.2d 642, 646 (App. Div. 1951), affid, 103 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. 1952); Byrd v.
City of Dallas, 6 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. 1928); Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 108 P.2d 348, 350
(Wash. 1940).
122. E.g., Hadden v. Consolidated Edison Co., 312 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1974); Jacoby v. Grays
Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 468 P.2d 666, 669 (Wash. 1970).
123. A hybrid between the public pension cases and the corporation law cases is Ledwith v.
Bankers Life Ins. Co., 54 N.W.2d 409 (Neb. 1952). Drawing upon public pension cases and
federal labor law cases (described below), the court there characterized an insurance company's
retirement plan as one providing a form of "contingent deferred compensation," id. at 417, so as
to find the plan authorized by state insurance law.
124. Nemser v. Aviation Corp., 47 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (D. Del. 1942); Lieberman v. Becker,
155 A.2d 596 (Del. Ch. 1959).
125. Berkewitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 88-94 (N.D. Ohio 1958); cf Fogelson v. Ameri-
can Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948) (remanding case for trial on issue of whether
president's pension under plan would be excessive).
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tions and the economic condition of the elderly. The literature was vast and
varied. One leading example is an article, Pensions as Wages,12 that appeared
in the American Economic Review for 1913. The article analyzed the implica-
tions of the view of systematically granted private pensions as "part of the real
wages of an employee . . . in the foregoing of an increase in wages which he
might obtain except for the establishment of a pension system. ' 127 The article
urged changes in the structure of both public and private pension systems that
would take into account their deferred compensation character. After empha-
sizing that employees had little if any contractual protection for the deferred
portion of their compensation, 12 and explaining why such a state of affairs
had socially and politically deleterious consequences, the author argued for
changes in the funding of plans and in the entitlement of employees to the
accrued value of their "deferred compensation" upon departure from
employment.129
Other social commentators, too, relied on a model of the pension as a de-
ferred wage in order to deal with problems of old-age dependency or condi-
tions of employment. Louis Brandeis, for example, relied on the premise that a
pension "is in substance part of the wage" to urge general adoption of
mandatory, partially contributory private pension programs.130 Labor organi-
zations, on the other hand, while also considering pensions to be deferred
wages, on this ground long opposed private pension plans as tending to depress
current wage scales.1 31
These policy concerns do appear to have worked their way into judicial con-
sciousness. However, as we have seen, courts were not concerned with the so-
cial problems addressed or with the use of private pension plans to solve them.
Thus, those writings had little direct impact on the development of private
126. de Roode, supra note 47.
127. de Roode, supra note 47, at 287.
128. The author explained:
It seems to me on the whole that most of the pension systems adopted by private
employers are merely very shrewd bits of wage bargaining. The absence of any con-
tractual right and the lack of assurance that a pension will be paid upon fulfilling the
conditions, give merely the shadow of provision for old age and not the substance.
Id. at 290-91.
129. The author further explained:
Considering pensions as wages ...it seems that a sound pension plan should be
developed on the following principles:
(1) Pay the sums necessary to maintain the pension fund over and above the pre-
sent scale of wages of its employees.
(2) Treat each employee's pension separately.
(3) Make proper funding provision upon actuarial calculation and set aside year by
year the necessary sums.
(4) Give to each employee, upon separation from the service ...(a) the accrued
value of his pension, or (b) the commutation of such value in the shape of a smaller
annual pension.
Id. at 295.
130. BRANDEIS, supra note 28, at 65-81.
131. See I LATIMER, supra note 24, at 758 & n.19.
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pension plan law.
The fourth source for the view of pensions as deferred wages is labor law. In
Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB,182 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals construed
the terms "wages" and "conditions of employment" as they are used in the
National Labor Relations Act to describe subjects of mandatory collective
bargaining. The court in Inland Steel held that pensions and other benefits are
"conditions of employment" within the meaning of the Act. It also concluded
that, while "a reasonable argument can be made that the benefits flowing from
[a pension or retirement] plan are not 'wages', we think the better and more
logical argument is on the other side."' 83 This holding, of course, involved no
more than interpretation of a provision in the NationalP Labor Relations Act.
Nonetheless, it was extremely influential beyond its limited scope. Probably
more than anything else, the Inland Steel decision suggested to courts that
pensions of any kind, in any context, should be viewed as a deferred part of
the employee's wage. The decision may serve as a point of conceptual demar-
cation. Prior to it, only one case involving employee rights under a private
pension plan had accepted (but still did not rely on) the characterization of
private pensions as a form of deferred compensation. 34 After the Inland Steel
decision, judicial reference to pensions as deferred wages became widespread.
The fifth and final source for the treatment of private pensions as deferred
compensation was the body of federal income tax laws. A curious aspect to
this source was that the issue of tax policy calling for such treatment of pen-
sions was not one relating to the pensions granted, but one relating to em-
ployer contributions to funded pension plans. Consistent with the recognition
of pension plans as parts of the employer's business, it was early on recognized
that "the fair cost of a real provision for superannuation . .. is one of the
current costs of doing business,"' 6 and so employers, from virtually the first
days of income taxation, were permitted to deduct the contributions to pension
trusts from current income.136 Thus, the question arose of the proper classifica-
tion of the deduction.
The conceptual difficulty that made classification uncertain is that any given
employee receives no immediate benefit from the employer's expenditure and,
absent vesting, may not receive any benefit at all. Thus, there is good reason
not to classify employer contributions to plans as a form of payment for com-
132. 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), affid sub noma. American Communs. Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950).
133. Id. at 251.
134. Hunter v. Sparling, 197 P.2d 807, 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (relying on public pension
cases).
135. Erwin N. Griswold, The Tax Treatment of Employees' Contributions to Pension Plans,
57 HARV. L. REV. 247, 247 (1943). Thus, when the employer paid pensions to its employees on a
current basis from its own assets, it was allowed a deduction for the payments on the ground that
they constitute an ordinary and necessary business expense. For the first recognition of this, see
T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 281 (1914).
136. See O.D. 110, I C.B. 224 (1919).
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pensation.' s7 Nevertheless, employer contributions to pension plans have long
been treated as payment of deferred compensation. The rationale is that the
classification helps control tax avoidance through excessive deductions."8' To
this end, deductions for contributions to pension plans were treated as deduc-
tions for compensation and made subject to the Internal Revenue Code's limi-
tation on deductions for salaries and compensation to a "reasonable allow-
ance" for them. 139
As a result of these various influences, there emerged a general sense that
private pensions really are deferred wages." 0 The notion ultimately became
entangled with the other widely held notion that plans really are contracts.
And so one finds many a court reciting as obvious truth such statements as,
"[W]here an employer has a pension plan and the employees know of it, con-
tinued employment constitutes consideration for the promise to pay the pen-
sion. . . .A retirement pension is pay withheld to induce faithful service. It
amounts to delayed compensation for services rendered.""'
2. The Sterility of the Notion that Pensions Are Deferred Compensation
What makes statements of the sort just quoted so peculiar is that the char-
acterization of pensions as deferred compensation made absolutely no differ-
ence for any issue in pension plan law. When faced with arguments seeking to
base employee pension rights on the notion of pensions as deferred compensa-
tion, courts invariably rejected them."" It is thus difficult to understand why
courts persisted in calling pensions "deferred compensation." On the other
hand, it is not difficult to understand why courts rejected the arguments. They
137. RAINARD B. ROBBINS, IMPACT OF TAXES ON INDUSTRIAL PENSION PLANS 14-15 (1949);
LOGUE, supra note 47, at 19-20. Initially, the contributions were classified as "donations to a
charitable institution conducted for the benefit of the corporation's employees." O.D. I10, 1 C.B.
224 (1919).
138. ROBBINS, supra note 137, at 13.
139. Id. In connection with the 1942 revisions to the Code, the Treasury Department also pro-
posed to require vesting of employee interests in pension plans. Initially, the Treasury Department
proposed immediate vesting. See I Revenue Revision Hearings, supra note 44, at 87. After vehe-
ment opposition was expressed, the Treasury Department retreated to a proposal for deferred
vesting. I Id. at 1004-05. Even this proposal was assailed, and there was much testimony to the
effect that pension contributions, while ordinary and necessary expenses, are not payment of com-
pensation. See I id. at 879 (testimony of Alger B. Chapman); 2 id. at 2386 (testimony of Denis B.
Maduro); 3 id. at 2430 (testimony of Robert S. Gordon); 3 id. at 2439 (statement of H. Walker
Forster).
140. For another context in which the deferred compensation model of pensions was applied,
see Laffitte v. Laffltte, 232 So. 2d 92 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (discussing community property laws).
141. Jacoby v. Grays Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 468 P.2d 666, 669 (Wash. 1970); see also,
e.g., Hardy v. H.K. Porter Co., 417 F. Supp. 1175, 1183 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Conner v. Phoenix Steel
Corp., 249 A.2d 866, 868 (Del. 1969); Parsley v. Wyoming Automotive Co., 395 P.2d 291, 295
(Wyo. 1964).
142. E.g., Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp 125, 134 (N.D. Ill. 1955), affd, 234 F.2d
942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 918 (1956); Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150, 155
(111. 1928).
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did so because an inconsistency would otherwise have entered the law.
There is a straightforward way in which even a vague notion of pensions as
deferred compensation could have served as a basis for enforcement of pension
claims. The approach is restitutionary.' 4 s Simply put, if the pension truly is a
wage differing from normal wages only through being paid years after the
corresponding labor has been performed, then an employer who does not pay a
pension to a retired or former employee may well be unjustly enriched, just as
the employer would be if it failed to pay the employee a salary. In either case,
basic principles of restitution would apply and, in appropriate cases, might
justify enforcement of the employee's claim to the accrued value of his pension
rights." Indeed, enforcement might be justified irrespective of the language
of the plan document.
This restitutionary approach to enforcement was soundly rejected by courts
at every turn. Its most compelling potential application was to cases in which
either an employee had been involuntarily terminated, or the employer had
terminated its business or the plan, before a sufficient number of years of ser-
vice had passed for the pension rights of the claimant or claimants to vest
under the terms of the plan. The plausibility of using a restitutionary theory
for recovery of pension rights in cases of this sort could even be bolstered by
analogy, for there were many cases permitting employees to recover bo-
nuses, 145 unused vacation benefits,4 6 and interests in profit sharing plans, 47 in
like settings, on a restitutionary theory rooted in a view of the benefit in ques-
tion as a form of compensation. Remarkably, even courts that accepted a resti-
tutionary theory for welfare benefits refused to extend the theory to pension
benefits.' 48 In every case, courts refused to apply these basic restitutionary
principles to pension benefits under plans, because of their view that employee
rights were limited to whatever the plan document said they were. If the plan
143. Arguably, the doctrine of substantial performance might also be applicable, see Hadden v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 312 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1974), but it has less generality.
144. See Merton Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down: Problems and
Some Proposals, 76 HARV. L. REV. 952 (1963); Heinsz, supra note 50, at 285-90.
145. E.g., George A. Fuller Co. v. Brown, 15 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1926); American Sec. Life Ins.
Co. v. Moore, 72 So. 2d 132 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954); Roberts v. Mays Mills, 114 S.E. 530 (N.C.
1922).
146. See, e.g., In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., I II F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 1940) ("A vacation
with pay is in effect additional wages. . . . If the employer had discharged the employee wrong-
fully after the latter had done the work necessary to earn a vacation he could not be deprived of
the benefits due him."); Livestock Feeds, Inc. v. Local Union No. 1634, 73 So. 2d 123 (Miss.
1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 907 (1955); cf Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Ryan
Aeronautical Co., 236 P.2d 236 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1951) (granting vacation pay award
on grounds of substantial compliance). For criticism of the concept of vacation benefits as deferred
compensation, see Joseph R. Weeks, Continuing Liability Under Expired Collective Bargaining
Agreements (pt. 2), 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 359, 435-45 (1990).
147. E.g., Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 137 N.W. 769 (Wis. 1912).
148. See, e.g., Avondale Mills v. Saddler, 290 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 1974). In Schneider v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 456 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1972), the court upheld pro rata vacation benefits but
denied pro rata pension benefits.
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document did not confer a right to a pension until a certain period of service
had been completed, then a pension-no matter how one characterized
it-could not be granted at any earlier time. 9
Prior to ERISA, there was exactly one reported case in which a court per-
mitted pension claimants whose employment had been terminated before vest-
ing to proceed on a restitutionary theory of pensions as deferred compensation.
In Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 50 the plaintiff class consisted of the thirty em-
ployees-approximately fifty percent of the workforce-who had been dis-
charged en masse before their retirement. The employer claimed that all of
them, as a result, had lost their rights to pensions under the unambiguous
written terms of the plan. The court, however, held otherwise, observing that
pensions are well recognized to be a form of compensation, even though "pre-
sent decisions apparently give no weight or recognition to [that] existing and
accepted characteristic."' ' Because of that characteristic, the court continued,
pensions are properly made the subject of the usual rules of restitution. Ac-
cordingly, since "the employer retains the full benefit of the employee's past
service and secures favorable income tax treatment," and would also "recap-
ture . . . the accumulated pension credits created by forfeitures," restitution
in cases of termination before vesting might be appropriate. 15 Whether it was
appropriate in that case, though, was held a matter that had to be determined
on the facts.
This holding was rejected (or else read narrowly enough to be distinguished)
in every subsequent case in which claimants sought to rely on it.' 53 In each of
those cases, the reason for refusing to follow the Seagrave conclusion was that
the terms of the plan document, and in particular the vesting requirements,
were absolutely controlling. Some courts even went so far as to explain that
the plan, as a contract, was a consensual means for allocating risk, and it had
allocated the risk involved to the employees.5 4
And so, before ERISA, the notion of pensions as deferred compensation,
although widespread, had no relevance to the central issue of enforceability of
pension claims. To have permitted it to serve as a basis for enforcement would
have subverted the view of plans as contracts. For if pensions really had to be
treated as wages by another name, then it would be difficult to justify giving
effect to a delayed vesting provision unilaterally imposed by the employer.
Such a term would have no greater claim to enforceability than any other
unilaterally imposed term that purported to contradict employee rights secured
149. See, e.g., Bailey v. Rockwell Spring & Axle Co., 175 N.Y.S.2d 104, 108 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Jacoby v. Grays Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 468 P.2d 666, 670-71 (Wash. 1970).
150. 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967).
151. Id. at 344.
152. Id. at 345.
153. See, e.g., Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1975); Knoll v. Phoenix Steel Corp.,
465 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973); Hardy v. H.K. Porter, Inc.,
417 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Rose City Transit Co. v. City of Portland, 525 P.2d 1325
(Or. Ct. App. 1974), modified, 533 P.2d 339 (Or. 1975).
154. Hardy, 417 F. Supp. at 1182.
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independently of the document or contract. That result was conceptually
unacceptable. 5
III. SUMMARY
Let us summarize the key findings before we proceed to consider the impact
of ERISA on pension plan law.
First, the starting point for pension plan law is the fact that plans are pro-
grams established by employers, not primarily to benefit employees but to
serve the employer's own business needs. Formal pension plans appear to have
originated mainly as formal retirement programs, where the purpose was sys-
tematically and impersonally to remove so-called "superannuated" workers
from the enterprise."" In time, the prospect of a pension came to be recog-
nized as a valuable feature of the plan that could help promote desirable char-
acteristics of the workforce. It permitted plans to be used as tools to attract
employees, reduce turnover, and prevent unionization of the workforce. The
precise use for a plan might vary from employer to employer. Fundamentally,
though, it was a program for labor relations.
Second, the prospect of a pension, held out to employees, gives rise to expec-
tations. Those expectations arise not from individual dealings between em-
ployer and employee but from the systematic, self-serving character of the
holding out of the prospect of a pension. There is a compelling case for en-
forcement of these systematically created expectations. Because the expecta-
tions are created systematically and on a group-wide basis, different legal prin-
ciples should apply than those which had been developed to protect
individualized, nonsystematic expectations.
Third, a basic problem of pension plan law is to protect and enforce em-
ployee expectations while at the same time recognizing the employer's own
business interest in its plan. The law prior to ERISA failed to accommodate
those two interests and concerns. It greatly overprotected the employer's pro-
prietary interest in plans and failed to protect employee expectations beyond
what the employer said those expectations should be.
Fourth, the gift and contract characterizations were misguided meta-
155. It was also unacceptable as a matter of policy. If unilaterally imposed delayed-vesting
terms in plans were to be held invalid, the utility of plans to employers might be greatly dimin-
ished. Since the receipt of a pension would always be a certainty, the employee would forfeit
nothing by leaving, and one important method of bonding employees to the firm would be taken
away. Very likely this consideration contributed to the judicial reluctance to enforce employee
claims to their "deferred compensation."
156. A study of private pension plans conducted between 1947 and 1950 disclosed that, even at
that date, "[t]he consensus of the executives interviewed ... was that the greatest value resulting
from an effective pension plan was the systematic retirement of employees unable to perform their
duties efficiently because of old age or infirmity." STRONG, supra note 49, at 1; see also 3 Reve-
nue Revision Hearings, supra note 44, at 2417, 2425 (testimony of Keith S. McHugh) (explaining
that the purpose of AT&T pension plan was to provide for orderly retirement of superannuated
workers). For a recent example of such use of plans, see IBM Pension Plan Changes Are Ex-
pected to Entice Thousands of Workers To Retire, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1991, at A7.
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phors.157 Neither provided any framework for protection of employee expecta-
tions in their true character as expectations arising from systematic plans.
Each presupposed that plan-related legal relations could be analyzed solely in
terms of relations-such as contact or gift-between the employer and indi-
vidual employees.
Fifth, the deferred compensation characterization of pensions was empty. It
was also inconsistent with the contract metaphor and, in particular, that meta-
phor's insistence that all employee rights are conferred by employers through
the plan. Thus, it was rejected. Nonetheless, a deferred compensation ap-
proach to the protection of employee interests in pensions is possible in princi-
ple. Such an approach would protect pensions independent of their connection
with a plan and would supplement protection accorded on the basis of protect-
ing expectations.
Thus was the state of the law before ERISA. It is against this background
that ERISA must be understood.
ERISA'S APPROACH TO PLANS AND PENSIONS
ERISA neither halts the process of developing plan common law nor sets it
into motion. The common law of plans has long existed, and one of ERISA's
main functions is to redirect its evolution along a more appropriate path. We
have examined at some length the pre-ERISA common law of plans. We now
turn to ERISA itself to determine the conceptual and policy transformations
Congress intended to bring about.
ERISA on its face makes striking changes in benefit plan law. It establishes
mandatory minimum standards for key characteristics of pension plans, such
as eligibility, vesting, and funding." It announces stringent fiduciary princi-
ples to govern the conduct of persons responsible for the operation of plans. "
And it creates a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that facilitates judi-
cial protection of participant and beneficiary rights.1 60 These rules, along with
others, are sources of guidance to be used by courts when filling in statutory
gaps or otherwise developing rules of plan common law. Yet these rules only
reflect the fundamental principles of ERISA; they are not the fundamental
principles themselves. To fill gaps in the statute and to develop plan common
law, courts must go behind the rules and identify the principles and concepts
on which they are based. Only then can courts fully understand what ERISA
seeks to accomplish and what aims and policies common lawmaking should
respectively further and avoid.
This is not to say that the text of ERISA is inscrutable. Far from it. It is
clear that "Protection of Employee Benefit Rights"-the name given to Title
157. Cf. Wieck, supra note 50, at 114 (arguing on other grounds that contract theories are
inappropriate for pension plans).
158. ERISA 33 201-308, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1086 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
159. ERISA 33 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114.
160. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
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I-is the overarching purpose of the act. But standing alone, that is too gen-
eral a statement of purpose to be helpful in the hard cases. It is also incom-
plete. What are the "benefit rights" that are protected by the statute? What
are their sources? How are they protected by ERISA? How does ERISA af-
fect the employer's rights and interests in the plan? What use, if any, does
ERISA have for the metaphor of the plan as a contract? What use, if any,
does ERISA have for the notion of pensions as deferred compensation? What
new concepts and what new considerations, if any, does ERISA interject into
the law of plans? These are questions that must be answered if the further
development of law under ERISA is to have a proper foundation. To answer
these questions, we must first look at the legislative history.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
ERISA had a lengthy path to enactment. It was the product of nearly ten
years of study and effort by both Congress and the executive branch to im-
prove the legal protection of employee interests in plan-based pensions. 6' A
plethora of hearings and efforts to enact protective legislation had preceded
the Ninety-third Congress, the one that produced ERISA. In the Ninety-third
Congress itself, ERISA emerged only through a lengthy process of reconciling
four independent and sometimes competing bills, two in the House and two in
the Senate.'
A. The Emergence of Expectation Protection as the Dominant Theme
In each house of Congress, one of the two bills was initially presented as
labor legislation163 and was dealt with by that house's labor committee; the
other was initially presented as tax legislation 64 and was dealt with by that
house's tax-writing committee. Each of the four bills sought mainly to define
and protect employees' pension rights. Each of the bills also proposed to do so,
in large part, through imposition of minimum vesting and funding standards
for some or all pension plans, which would help ensure the realization of bene-
fit expectations. Each also proposed to do so through implementation of a sys-
tem of plan termination insurance, which would guarantee at least some part
of the benefits promised to employees in the event of a plan termination.
Initially, the labor and tax bills differed in their approaches to the definition
and protection of employee pension rights and to the overall structure of regu-
161. For a review of such actions in the period 1965-1972, see Gordon, supra note 7.
162. In fact, bills similar to each of these four bills were also introduced. It is not important,
though, to be concerned with the differences in detail between the bills we consider and the other
similar ones.
163. S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at
93; H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at
3599.
164. S. 1179, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7,
at 230; HR. 12855, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
7, at 2924.
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lation. As the legislative progress continued, though, the more comprehensive
labor approach to regulation, with its emphasis on a statutory framework that
would systematically protect employee benefit expectations, increasingly
predominated. We shall describe the progress in the Senate; the House took a
similar path.
In the Senate, the starting point was Senate Bill 4165 Described as a bill
"[t]o strengthen and improve the protections and interests of beneficiaries of
employee pension and welfare benefit plans,"' 66 it was offered as a remedy for
the problem, which hearings and studies had shown to be widespread, of plans
failing to provide retirement benefits that employees had been led to believe
they would get. 167 The bill was concerned mainly with protecting employee
expectations, primarily those concerning pensions and other retirement income
but also those concerning welfare benefits.168 As the sponsors of the bill
explained:
S. 4 is intended to restore the credibility and faith of American working
men and women in their pension plans. Simply stated, a pension plan is
either a promise which an employer expects to fulfill and which his employ-
ees expect to be fulfilled, or a warranted expectation by them that they will
receive pensions.
Any failure by the employer to carry out his part of the agreement, or any
lack of faith by his employees in the willingness of the employer to pay in
full their earned and reasonably expected pension benefit serves to defeat
the combined labor, management and social objectives which the pension
plan was established to serve. The failure of the pension promise produces
irreparable injury to the interdependent relationship which must exist be-
tween employee and employer. Thus a major work incentive which is indis-
pensable to the productivity of a sound economy is undermined.
The underlying thrust of S. 4 is to protect workers' rights in and expecta-
tions in private pension benefits .... ll
165. The bill was identical to S. 3598, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), which had been introduced
in but not enacted by the prior Congress.
166. S. 4, supra note 163, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 93.
167. 120 CONG. REC. 130 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 90-91
(remarks of Sen. Williams); 120 CONG. REC. 145-47 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
supra note 7, at 203-09 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
168. The introductory sections of the proposed statute included the following:
SEC. 2. (a) The Congress finds that private pension and other employee benefit
plans and programs in the United States are intrinsically woven into the working and
retirement lives of American men and women; . . . that deficient and inadequate pro-
visions contained in a number of such plans are directly responsible for hardships
upon working men and women who are not realizing their expectations of pension
benefits upon retirement ....
(b) It is the declared policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce, and the
equitable interests of participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries, by
improving the scope, administration, and operation of such plans ....
S. 4, supra note 163, § 2, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 7, at 94-96.
169. 2 Private Pension Plan Reform: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans
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Because benefit expectations were being defeated in so many ways, the bill
took an expansive approach to their protection. It imposed on pension plans
minimum standards for eligibility, vesting, and funding; established a system
of mandatory registration for pension plans; established a program of plan ter-
mination insurance; established a voluntary system for transfer of vested cred-
its between registered pension plans; strengthened the reporting and disclosure
obligations for all benefit plans; imposed stringent fiduciary standards on per-
sons responsible for benefit plans; provided a panoply of enforcement mecha-
nisms; and conferred substantial enforcement and regulatory authority on the
Secretary of Labor.
A competing tax-oriented bill to improve pension plan law, Senate Bill
1179; was introduced shortly thereafter. Its stated purposes, with respect to
protecting employee expectations, were virtually identical to those of the labor
bill. 170 An additional purpose was to encourage retirement savings on the part
of persons not covered by pension plans.
As initially proposed, Senate Bill 1179 was much more limited than the
competing labor bill. It did not deal with welfare benefit plans or nonqualified
pension plans. Its eligibility, vesting, and funding standards were not
mandatory but instead were made only conditions for favorable tax treatment.
And it did not contain fiduciary or disclosure provisions or rules for their en-
forcement.171 Yet in one respect, it was broader than the labor bill: It estab-
lished a framework for individual retirement accounts. Such accounts are not
employee benefit plans but are tax-favored, individualized retirement-savings
vehicles for persons not covered by plans. In light of these differences it is fair
to say that Senate Bill 1179, in its approach, initially differed from Senate Bill
4 by focusing on pensions and retirement income rather than on the employee
benefit plans through which such benefits are provided.
The two bills quickly converged, and the labor approach, with its emphasis
on plans as sources of expectations and its comprehensive treatment of plan-
based risks, came to predominate. The convergence began with hearings on the
bills. 172 The problems of disappointed employee expectations continued to be
urged as fundamental. In addition, witnesses expressed concern with the lim-
of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1059 (1973) [hereinafter Pension Reform
Hearings] (memorandum submitted by Sens. Williams & Javits).
170. See S. 1179, supra note 164, §§ 101-102, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
7, at 230-32.
When introducing S. 1179 on the Senate floor, its sponsor, Senator Bentsen, recounted tales of
workers who had unfairly been denied their reasonably anticipated pensions, and he concluded, as
reason for the bill, that "not all private pension plans have performed adequately. Too many
retired workers have lost their anticipated benefits. Too many promised benefits have failed to
become a reality." 120 CONG. REC. 7417-20 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 7, at 210-14.
171. It did, however, contemplate that the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act might be
amended to deal with these issues. See 120 CONG. REC. 7425 (1973) (Explanation of Senator
Lloyd Bentsen's Proposed "Comprehensive Pension Security Act of 1973"), reprinted in I LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 229.
172. Pension Reform Hearings, supra note 169.
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ited protection that Internal Revenue Code provisions relating to deductions
and taxes alone could provide, and they also expressed concern over Senate
Bill 1179's limitation of its mandatory vesting, funding, and other standards to
only qualified pension plans. Many witnesses at the hearings emphasized the
need for a more comprehensive approach of the kind taken by Senate Bill 4 .78
After the hearings concluded, the tax bill was amended. Added to it were
protective features contained in the labor bill, such as benefit portability provi-
sions, fiduciary standards applicable to all plans, and mechanisms for enforc-
ing the fiduciary provisions.
Subsequently, the committees with jurisdiction over the two bills reconciled
their differences. Senate Bill 1179 was set aside while Senate Bill 4 was
amended so that it now contained features from both the labor and tax bills.
Minimum standards were imposed on all pension plans; a system of plan ter-
mination insurance was established; a benefit portability system was estab-
lished; strong disclosure requirements were imposed; fiduciary and enforce-
ment provisions were included; and provisions for individual retirement
accounts were included. In its structure, scope and substance, the final bill
strongly resembled its labor-bill progenitor. This was the bill enacted by the
Senate and sent to the conference committee.
B. Principles and Policies Underlying the Senate Labor Bill
Because the bill passed by the Senate largely adopted the approach of the
labor bill, it is useful to examine the report prepared by the Labor Committee
to accompany and explain the penultimate version of Senate Bill 4.
1. Protection of Employee Expectations
The report began by explaining that "[t]he provisions of Senate Bill 4 are
addressed to the issue of whether American working men and women shall
receive pension benefits which they have been led to believe would be theirs
upon retirement from working lives. '17  According to the report, employee
benefit expectations were being defeated, both deliberately and otherwise, in a
wide variety of ways. Expectations were commonly defeated by overly strin-
gent vesting rules or the lack of any preretirement vesting rule at all.175 In
addition, "courts strictly interpret the plan indenture and are reluctant to ap-
ply concepts of equitable relief or to disregard technical document word-
173. E.g.. Iid. at 231-40 (statement of Preston C. Bassett); Iid. at 274-86 (statement of Fred
E. Seibert); I id. at 453-71 (statement of Leonard Woodcock); 2 id. at 623-24 (statement of
Converse Murdock); 2 id. at 624-31, 743-84 (statement of Paul S. Berger); 2 id. at 876-910
(statement of Merton C. Bernstein); 2 id. at 969-1039 (statement of Frank Cummings); 2 id. at
1040-50 (statement of Leonard Lesser).
174. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 7, at 1, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at
587, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4838.
175. Id. at 8, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 7, at 594, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4844-45.
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ing." 7 6 Funding often was inadequate; this threatened to make the promise of
a pension "illusory and empty. 1 7 Employees often lacked knowledge of writ-
ten plan provisions that affected benefit rights and that specified plan benefit-
claim procedures.178 Fiduciary standards were unavailing,7 9 and enforcement
mechanisms were missing.' The report concluded that, because of the wide
variety of interrelated problems, "it would be unwise and impractical to pro-
pose either revisions or new provisions in a patchwork fashion. . . . [T]he na-
ture and extent of the problems determined to exist required one omnibus leg-
islative proposal which would embody essential and indispensable reforms."' 8 '
Thus, Senate Bill 4 was meant to be a systematic and multifaceted approach
to protecting employee interests in their anticipated benefits from plans. 182
2. The Employer's Interest in Its Plan
Although the bill was concerned chiefly with protection of employee expec-
176. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 591, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4842.
177. Id. at 10, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 596, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4846.
178. Id. at 11, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 597, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4847 (stating that "[ilt is grossly unfair to hold an employee accountable for
acts which disqualify him from benefits, if he had no knowledge of these acts, or if these condi-
tions were stated in a misleading or incomprehensible manner in plan booklets").
179. Id. at 4, 30-31, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 7, at 590, 616-17, and in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4841, 4866-67.
180. Id. at 5, 35, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 591, 621, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4841, 4871.
181. Id. at 13, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 599, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4849.
182. The report accompanying the corresponding House labor bill explained that its purpose
was to protect employee expectations from a panoply of threats. "Underlying the provisions of this
Act is a recognition of the necessity for a comprehensive program . . . [establishing] minimum
standards to which all private pension plans must conform if the private pension promise is to
become real rather than illusory." HR. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 9-10 (1974), reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 2348, 2356-57, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4647-48; see also id. at 41, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 2387, and in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4666 (Supplemental Views) ("Our primary consideration in writing pen-
sion reform legislation has been to help ensure that workers now covered by pension plans get
their expected benefits."). As in the Senate bill, employee expectations were to be protected
through vesting standards, funding standards, and disclosure requirements that would close the
gap between what the employee is told and what he reasonably might expect. Id. at 6-8, 11,
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 2353-55, 2358, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4644-45, 4649.
The Senate Finance Report, S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in I LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY. supra note 7, at 1063, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, nowhere expressly men-
tions employee expectations or their protection. However, the stated purposes of "improving the
effectiveness of qualified retirement plans," of ensuring that participants "actually receive bene-
fits," and of "encouraging the establishment of plans which contain socially desirable provisions,"
id. at 2, 10-1l, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 1063, 1070, 1078-79, and in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4890, 4898-99, appear to reflect expectation-protective aims substan-
tially the same as those of the labor bill.
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tations, it did recognize that plans are employer programs, voluntarily estab-
lished, in which the employer has legally recognized interests.1 83 Thus, recog-
nizing the "symbiotic relationship existing between the employer and the plan
covering his employees,"1 84 the bill permitted an employer (or employer repre-
sentative) to serve as administrator, trustee, or other fiduciary.
However, the bill was greatly concerned with limiting one of the employer's
traditional uses for a plan. Hearings had emphasized the increasing transience
of the labor force and had led Congress to conclude that job mobility was
socially desirable and should be facilitated.185 Accordingly, through its
mandatory vesting rules and otherwise, the bill gave preference to protecting
job mobility over protecting employer use of plans to retain employees long
term.196
The bill also sought to diminish employer control and use of plans in other
ways. It required that plan assets be placed in a trust for "the exclusive pur-
pose of . . .providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries,"1 87 and
it required that an employer-fiduciary (and any other fiduciary) administer the
plan for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries. 18  Thus, although the bill treated plans as employer programs, it
sought to place significant limits on employer business uses for them.1 89
3. Social Policy
The bill contained a new and important policy theme that had been absent
from the common law treatment of plans and pensions-that plans are socially
desirable and should be encouraged because they provide retirement income
(itself a highly desirable social good). Pension plans were now imbued with a
public interest. Thus, although the bill contained no direct incentives to plan
formation, the report concluded that it would still have that salutary effect:
[E]xpeditious enactment of S. 4 will institute a program which will achieve
183. "[Tihe Committee believes it has designed a bill, which ... brings the workers' interests
up to parity with those of employers." S. REP. No. 127, supra note 7, at 13-14, reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 599-600, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4850.
184. Id. at 33, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 619, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4869.
185. Id. at 7, 11, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 593, 597, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4843-44, 4847-48.
186. Id. at 9, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 595, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4845.
187. Id. at 46, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 632, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4881.
188. Id. at 30, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 616, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4866.
189. Like the Senate bill, the House bill recognized that plans are employer programs: "The
primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension rights, but the committee has
been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private retirement plans." H.R. REP. No.
533, supra note 182, at 1, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 2348, and in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4639.
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a strengthening of the role played by private retirement plans within the
fabric of our economic and social structures. Its most important purpose will
be to assure American workers that they may look forward with anticipation
to a retirement with financial security and dignity, and without fear that
this period of life will be lacking in the necessities to sustain them as human
beings within our society. The enactment of progressive and effective pen-
sion legislation is also certain to increase stability within the framework of
our nation's economy, since the tremendous resources and assets of the pri-
vate pension plan system are an integral part of our economy. It will also
serve to restore credibility and faith in the private pension plans designed for
American working men and women, and this should serve to encourage
rather than diminish efforts by management and industry to expand pension
plan coverage and to improve benefits for workers. 9 °
190. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 7, at 13, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7,
at 599, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4849.
The House report summarized the main themes and purposes of the bill as follows:
[E]xpeditious enactment of H.R. 2 will institute a program which will achieve a
strengthening of the role played by private retirement plans within the fabric of our
economic and social structures. Its most important purpose will be to assure American
workers that they may look forward with anticipation, to a retirement with financial
security and dignity, and without fear that this period of life will be lacking in the
necessities to sustain them as human beings within our society. The enactment of
progressive and effective pension legislation is also certain to increase stability within
the framework of our nation's economy, since the tremendous resources and assets of
the private pension plan system are an integral part of our economy. It will also serve
to restore credibility and faith in the private pension plans designed for American
working men and women, and this should serve to encourage rather than diminish
efforts by management and industry to expand pension plan coverage and to improve
benefits for workers.
The Committee believes that the legislative approach of establishing minimum
standards and safeguards for private pensions is not only consistent with retention of
the freedom of decision-making vital to pension plans, but in furtherance of the
growth and development of the private pension system. At the same time, the Com-
mittee recognizes the absolute need that safeguards for plan participants be suffi-
ciently adequate and effective to prevent the numerous inequities to workers under
plans which have resulted in tragic hardship to so many.
The Bill reported by the Committee represents an effort to strike an appropriate
balance between the interests of employers and labor organizations in maintaining
flexibility in the design and operation of their pension programs, and the need of the
workers for a level of protection which will adequately protect their rights and just
expectations.
H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 182, at 8-9, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at
2355-56, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4646-47.
Additional themes were also in the House Labor Report-that employers have a "responsibility
for the physical and economic welfare of their employees, even for the years beyond retirement,"
id. at 2, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 2349, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4640, and that pension funds which accumulate to pay benefits have a substantial impact on
the economy and on capital markets, which demand regulation, id. at 2-3, reprinted in 2 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY. supra note 7, at 2349-50, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4640-41. Although these
themes were sounded, they do not seem to have had any important bearing on the content of any
of the proposed rules.
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4. Deferred Compensation
A final theme was that benefits are a form of compensation. For example, as
an additional reason for requiring preretirement vesting of pension benefits,
the report stated that "the issue basically resolves itself into whether workers,
after many years of labor, whose jobs terminate voluntarily or otherwise,
should be denied benefits they have earned as deferred compensation." 9 '
However, that such perspective on benefits was a secondary consideration can
be seen from the fact that the bill permitted as much as fifteen years until full
vesting (a period hardly consistent with a strong view of pensions as earned
compensation), and that it failed to require that health and other welfare ben-
efits-which had often been viewed at common law as a form of deferred or
additional consideration-ever vest. 92
A deferred compensation perspective may have partially underlain the fidu-
ciary rules. The bill applied its fiduciary rules only to those plans "which leave
assets at risk"-to those which use a segregated fund to finance benefit pay-
ments-and substantially limited fiduciary obligations to matters of plan asset
management.'" However, the fiduciary rules did not make the principal duty
of fiduciaries that of preserving plan assets,1 94 as would be expected if the
fiduciary rules were mainly concerned with protecting the participants' de-
ferred compensation. Instead, fiduciaries were more broadly obligated to act in
accordance with the requirement that the assets of the plan be held exclusively
for the expectation-oriented purpose of providing benefits to participants and
beneficiaries.195
191. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 7, at 9, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at
595, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4845.
192. Id. at 16, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 602, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4852.
193. Id. at 28-30, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 614-16, and in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4864-66.
194. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 176 (1977) (duty to preserve trust property).
195. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 7, at 30, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7,
at 616, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4866. The House bill appears to have placed slightly greater
emphasis on the notion of pensions as deferred compensation. The House report referred to pen-
sion plans as "deferred compensation schemes," H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 182, at 2, re-
printed in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 2349, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4640,
and explained that "[t]he Act presumes that promised pension benefits are in the form of a condi-
tional deferred wage," id. at 13, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 2360, and
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4651. While the bill established vesting standards primarily to protect
employee expectations, it secondarily based vesting rules on the need to prevent employees from
being "denied benefits that have been placed ...in a fund for retirement purposes." Id. at 6,
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 2353, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4645.
The Senate Finance Report made no mention of pensions as deferred compensation. However,
such an outlook appears to have underlain the bill, since the report sounded the themes that
pensions are something to which employees are entitled by virtue of their "careers in useful and
socially productive work," S. REP. No. 383, supra note 182, at 10, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 1078, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4898; that pension rights are some-
thing "slowly ... stockpiled over many years," id. at 45, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
supra note 7, at 1113, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4930; and that immediate vesting of benefits
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C. Congressional Debate
The bill that emerged from the conference committee was comprehensive
and took the plan-oriented, expectation-protecting approach to regulation.' 96 It
contained one part (Title I) that dealt with "Protection of Employee Benefit
Rights" through disclosure rules, eligibility, vesting and funding standards, fi-
duciary standards, and enforcement rules; tax provisions (Title II) concerned
with qualified plans and individual retirement accounts; and a final major part
(Title IV) dealing with the plan termination insurance system. 9
In the final debate on the conference report, members of Congress clearly
recognized that, the bill was fundamentally a bill to protect employee benefit
rights based on legitimate employee expectations. 98 Horror stories were retold
of workers whose retirement benefit expectations had been destroyed, 99 and it
was emphasized that
[w]ith the enactment of this legislation we intend to end the problem
which so many American workers face when they learn that after working
is preferred as the means to accord employees "maximum protection," id. at 19, reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 1087, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4905. This emphasis
on protection of deferred compensation also emerges in the fiduciary provisions' focus on the re-
sponsibility of fiduciaries to protect plan assets. See id. at 8, 31, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 1076, 1099, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4896, 4916.
196. The conference report, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 9, reprinted in 3 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 4277, and in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5038, is almost entirely a
provision-by-provision discussion of the final bill, with particular attention to how the variations
between the House and Senate bills were reconciled. It contains little discussion of policy or back-
ground. Thus, while the report is useful to courts for interpreting specific provisions, it contributes
little to our understanding of the underpinnings of the law.
197. Part 111, labeled "Jurisdiction, Administration, Enforcement; Joint Pension Task Force,
Etc.," dealt with miscellaneous nonsubstantive matters.
198. E.g., 120 CONG. REC. 29,194 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7,
at 4660. One House member stated: "H.R. 2, while extremely complex, has one underlying theme.
It is a piece of legislation designed to protect and expand the rights of all workers to a pension."
Id. (remarks of Rep. Biaggi); see also 120 CONG. REc. 29,952 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 4798 (stating that this is "legislation with the very simple goal that
workers have a right to the pensions they have been promised") (remarks of Sen. Nelson); 120
CONG. REC. 29,192 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 4657 (stating
that "the purpose of this conference report is ... to reduce sharply the number of people who pay
money into private pension plans year after year expecting eventually to receive retirement income
only to have their hopes dashed and end up getting nothing") (remarks of Rep. Perkins); 120
CONG. REc. 29,949 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, supra note 7, at 4791 (remarks of
Sen. Bentsen); 120 CONG. REC. 29,207 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note
7, at 4698 (stating that "the bill will protect private pension plans and will prevent a recurrence of
the too-often repeated story of pensions which unexpectedly vanished when workers reached re-
tirement age") (remarks of Rep. Minish).
199. E.g., 120 CONG. REC. 29,934-35 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
7, at 4749-50 (remarks of Sen. Javits); 120 CONG. REC. 29,93 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY. supra note 7, at 4656-57 ("It has been a source of great regret to me over the years to
encounter time after time cases of miners who have been denied benefits which they had every
reason to expect.") (remarks of Rep. Perkins); 120 CONG. REC. 29,949-50 (1974), reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 4790-94 (remarks of Sen. Bentsen).
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for several years the pension benefits to which they thought they were enti-
tled are nonexistent-nonexistent because of inadequate vesting protection,
or poor or negligent administration, because the plan was not properly
funded. 00
Illusory promises, deceptively creating long-term expectations, were to be
abolished 201
Congress also recognized that plans are employer-sponsored business pro-
grams, and that legal protection of employee interests and rights should not be
so stringent as to deter employers from creating them.2 0 2 Indeed, it was gener-
ally agreed that private pension plans should be encouraged through the tax
laws.2 03 Speakers also continued to emphasize that job mobility is a fact of
modern economic life and is a societal good that should be protected against
restraint'by pension plans.10 4
Nor was the policy rationale for protecting benefit expectations forgotten.
As one of the sponsors of the Senate labor bill explained:
Under this bill, the Congress has developed a fair and feasible system of
private pension plan regulation. And under this regulation, private plans will
develop more rapidly than in the past because the Congress will have as-
sured that pension promises are kept and reasonable expectations built upon
those promises are not disappointed.
200. 120 CONG. REC. 29,212 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at
4711 (remarks of Rep. Ford).
201. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,214 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at
4717. One congressman argued:
Until now, the promise of your pension has been this: If you remain in good health
and stay with the same company until you are age 65; and if the company is still in
business; and if your department has not been abolished; and if you had not been laid
off for too long a period; and if there is enough money in the fund; and if that money
has been prudently managed, you may get a pension.
It is utterly and totally indefensible in an American society as affluent as ours, that
an individual's economic security in his later years should rest on such a flimsy foun-
dation and a phony promise, to be so endangered by such an incredible list of "irs"
and "maybe's."
Id. (remarks of Rep. Daniels).
202. E.g., 120 CONG. REc. 29,195 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7,
at 4664 (remarks of Rep. Thompson); 120 CONG. REc. 29,210 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY. supra note 7, at 4706 ("The goal of the legislation was to strengthen the rights of
employees under existing pension systems, while at the same time encouraging the expansion of
these plans and the creation of new ones.") (remarks of Rep. Rostenkowski); 120 CONG. REC.
29,949, 29,951 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 4791, 4797 (re-
marks of Sen. Bentsen).
203. E.g., 120 CONG. REC. 29,198 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7,
at 4673 (remarks of Rep. Ullman); 120 CONG. REc. 29,944 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 4778 (remarks of Sen. Long).
204. 120 CONG. REC. 29,214 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at
4716 (remarks of Rep. Daniels); see also 120 CONG. REc. 29,930 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 4737-38 (remarks of Sen. Williams) (noting statutory accommo-
dations for highly mobile workers).
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Private pension and welfare reform legislation is not a panacea for dealing
with the more subtle undercurrents of social unrest; but the enactment of
this legislation will clearly establish a more positive climate of respect for,
and affirmation of, the worker's contribution to our economic progress. The
establishment of this climate is indispensable if we are to maintain our eco-
nomic growth .... 206
There was virtually no mention of the view that benefits are a form of
compensation .206
1I. THE STATUTORY TEXT
Let us now examine the provisions of ERISA to see how the themes found
in the legislative history came to be realized in the text.
A. Protection of Employee Expectations
Unsurprisingly, the text of ERISA shows its predominant concern to be pro-
tection of employee expectations; in particular, expectations concerning pen-
sions. ERISA's statement of findings emphasizes that the problem to be reme-
died is that of disappointed employee expectations regarding "anticipated
benefits" and "promised benefits. ' 20 7 We have already seen how the vesting,
funding, and plan termination insurance provisions are designed to protect
these expectations.
ERISA also contains provisions designed to ensure that employee expecta-
tions are well grounded. One is that every plan must be "established and
maintained pursuant to a written instrument. 2 8 A purpose of this require-
ment is to help ensure that employees can determine precisely what rights they
have under a plan, so that erroneous but still reasonable expectations about
benefits from the plan may be avoided. To the same end, ERISA requires the
plan administrator to distribute or otherwise make available to employees
written information about the plan, their rights and responsibilities with re-
spect to the plan, and the status of their interests in benefits-all in easily
understood form.20 9
The fiduciary rules are also designed to protect benefit expectations. Unlike
the precursor bills, the fundamental concern of the final set of fiduciary provi-
sions is not the safeguarding of assets. Although some of the rules are con-
cerned with asset management and investment, the central fiduciary require-
ment-that a fiduciary discharge his duties "for the exclusive purpose of...
205. 120 CONG. REC. 29,944 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at
4775-76 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
206. For such a view, but expressed only in passing, see 120 CONG. REC. 29,205 (1974), re-
printed in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 4690 (remarks of Rep. Brotzman).
207. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
208. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
209. ERISA §§ 101-105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025.
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providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries" 210-goes well beyond
those functions. It seeks to ensure that the employees' anticipated benefits are
received and that threats to those anticipated benefits are avoided, whether the
threats arise from asset handling, plan administration, or plan management.
B. The Plan as Employer Program
In significant ways, ERISA is predicated on a recognition that plans are
employer programs. ERISA describes plans as programs established and
maintained by employers." Consistently, it permits employers and their of-
ficers, employees, and agents to manage and administer the plan;2"2 permits
employers to designate the named fiduciary;21 and makes the employer
(where it is the plan sponsor) the plan administrator by default in cases where
an administrator cannot be identified from the plan document." 4 These provi-
sions clearly recognize the employer's continuing interest in plans it estab-
lishes, as well as the propriety of the employer's continuing involvement in
plan management and administration.
ERISA also permits properly funded pension plans to be terminated by the
employer for its own business reasons.215 It permits welfare benefit plans to be
terminated whenever the employer chooses. In so doing, ERISA recognizes
that plans are established to serve employer business needs and that plans may
cease to satisfy those business needs as circumstances change.
There are still other ways in which ERISA recognizes that plans are em-
ployer programs. One is ERISA's concern with preventing employer interfer-
ence with the participants' plan-based rights through dealings with partici-
pants in their status as employees.2 " Another is ERISA's authorization of
limited plan investment in employer stock and employer real property, 217 and
its authorization of employee stock ownership plans ("ESOPs"), plans
designed to invest primarily in stock of the employer. 2' 8 ESOPs are thought to
be extremely effective programs for inducing employee dedication to the enter-
prise, serving this end by providing employees with ownership stakes in the
firm. 2
1 9
210. ERISA § 404(a)(l)(A), 29 U.S.C. § l 104(a)(l)(A).
211. ERISA § 3(l)-(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(2). It also recognizes that labor organizations
may establish and maintain plans.
212. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3).
213. ERISA § 402(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
214. ERISA § 3(16), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16).
215. ERISA § 4041, 29 U.S.C. § 1341.
216. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
217. ERISA § 407(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(3).
218. ERISA §§ 404(a)(2), 407(b)-(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(2), I 107(b)-(d).
219. See, e.g.. Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989) (dis-
cussing other uses of ESOPs).
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C. Benefits as Deferred Compensation
ERISA also treats pensions and other benefits as forms of compensation,
but only to a limited extent.
Pension plans are defined so as to include plans that "result[] in a deferral
of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered
employment or beyond."22 Nothing in the definition of "welfare plans" ex-
pressly deems a welfare benefit to be a form of compensation. However, the
description of welfare benefits has an underlying focus on compensation. With
few exceptions, welfare benefits are limited to those that are in the form of
money, services, or other items of value, and that are provided to employees on
an individual basis. Excluded are generalized benefits and noncompensatory
benefits, such as company cafeterias, job security or seniority standards, and
shuttle bus serve to the employees' parking lot.22 From a pure protection-of-
expectations perspective, there is little reason to exclude from ERISA's cover-
age plans that provide these kinds of benefits. If ERISA is construed to pro-
tect forms of compensation, however, the limitation makes sense.
But other provisions of ERISA seem to reject a view of benefits as compen-
sation. For example, although there are maximum periods within which an
employee's interest in his pension benefit must vest, his interest still need not
vest immediately. Welfare benefits, even for retirees, need never vest at all.222
Other provisions of ERISA inconsistent with a view of benefits as compen-
sation are those permitting retirement benefits and contributions to retirement
plans to be integrated with social security. The integration rules permit em-
ployers to reduce contributions (in the case of defined contribution plans), or
permit the plan to reduce benefits (in the case of defined benefit plans), so as
to take into account an employee's entitlement under the Social Security pro-
gram.22 In either case, an employee's retirement income is decreased because
of factors having nothing to do with the quantity of service he provided sup-
posedly in exchange for the retirement income.
These and other inconsistencies224 show that the view of benefits as compen-
220. ERISA § 3(2)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii).
221. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(c) (1990). The only significant exception in the statute is for
day care centers. Plans providing them are deemed by statute to be welfare benefit plans. ERISA
§ 3(l)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(I)(A).
On the other hand, salary and other forms of basic compensation provided through the payroll
are not considered to be welfare benefits. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(b).
222. ERISA §§ 201, 203, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1053. It is not an objection to this reading of
ERISA that an exchange of value may involve contingent consideration; for example, option con-
tracts and lottery tickets are quite conventional economic exchanges. We are not using "compen-
sation" here as a synonym for "consideration." Rather we are concerned with the extent to which
ERISA treats benefits as materially like wages, salaries, and similar forms of remuneration for
labor. To the extent that benefits are contingent, they differ in an obvious way from these paradig-
matic forms of compensation. To the extent that ERISA permits benefits to be contingent, it
treats them less like compensation.
223. I.R.C. § 401(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
224. See, e.g., ERISA § 302(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1062(b)(2) (outlining amortization rules for
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sation is present in ERISA only in attenuated form.
D. Plans and Contracts
A significant omission from ERISA is any suggestion that plans should be
deemed contracts between the establishing employer and its employees. 225 In-
stead, plans are characterized by ERISA as structured and purposive "funds"
or "programs '226 that may be established unilaterally by the employer, 2 7 that
may enter into business transactions, 28 that have officers, employees, consul-
tants, and decision-makers 2 9 and that may be terminated.22 ' None of the civil
enforcement provisions reflect any view of wrongs with respect to plans as
breaches of contract. To the contrary, suits under ERISA are regarded as
suits to remedy fiduciary breaches or violations of statute, or to "recover bene-
fits due" or to "enforce" rights under the plan.231 ERISA is not greatly con-
cerned with the rights and obligations of the employer, the party that, from a
contract perspective, would be the promisor. Rather it is concerned with the
obligations of the plan itself and its fiduciaries. Even more generally, ERISA
is not concerned with plan formation and the enforceability of plan terms, as
had been the pre-ERISA law based on the contract metaphor. Contract for-
mation and enforceability of terms are central concerns of contract law.
Thus, there is nothing in the text of ERISA to suggest that it should be
viewed as if it were the law of a specific kind of contract in the way, for
example, that Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code is the law of sales
contracts. ERISA, rather, is a scheme for regulation of a unique kind of em-
ployer activity.2 2
III. SUMMARY
The key changes made by ERISA are as follows. First, and fundamentally,
what ERISA does not change is the premise that plans are employer business
programs that employers have a right to establish and use for their own busi-
ness purposes. Nonetheless, there are some important changes in the details of
this premise. One is that pension plans and welfare benefit plans are deemed
to have similarities sufficient to make appropriate their treatment by the same
statute, in accordance with the same set of policies. This differs from pre-
past service liabilities); ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (discussing nonalienability of
pension benefits).
225. Of course, plans may be maintained pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. See,
e.g., ERISA § 3(37)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(A) (defining multi-employer plans).
226. ERISA § 3(1)-(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(2).
227. Id.
228. ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
229. ERISA § 411, 29 U.S.C. § I It.
230. ERISA § 4001ff, 29 U.S.C. § 1301ff.
231. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); see Weeks, supra note 87, at 143-45 (stating that
benefit claims are not contractual claims).
232. Cf. Leff, supra note 68 (proposing product-safety type regulation for consumer contracts).
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ERISA common law, in which pension plans and welfare plans were subject to
different legal rules-for example, those concerning the availability of restitu-
tion. Another important change is that some employer uses of plans are re-
stricted in order to advance social policies. For example, a policy favoring job
mobility leads to rules that limit the employer's ability to bind employees to
their jobs.
Second, the undisputed main purpose of ERISA is to help ensure the reali-
zation of benefit expectations that arise from these employer programs.
ERISA's minimum standards, plan termination insurance provisions, disclos-
ure rules, fiduciary standards, and enforcement provisions are all designed to
help protect employee expectations. ERISA inverts the priority of interests in
a benefit plan, rejecting the common law's approach and instead strongly
favoring employee interests over those of the employer.
Third, ERISA expands on the common law's half-hearted treatment of ben-
efits as compensation, but declines to make that the principal regulatory
theme. ERISA recognizes that there is a sense in which benefits are forms of
compensation (and implicitly uses that characteristic to identify the benefits
with which it is concerned), but very little expressly turns on this status, and
much of the statute is inconsistent with it. 233 The concept of benefits as com-
pensation remains available as a tool for development of plan common law-as
a basis, for example, of a law of restitution. However, any such body of rules
must be tempered by recognition of the subordinate role of the concept, as well
as the limits that ERISA places on its usage.
Fourth, ERISA implicitly discards the metaphor of plans as contracts.
Thus, the post-ERISA common law of plans may not proceed, as did the
traditional common law, as a blind elaboration of contract doctrine. If con-
tract law principles are to be used, analogically or otherwise, in the develop-
ment of the law of plans, that use must be justified on independent grounds,
consistent with the principles underlying ERISA.
APPLICATIONS
Our investigation of the foundations of the law of plans has so far yielded
some conclusions about the appropriate framework for common law develop-
ment. We show in this part of the Article how those conclusions may be
applied.
I. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEMS
Many areas of plan common law are actively being developed. Among the
more active are (a) claims not expressly provided for by the text of ERISA,
233. It is thus quite wrong to assert, as some have, that "ERISA ...implicitly regards the
pure deferred wage theory of pensions as correct." LOGUE, supra note 47, at 62; see also, e.g.,
BRUCE. supra note 12, at 314-15 (emphasizing significance of statements in legislative history
viewing pensions as deferred compensation); Langbein, supra note 22, at 129.
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such as claims for indemnity and contribution,' 4 nonfiduciary liability for par-
ticipation in a fiduciary's breach, 23 5 and liability of fiduciaries to compensate
participants and beneficiaries (as opposed to the plan itself) for injuries the
fiduciaries cause;236 (b) benefit claims, in particular, the issues of the kind of
review to be performed by courts231 and the entitlement of participants to ben-
efits on the basis of estoppel; 2 8 and (c) participant rights in welfare benefit
plans (with respect to which ERISA itself imposes very few standards), espe-
cially plans providing medical benefits to retirees. 29 These developing areas
are also ones in which there is much uncertainty and questionable analysis as
to both proposed rules and rationales to support them. Too often, a proposed
rule or rationale uncritically reflects the concepts, principles, and modes of
analysis regularly used before ERISA, but which now have become obsolete.
Some such errors can easily be detected and cured. For example, many
courts have concluded that ERISA's express requirement that plans be estab-
lished pursuant to a written instrument 40 functions as a sort of statute of
frauds that prohibits enforcement of employee benefit expectations arising
from conduct or oral representations. 24 1 The conclusion does not follow. Exam-
ination of the purposes of ERISA makes it clear that the writing requirement
234. See, e.g., Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland, 939 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1991); Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1336-38 (7th Cir. 1984); Physicians Healthchoice, Inc. v.
Trustees of the Automotive Employee Benefit Trust, 764 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Minn. 1991);
NARDA, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F. Supp. 685, 696 (D. Md. 1990);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yampol, 706 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. II1. 1989); McLaughlin v. Biasucchi,
688 F. Supp. 965, 967-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); McClendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 7 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2403 (D.N.J. 1986); Schaffler v. McDowell Bank, 6 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 2485 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Freund v. Marshall & llsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 641-42
(W.D. Wis. 1979).
235. See, e.g., Pappas v. Buck Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1991); Brock v. Hen-
dershott, 840 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1988); Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988); Whitfield v.
Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989); Lowen v. Tower
Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1987); PBGC v. Ross, 733 F. Supp. 1005
(M.D.N.C. 1990); Pension Fund-Mid Jersey Trucking Indus.-Local 701 v. Omni Funding
Group, 731 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1990).
236. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Warren v.
Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I ll S. Ct. 2256 (1991); Amos v.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 868 F.2d 430, 432 (1Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 855 (1989).
237. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989); Brown v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (1I1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 712 (1991).
238. See, e.g., Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1990); Lister v. Stark, 890
F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 579 (1990); Reid v. Gruntal & Co., Inc.,
760 F. Supp. 945 (D. Me. 1991).
239. See, e.g., Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1988); In re White
Farm Equip. Co. 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Reading Co., 72 B.R. 258 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
240. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l) (1988).
241. See, e.g., Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1296 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that
the policy of a writing requirement is to "prevent collusive or fraudulent side agreements between
employers and employees"); Saret v. Triform Corp., 662 F. Supp. 312, 316 (N.D. II1. 1986) (stat-
ing that ERISA's writing requirement "protects ERISA plans from the sort of corruption fostered
by private verbal agreements").
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was not intended as a vehicle to impede enforcement of benefit expectations.
Rather, it was intended as a device to further the protection of those expecta-
tions by controlling the mode of their creation. By prohibiting unwritten plans
and oral plan provisions, ERISA seeks to prevent vague or unsystematic ex-
pectations that have a high risk of being defeated, and to promote clarity and
definiteness in pension promises. To use this preventative provision as a means
to defeat employee expectations is to contravene its purpose. Indeed, it is to
return to the contract-oriented view that no benefit expectation is reasonable
or enforceable unless it is based on the language of the plan document. 242
There may well be good reasons for not permitting estoppel-based actions for
benefits, but the writing requirement cannot plausibly be treated as one of
them.
Another example is restitution. Several courts have refused to allow actions
for restitution on the ground that "[q]uasi-contractual remedies have no place
where there is a contract between the parties. 2 48 This is a non sequitur. The
rule barring restitution where an existing contract governs the subject matter
is based on the principle that a negotiated bargain fixes the parties' entitle-
ments and risks, and that consensual arrangements should not lightly be over-
turned.244 The principle cannot simplistically be applied to plans. Again, there
may be reasons for denying restitution in some,2 45 or even all, cases involving
plans, but the supposition that a plan is essentially a deal cannot be one of
them.
Another example is the standard of review for benefit claims. Current law
provides that, where the plan document grants decision-making discretion to
the fiduciary responsible for benefit claims, any denial of a claim by that fidu-
ciary is presumptively to be reviewed by courts under an extremely deferential
"abuse of discretion" standard.2 6 This is a doubtful rule. Deferential review
242. Some courts have recognized that the purpose of the writing requirement is to protect
expectations. For example, in Adams v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 905 F.2d 943 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, II1 S. Ct. 517 (1990), the court considered the purpose of the subsidiary requirement that
the written document specify a procedure for amending it, ERISA § 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. §
1103(b)(3). The court concluded: "The provision serves the important purpose of insuring 'against
the possibility that the employee's expectation of the benefit would be defeated' by an unantici-
pated amendment of a welfare plan, whose benefits employees may come to take for granted."
Adams, 905 F.2d at 949 (citation omitted).
243. Morales v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (E.D. La. 1989); see also
Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 383, 390 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1008 (1986); Van Orman v. American Life Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 313 (3d Cir. 1982);
Searcy v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 728 Pension Trust Fund, 685 F. Supp. 241,
242 (S.D. Fla. 1988). One court has even rejected a claim for restitution on the basis of the pre-
ERISA contract-based cases rejecting such claims. Wishner v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ctr., 550 F.
Supp. 1016, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
244. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 107 & cmt. (1937).
245. For example, the presence of a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to which a plan
is established may be a factor bearing on the availability of restitution as to some matters ad-
dressed by the agreement.
246. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). If the fiduciary is subject to
a conflict of interest, less deference will be accorded its decision. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue
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has its origins in the strict employer-property view of plans, where it served as
an ad hoc device to afford employees limited protection from employer
abuse. 4 ' Thus, it was originally an employee-protection rule. But it was pro-
tective of employees only in its original context. Because contemporary benefit
plan law is now so overwhelmingly protective of employee benefit expectations,
abuse-of-discretion review has been transformed, through change of context,
into a vehicle to defeat the employee expectations otherwise so strongly pro-
tected. It is quite astonishing to find courts concluding, as if contract law were
the touchstone of legitimacy, that a plan sponsor can unilaterally insert magic
language into the plan document, and thereby evade the fundamental purpose
of ERISA. There may be circumstances where such mode of review is appro-
priate. However, it is difficult to see what considerations could justify allowing
employers to impose it substantially at will.
A final example relates to suits to remedy fiduciary breaches in connection
with unfunded welfare benefit plans. Some have suggested that it is erroneous,
indeed incoherent, to allow actions for breach of fiduciary duty with respect to
these plans, because there are no lost assets to restore to a fund."4 8 This argu-
ment misconstrues the purpose of ERISA's fiduciary rules. Their purpose is
not simply to protect plan assets; rather they have the broader purpose of pro-
tecting employee benefit expectations by ensuring that fiduciary conduct, no
matter what it relates to, does not jeopardize the integrity of the benefit pay-
ment program that is the plan. The integrity of that program can, of course,
be threatened by the misuse of plan assets, and such misuse may even be the
greatest threat to the plan. But the integrity of the program can also be
threatened in many other ways: for example, by a fiduciary's refusal to follow
plan documents, by a pattern of illegitimate denials of benefit claims, or by the
imprudent hiring of incompetent service providers to the plan. All of these are
wrongs to the plan, remediable under the fiduciary and enforcement provi-
sions; they make benefit expectations less secure, and thereby cause injury to
the ongoing program of affording benefits to employees.2" 9 The remedy for
any breach of fiduciary duty is to remove the source of unacceptable risk. In
cases where there is a funded plan, the remedy may be the conventional one of
Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied. Ill S. Ct. 712 (1991).
247. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. Most courts and writers believe that the
deferential standard derives from a series of decisions by the District of Columbia federal courts
in the late 1950s under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). See, e.g., Bruch v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), affd in part and rev'd in part, 489
U.S. 101 (1989); John A. McCreary, Note, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Under
ERISA: Its Origins and Application, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1033 (1985). This account is incomplete,
though, because those LMRA cases themselves drew on the line of common law cases cited and
discussed in this Article. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282, 286 (D.D.C. 1958).
248. See, e.g., Weeks, supra note 87, at 163-80.
249. Cf. Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that "[t]he nature of the
breach of fiduciary duty alleged here is not the loss of plan assets but instead the risking of the
trust's assets"); Sandoval v. Simmons, 622 F. Supp. 1174, 1212, 1216 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (citing
Leigh).
[Vol. 41:575
COMMON LA W OF PLANS
an order compelling the wrongdoing fiduciary to compensate the plan for its
monetary losses. But in cases not involving misuse of plan assets, the proper
remedy may be an order, for example, that the provisions of the plan be fol-
lowed, that an untrustworthy fiduciary be removed from his position of respon-
sibility, or that some other threat to the realization of benefit expectations be
eliminated.
These examples show how the conclusions reached in the first two parts of
the Article can straightforwardly be applied to current issues in plan common
law. Additional examples could be provided, and the analyses given above
pushed to greater depth. To do so, however, would not greatly contribute to
development of a general framework for plan common law-the principal aim
of this Article. Thus, we shall turn once again to more fundamental issues and
see how the conclusions so far reached can be applied to other structural issues
that the text of ERISA leaves unresolved. These issues are ones that must be
addressed if we are to have a complete framework for analysis of problems
such as the ones just discussed. Thus we turn to the important foundational
questions: What is the employer's relation to its plan? What is a plan?
II. THE EMPLOYER'S LEGAL RELATION TO ITS PLAN
ERISA recalibrates the balance of interests in a plan. That is one of its
purposes. Before ERISA, case law treated the employer's interest in a pension
plan as essentially proprietary, and the plan itself as employer property not to
be meddled with by the courts. Correspondingly, employees were deemed not
to have any pension rights arising from the expectation-creating mechanism of
the plan; their rights were substantially limited to those that the employer had
voluntarily granted in the putative plan contract. ERISA rejects this calculus.
It recognizes that employee rights may exist irrespective of the employer's
wishes and irrespective of any putative contract, and it makes the employees'
interest in receiving anticipated benefits the paramount interest to be
furthered.
A. The Status of Employer Interests Under ERISA
But the statute itself tells only half the story. ERISA deals with employee
rights and their elevation to preeminence at great length. But what of the
employer's interests and rights with respect to plans? ERISA certainly does
not intend to nullify them. Employers still may use plans for most of their
traditional purposes. Yet, by contrast with its treatment of employee interests,
ERISA has little expressly to say about employer interests and the extent to
which they may be furthered and protected. How, then, are we to understand
the status of the employer's interest under the law of benefit plans?
Statutory silence is not the only obstacle. ERISA's central fiduciary require-
ment, the so-called "exclusive benefit" rule, requires that any plan fiduciary
"discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of partici-
pants and their beneficiaries and .. .for the exclusive purpose of providing
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benefits to participants and their beneficiaries. 250 Because the fiduciaries are
the persons who manage and administer the plan,2 51 the rule, in effect, re-
quires that employee benefit plans be managed and administered "solely in the
interest of participants and their beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive pur-
pose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries." No allow-
ance is permitted for employer interests. 252 Some have argued that the exclu-
sive benefit rule undermines legal recognition of employer interests in their
plans . 5
But that is not the result the statute demands. Our discussion of ERISA's
structure and legislative history shows that Congress did recognize and did
intend to protect an employer's continuing interest in its plan. And so the
question then becomes one of how, in light of the exclusive benefit rule, the
common law of plans should accommodate employer interests.
The key to understanding the legal status of employer interest in plans is to
recognize that ERISA, with its exclusive benefit rule, does not encompass the
whole of benefit plan law. The potential scope of benefit plan law is deter-
mined by the potential field of plan-related activity: roughly speaking, by what
plans can do and by what can be done to them. Employee benefit plans are
ongoing activities, established by employers for their own business purposes.
They are not inert retirement savings programs or trust accounts. There is an
enormous variety of things that plans, as enterprises, can do and that can be
done to or with respect to them254 and that, accordingly, may be the subject of
250. ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
251.'ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
252. This is not the only such statutory restriction. A supplement to the exclusive benefit rule
provides that "the assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be
held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their benefi-
ciaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1). Other fiduciary provisions, in particular the prohibited transaction rules,
reinforce the principle that the fiduciaries' obligations are to focus singlemindedly on the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries in receiving anticipated benefits. ERISA § 406(b)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1106(b)(l).
253. See Daniel Fischel & John Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclu-
sive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1118 (1988). The authors state:
Because . . . the employer and the employee both benefit from the pension or wel-
fare benefit plan, there is an obvious difficulty in interpreting the exclusive benefit
rule. The plans are established for the mutual advantage of employer and employee,
not for the exclusive benefit of one. The exclusive benefit rule on its face is inconsis-
tent with the economic realities of plans.
Id.
254. Under ERISA, a plan is a legal entity, entirely distinct from both the employer of the
participants and the union (if any) to which the participants belong. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Work-
ers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 373 (1990) (stating plan and union sponsor were "distinct
entities," and wrong by plan fiduciary to union sponsor was not wrong to the plan remediable
under ERISA). As an autonomous legal entity, a plan may sue or be sued, ERISA § 502(d)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(l), engage its own legal counsel, enter into contracts, own property, make
loans and investments, hire employees, and otherwise transact business, ERISA §§ 406(a),
408(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a), 1108(b). Plans can also be established, amended, terminated, col-
lectively bargained over, and used in a myriad of ways for purposes of improving employee rela-
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rules and principles of benefit plan law.
But the scope of ERISA is limited. ERISA deals mainly with the ongoing
operation of the plan-with its character as a program for providing benefits
to employees. So, too, does the exclusive benefit rule. It is concerned with the
integrity of the ongoing program of providing benefits for employees and re-
quires only that plans and their assets be managed and administered according
to its strictures. 65 It does not require, for example, that plans be established
solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to,
participants and beneficiaries.256 By its silence, the exclusive-benefit rule leaves
an entire domain of plan-related activity-roughly that which is not part of
plan management and administration-outside its scope. That part includes
plan establishment, amendment, and termination, as well as employer business
activity having an impact on the plan. That other domain of plan-related ac-
tivity is the domain in which employer interests may properly be taken into
account (unless other laws provide to the contrary). Indeed, it is the domain in
which employer interests might prevail over employee interests. Thus the key
to understanding how employer interests can be accommodated under benefit
plan law is to recognize that ERISA is part, but far from all, of it.
B. Ramifications for the Common Law of Plans
This observation is not entirely new. Courts have had little difficulty recog-
nizing that the exclusive-benefit rule, and ERISA's other fiduciary require-
ments, are not all-encompassing. It is well recognized, for example, that the
fiduciary standards do not govern the establishment of a plan and selection of
tions. They can be used as tools of corporate finance. They can be subjects of negotiation in
corporate sale transactions. For discussions of some of the roles of plans in business and the econ-
omy, see, e.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (1982); IPPOLITO,
supra note 48; Robert C. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Man-
agement Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 571-73 (1981).
255. See ERISA §§ 3(21)(A), 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(A), 1104(a)(1); Musto v.
American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 912 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
"For the most part ... fiduciary responsibilities with respect to qualified trusts relate to the
receipt, handling, investment of, and disposition of, employer, and, if applicable, employee contri-
butions." MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
582 (1990).
256. Consider what the exclusive benefit rule could have provided and how it could have sub-jected a broader class of activity to its "exclusive benefit" mandate. Consider I.R.C. § 401(a)
(1988), which is contained in Title 1H of ERISA. Section 401(a) requires that, to qualify for
favorable tax treatment, a pension trust must be part of a plan that is "for the exclusive benefit of
• . . employees or their beneficiaries." I.R.C. § 401(a). This rule has been construed by the Trea-
sury Department, consistent with its broad language, to impose an "exclusive benefit" requirement
on both the establishment and the operation of the plan. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401-1(a)(3)(ii), 1.401-
l(b)(3) (1991). There is no inconsistency between the Code exclusive benefit rule and the Title I
exclusive benefit rule, because the Code provision antedates ERISA and imposes substantive re-
quirements different from those imposed under Title 1. The Code requirement is concerned mainly
with prohibiting discrimination among classes of employees and preventing use of plans as subter-
fuges to avoid income tax.
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its terms, 57 the termination of a plan,258 the amendment of a plan, 59 the sale
of the business with which the plan is associated, 260 or the personnel activities
of an employer. 261 Courts have recognized that the employer is largely free to
pursue its own interests in these circumstances, without automatically expos-
ing itself to liability for breach of fiduciary duty.262 Yet there are important,
and generally unappreciated, ramifications for plan common law of this mode
of accommodating employer interests.
To begin, these areas of plan-related activity beyond the scope of the exclu-
sive-benefit rule are areas for development of plan common law. ERISA's rela-
tive inattention to them is no bar to further legal development. ERISA
preempts all state laws relating to plan establishment, amendment, and termi-
nation-subjects that are expressly dealt with by the statute.263 It also
preempts many other areas of state law that deal with the employer's relation-
ship to its plan and that accordingly "relate to" a plan within the meaning of
ERISA's preemption provision. 26" But to the extent that ERISA itself fails to
supply the replacement rules, a domain is left where federal common lawmak-
ing must fill in the gaps.2 65
Courts do not always appreciate this. For example, in Berlin v. Michigan
257. Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 1075, 1079 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
281 (1989); Trenton v. Scott Paper Co., 832 F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1022 (1988).
258. Young v. Standard Oil, 849 F.2d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981
(1988); Cunha v. Ward foods, Inc., 804 F.2d 1418, 1432 (9th Cir. 1986); United Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers of Am. v. Amcast Indus. Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
259. Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1990); Adams v. Avondale In-
dus., 905 F.2d 943 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 517 (1990); Chait v. Bernstein, 645 F.
Supp. 1092, 1100 (D.N.J. 1986).
260. Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406, 411 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984); Coleman v. General Elec. Co., 643 F. Supp. 1229, 1239 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986), affid, 822 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1987).
261. Hickman v. Tosco Corp., 840 F.2d 564, 566-67 (8th Cir. 1988).
262. ERISA imposes other nonfiduciary restrictions on some aspects of these activities. In es-
tablishing a pension plan, the employer must ensure that it satisfies the minimum participation,
accrual vesting, and other standards. ERISA §§ 201-308, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1086 (1988); I.R.C.
§ 401(a) (1988). In terminating a pension plan, the employer must satisfy the procedural and
substantive rules of Title IV of ERISA. ERISA § 4001iff, 29 U.S.C. § 1301ff. In amending a plan,
the employer cannot reduce accrued benefits of the participants. ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. §
1054(g). In dealing with its employees, the employer cannot interfere with protected rights.
ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140. But these are specific and limited requirements. There is no duty
on the employer or anyone else to act in these circumstances exclusively or even primarily to
further the employees' interest in receiving expected benefits.
263. E.g., Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1990); Rasmussen v. Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 675 F. Supp. 1497 (W.D. La. 1987); see ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(stating that "the provisions of [Title I and Title IV of ERISA] shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan").
264. E.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990) (preempting state wrongful
discharge law).
265. See generally Conison, supra note 3, at 1098-1117; Ray & Halpern, supra note 13;
BRUCE. supra note 12, at 299-300.
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Bell Telephone Co.,2"6 the issue for decision was the appropriate rule of liabil-
ity, if any, for certain representations made by the employer-administrator. In
that case, the employer had established a special early retirement program to
help prune the workforce of a superabundance of managers. Initially, the plan
was offered for only two months. Subsequently, employees approaching retire-
ment age began to ask the employer whether there would be a reactivation of
the plan. To discourage these and other employees from delaying retirement
because of the prospect of benefits under the plan, company officers stated that
reactivation would be unlikely. They allegedly continued to say this even after
"serious consideration" had been given to reactivation. After the employer
again offered early retirement benefits under the plan, employees who had not
delayed their retirement in reliance on the representations sued. All parties
agreed that the employer's decision to reactivate the plan was a business deci-
sion not subject to ERISA's fiduciary rules. They disagreed, however, as to
whether the employer's representations about the reactivation of the plan were
nonetheless governed by ERISA's rules of fiduciary conduct. Apparently be-
lieving that there could be no liability imposed on the employer unless the
representations were found to be governed by ERISA's fiduciary standards,
the court strained to conclude (without any plausible justification)2 67 that the
representations were made as part of plan administration. On this basis, it
permitted a suit for breach of fiduciary duty to proceed.
But such contortions were not needed to justify the sensible result that the
representations could be a basis for liability. For even if the representations
had been made in the course of the employer's plan-related business conduct,
and thus not governed by ERISA's fiduciary rules, there still might be liability
under plan common law. Indeed, because the conduct in question was a course
of employer representations about benefits that was designed to affect em-
ployee conduct through creation of expectations, the practice invoked a central
concern of ERISA. A common-law rule to protect employees' expectations
here would seem highly appropriate.2 68
266. 858 F.2d 1154 (6th Cir. 1988).
267. To the extent the court offered any rationale, it was that a fiduciary may not mislead plan
participants. Id. at 1163. But this rationale proves too much. The basic question before the court
was whether ERISA's fiduciary duties forbid fiduciaries from misleading participants; if so, then
from misleading participants about what. The court's rationale would impose liability under the
fiduciary provisions for any misrepresentation, regardless of whether it had any bearing on plan
management or administration.
In Payonk v. HMW Industries, 883 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989), the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals purported to distinguish Berlin, and held that the failure to disclose an impending plan
termination was not governed by ERISA's fiduciary rules. The basis for distinction was sheer ipse
dixit-a flat assertion that there was a difference between misrepresentation and nondisclosure.
Id. at 226.
268. Courts have had similar trouble dealing with alleged misrepresentations by employers re-
garding the formation of a plan. The difficulty commonly arises when courts must determine
whether state-law claims based on the alleged misrepresentations are preempted. Apparently be-
cause of their belief that preemption of state law would leave the employees without a remedy,
some courts have refused to find the state claims to be preempted, even though on their face they
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This common law of employer nonfiduciary activity should be no mere col-
lection of isolated rules or groups of rules. Even some who understand that the
exclusive-benefit rule is not all-encompassing lapse into a view of plan estab-
lishment, plan termination, and other areas outside its purview as limited "ex-
ceptions" to the rule.269 But that is an erroneous view of the relationship be-
tween the exclusive-benefit rule and these areas of employer plan-related
activity. To view these areas as if they were enclaves carved out of the exclu-
sive-benefit rule is to assume that the exclusive-benefit rule presumptively ap-
plies to all plan-related activity and that special considerations must exist to
take a matter out of its scope. But ERISA limits the scope of the exclusive-
benefit rule and does not intend it to be the fundamental axiom for all of
benefit plan law. The exclusive-benefit rule acts on the preexisting background
of benefit plan law by reversing the priority of interests within its delimited
scope. It is just as proper to view the exclusive-benefit rule as an "exception"
to the whole of benefit plan law as it is to view the rest of benefit plan law as
an exception to the exclusive-benefit rule.
What does result, though, is heterogeneity in benefit plan law. Employer
and employee rights with respect to plans derive from very different sources.
Employer rights derive from the status of the plan as a business program of
the employer, and the employer interest arguably is proprietary. On the other
hand, the employees' rights and interests in a plan derive from the plan's crea-
tion of group expectations concerning benefits. Traditional plan common law
did not appreciate the differing sources and characters of these interests and
did not understand how to accommodate them. Thus, it proceeded mechani-
cally by presuming that employer rights and interests were paramount and
that they could be limited to favor employees only through application of con-
tract principles. This was the approach taken for all aspects of benefit plan
law. For example, the employer's right to terminate its plan was determined in
substantially the same way as was its right to terminate an individual em-
ployee's right to benefits.27 And substantially the same rule emerged in the
two cases.
ERISA changes this. It recognizes that employer and employee interests
have different natures and that they relate to different aspects of plans. It does
not impose an artificial homogeneity on the law. The exclusive-benefit rule
deals with the employee interest in expected benefits, and it makes protection
of such interest the dominant principle in the part of plan common law where
it is appropriate-the part concerned with ongoing plan operation. Necessa-
relate to a plan. See, e.g., Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1166 (1990) (holding that state law action for rescission of plan was not
preempted).
269. See, e.g., Norman Stein, Trust Law and Pension Plans, in PROXY VOTING OF PENSION
PLAN EQUITY SECURITIES 1, 39 (Dan M. McGill ed., 1989).
270. Compare, e.g., Twiss v. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co., 287 N.W. 620, 622 (Neb. 1939) (involv-
ing individual claim for benefits) with Cowles v. Morris & Co., 161 N.E. 150, 154 (II1. 1928)
(involving plan termination).
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rily, this part of plan common law will be very different from the correspond-
ing part of plan common law before ERISA. But in the remainder of plan
common law, there is no exclusive-benefit rule to determine the priority of
interests. Instead, the interests of the employer and the employees, and the
potentially applicable policies, must be weighed and resolved on a case-by-case
basis. Appropriate rules must be advanced, tested, and refined through ordi-
nary caselaw development. In this area, pre-ERISA common law need not be
rejected out of hand. Indeed, although its rules may not be adopted uncriti-
cally, they still may be starting points for common law development. 71
Of course, this part of the law of plans cannot be as stringently protective of
employer interests as was pre-ERISA common law. Several factors preclude
this. First, as we have seen, the traditional common law of plans is concep-
tually unsound, and its rules would have to be rethought even if ERISA had
never been enacted. Second, ERISA demonstrates some concern with protect-
ing employee benefit interests in this area. For example, ERISA makes it un-
lawful for employers (and others) to "discharge, fine, suspend, expel, disci-
pline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan
[or ERISAI." 2 This prohibition, as well as the more general principles it
reflects, must be taken into account in developing common law rules to govern
employer business conduct relating to plans. Finally, ERISA's core protective
policies may properly be extended (although, perhaps, in an attenuated form)
into the realm of employer nonfiduciary conduct. For example, the employer
conduct in Berlin is so similar to ERISA's main regulatory concern that a
strong case can be made for regulating it through a common law, expectation-
protecting rule.
As a result of the division of benefit plan law into heterogeneous realms, it is
important to be able to determine just where the line of demarcation should be
drawn. In a sense, it is easy to do this. The exclusive-benefit rule is itself the
reason for the difference, and so the line of demarcation should be the line
dividing fiduciary from nonfiduciary functions, that between plan manage-
ment, administration, and asset management on the one side, and everything
else on the other. Unfortunately, as the example of Berlin shows, it is not
always clear whether or not employer conduct constitutes plan management or
administration. ERISA itself does not define those terms. It provides a few
examples but no other express guidance. Ultimately, the problem of demarca-
tion must be resolved by reference to congressional intent regarding the appro-
priate scope of the exclusive-benefit rule. A few courts have recognized this. 27 3
Most, however, have not recognized the importance of congressional intent and
so differentiate the two parts of benefit-plan law on a purely impressionistic
271. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (stating that although rules
of commercial law developed pursuant to Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), have no continuing
independent validity, they may be "a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal rules").
272. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
273. See, e.g., Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1990).
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basis. To delimit the scope of the exclusive-benefit rule, thus, is an essential
structural task for the common law of plans.
C. The End of Contract Analysis
Understanding the heterogeneous structure of plan common law can help
one appreciate why contract metaphors are not needed-and are indeed inap-
propriate-to describe plans and plan relationships. Consider, for example, the
contractual theory of plans and the employer's relation with its plan that has
recently been urged by Professors Fischel and Langbein.27"
Professors Fischel and Langbein begin with the important insight that, as a
matter of "economic realities," both employers and employees have interests
in plans. With this one can fully agree. But in trying to provide a framework
for accommodating these interests, they minimize the fact that plans are em-
ployer business programs275 and, instead, treat plans as essentially contracts
for deferred compensation. It is axiomatic, they say, that "employee benefit
plans are part of a total compensation package agreed upon by employer and
employee"; 276 they are bargained-for agreements.2" As Fischel and Langbein
explain:
Employees pay for pensions in the form of lower wages. Thus, employees
will bargain for plans only if the benefits anticipated exceed the income
foregone....
Pension and other benefit plans will not be established unless they are in
the mutual interest of employers and employees. Plans are strictly voluntary
arrangements. 21
8
But this contractual reconciliation of interests, they assert, immediately
leads to a "fundamental contradiction." If plans are established and adminis-
tered in the interests of both employers and employees,2 79 then the exclusive-
274. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 253; see also Langbein, supra note 22.
275. Of course, they realize that.plans may have business uses, Fischel & Langbein, supra note
253, at 1118, but make this feature a secondary consideration for purposes of analysis.
276. Id. at 1117.
277. It is not wholly clear how one should understand their discussion of the bargaining and
agreement supposedly involved in benefit plans. Sometimes they appear to have in mind the eco-
nomic construct of implied contract that is sometimes used in econometric modeling of the em-
ployment relationship and the labor market. See supra note 65. For example, they assert that
legal rules should "approximate the bargain the parties would have struck had they been able to
anticipate and resolve all . . . problems," Fischel & Langbein, supra note 253, at 1116, and so
appear to have in mind hypothetical bargains. Yet in other places they appear to have in mind
real agreements and real bargains. For example, they reject economic evidence of an implied
contract term that defined benefit plans should not be terminated (absent business necessity), see
IPPOLITO. supra note 48, ch. 3, because "[tihe persistent failure to spell out the term suggests that
it does not exist." Fischel & Langbein, supra note 253, at 1152 n.164. The argument presupposes
a real agreement in which the term might be included.
278. Id. at 1117 (footnote omitted).
279. Plans, they say, "are established for the mutual advantage of the employer and employee,
not for the exclusive benefit of one." Id. at 1118.
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benefit rule, by compelling plan fiduciaries to disregard legitimate employer
interests, meddles and serves to defeat the employer-employee bargain.280 Ei-
ther the contractual view of plans or the exclusive-benefit rule must yield.
Professors Fischel and Langbein opt for the latter alternative. They argue that
the exclusive-benefit rule must be modified or construed so as to take into
account all contractual interests in the plan, including the employer's. As a
solution, they urge that the exclusive-benefit rule be applied so that employers
are treated as beneficiaries for some applications of the rule.28" '
But this analysis is based on incorrect premises.282 It fails to recognize that
plans are ongoing employer programs and that, while employers and employ-
ees do both have interests in the plan, their interests center on, and derive
from, different features and aspects of it. The theory fails to recognize that the
program itself gives rise to employer rights in the business aspects of the pro-
gram and employee rights in anticipated benefits-all without the need for
any supposed bargain to justify or explain those rights. Failure to recognize
this interferes with recognition that the exclusive-benefit rule governs only a
part of plan law and plan-related activity. The supposed "fundamental contra-
diction" of the exclusive-benefit rule disappears once one recognizes the con-
tract metaphor has been displaced by ERISA.
III. WHAT Is A PLAN?
ERISA takes plans and plan formation as given.2 83 The statute contains no
280. Some economists also make this point. One, for example, writes:
The wide variety of pension arrangements [before the enactment of ERISA] presum-
ably reflected differences among firms and employees in the goals and preferences of
pension plans. The particular set of pension arrangements that prevailed between a
firm and its employees was probably the "best" set of features that could be agreed
upon after explicit or implicit bargaining. The package of features, such as vesting
requirements and funding policies, reflected a bargained solution. To the extent that
ERISA alters the package of features, it disturbs a noncoercively determined pension
arrangement. ERISA forces recontracting ....
LOGUE, supra note 47, at 63.
281. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 253, at 1128 (citation omitted). Under this theory, pro-
tection of employee expectations is no longer so central a part of ERISA's regulatory scheme. An
example of the change can be seen in the treatment by Professors Fischel and Langbein of em-
ployer use of plan assets to help acquire other companies or defend against hostile takeover bids.
In their view, there is no necessary risk to the participants and beneficiaries from such employer
use of plan assets, particularly if the plan is well funded, because the company will have to make
up any losses. Id. at 1139-40, 1142-43; see also Langbein, supra note 22, at 131. But this conclu-
sion misconstrues the purpose of ERISA's fiduciary rules, which is to minimize the risk that em-
ployee pension expectations are disappointed. ERISA takes a belt-and-suspenders approach to
protecting employee expectations. Part of the protection is safeguarding plan assets, mainly
through funding rules, plan termination insurance, and fiduciary rules. But it does not follow from
the fact that the funding rules and plan termination insurance themselves do a good job of insur-
ing sufficient assets to pay benefits that the fiduciary rules designed to provide the same protection
are superfluous.
282. For a different criticism of the proposal, see Stein, supra note 269, at 36-38.
283. As the congressional findings in ERISA begin:
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definition of "plan" or clarification of the concept, 8" and it provides no rules
or tests to help determine when a plan has been established. Instead, it im-
poses its regulatory structure as if there were no uncertainty over what a plan
is. This silence means that the subject matter of ERISA must be worked out.
through common law development.
At the outset, it is vital to emphasize one important point: The ultimate
function of any test purporting to define the concept "plan," as used by
ERISA, is to determine whether ERISA governs a given situation. ERISA is
about plans and only plans, 285 and little elsewhere in the law turns on whether
or not something is a plan. Virtually the only reason to ask the question, Is
this a plan? is to ascertain whether ERISA applies.
In recent years two common law theories have emerged that try to delineate
the meaning of "plan" under ERISA. One approach originated with the deci-
sion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Donovan v. Dillingham,2 86
and has been adopted by several other courts. 287 The other approach has been
used by the Supreme Court but thus far has had little influence. We shall
consider the Dillingham approach first.
A. The Dillingham Test
The Dillingham court framed its definition of "plan" as a test for the exis-
tence (or establishment) of a plan in circumstances where no comprehensive
plan document is to be found. The court explained that "a 'plan, fund, or
program' under ERISA is established if from the surrounding circumstances a
reasonable person can ascertain the intended benefits, a class of beneficiaries,
the source of financing, and the procedures for receiving benefits." '288 Thus, the
test ultimately serves to limit ERISA's coverage to those situations where "a
reasonable person can ascertain the intended benefits, a class of beneficiaries,
the source of financing, and the procedures for receiving benefits."
The Dillingham court did not give any reasons for its choice of factors.
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit
plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and
economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the continued well-being
and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by
these plans ....
ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
284. "Plan" is defined by ERISA only as a shorthand term for "an employee welfare benefit
plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both . ERISA § 3(3), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(3).
285. This statement is subject to the limited exception that some portions of ERISA included in
the Code deal with retirement vehicles that are not necessarily plans under Title I. See I.R.C. §§
401(c), (d), 408(a) (1988).
286. 688 F.2d 1367 (1lth Cir. 1982).
287. See, e.g., Brown v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 1989); McIntyre
v. Okurowski, 717 F. Supp. 10, 11-12 (D. Mass. 1989); James v. National Business Sys., 721 F.
Supp. 169, 175 (N.D. Ind. 1989); Molyneux v. Arthur Guiness & Sons, P.L.C., 616 F. Supp. 240,
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
288. Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1373.
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Nonetheless, they have a superficial plausibility, since a plan surely must in-
volve beneficiaries, benefits, financing, and a means to obtain benefits. Yet de-
spite this superficial plausibility, the test is inappropriate and inconsistent with
the purposes of ERISA.
To begin, the test is misguided in its emphasis on ascertainability of plan
terms. In this emphasis, the test appears to reflect a contract orientation, be-
cause definiteness of terms is an essential condition for the existence of a le-
gally enforceable contract.2 89 This is false analogizing. Contract law is an idio-
syncratic branch of law in that it is not primarily concerned with regulating
anything.2 90 Instead, it is principally concerned with the structural issue of
when certain formal categories of promises may be judicially enforced. For
purposes of contract law, to ask whether a contract exists in a given circum-
stance is to ask whether the promises made in that circumstance should be
enforced, solely on the basis of contract formation rules. 291
Contract law thus deals with enforcement of promises irrespective of the
promise's content. Since it is not limited to any special area of promising or
any special kind of economic activity, from its perspective there is an endless
variety of kinds of terms a contract might contain. As a result, the general law
of contracts must condition enforceability of a contract (that is to say, the
existence of a contract) on definiteness of the contract's terms. Otherwise,
there could be no rational basis, within the framework of contract law, to
determine what terms or promises should be enforced. Contract law alone,
because it is subject-matter indifferent, would have no way to fill in missing
details. By contrast, in well-defined areas of contracting-for example, in the
law of sales or employment contracts-gap-fillers have emerged, from custom
or through judicial development, to supply missing terms or to clarify indefi-
nite ones. In these specialized areas, the requirement of definiteness has ac-
cordingly been reduced.
But ERISA is not like contract law. ERISA is a body of regulatory law,
and unlike contract law, the key question is not whether a plan should be
"enforced." Rather, as even the Dillingham court recognizes, to ask whether
an arrangement is a plan is to ask whether it should be subject to ERISA's
scheme of regulation. Thus, the Dillingham test, by implicitly addressing the
contract-oriented issue of enforcement, addresses the wrong question.' 92
289. 1 CORBIN. supra note 68, § 95, at 394-95.
290. Indeed, contract law is often thought of as the law of unregulated business activity. See,
e.g., FRIEDMAN. supra note 66, at 23 (stating that "the law of contracts concerns and provides
support for the residue of economic behavior left unregulated (the free market)").
291. See generally I CORBIN, supra note 68, § 1, at 2-3.
292. Of course, there may be occasions where the reason one needs to determine whether a
practice is subject to ERISA is that an individual is seeking to enforce a benefit claim. See, e.g.,
James v. National Business Sys., 721 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ind. 1989); Molyneux v. Arthur Guiness
& Sons, P.L.C., 616 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). But even then, the issue is whether the
individual's claim is enforceable under ERISA, and so there still remains the threshold question of
whether the practice as a whole is governed by ERISA.
A further flaw in Dillingham's contract-oriented requirement of definiteness is that ERISA
19921
648 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:575
A deeper problem with the Dillingham test is that it begs the question. The
question to be answered is that of what employer activities ERISA regulates.
But why should it be thought to follow, from the mere informality or sloppi-
ness of an employer's activities, that they are not ones ERISA seeks to regu-
late? If a source of financing cannot be identified for an employer program
relating to payment of benefits, then either the program is not a plan or it is a
plan in violation of ERISA. The Dillingham test, without any attempt at justi-
fication, simply assumes the former. But just as the failure of a benefit pro-
gram to be established pursuant to a document does not prevent it from being
an ERISA plan,2"' and may mean only that it is a plan subject to but in
violation of ERISA, the failure of a practice to satisfy one or more of the
Dillingham criteria may simply mean that it is a plan, but one that fails to
comply with ERISA.20'
The upshot of accepting Dillingham, then, is that ERISA would not protect
employee expectations created by programs or practices in which the terms are
indefinite. This is not even a remotely tenable proposition. Where an employer
constantly assures employees, for example, only that they will be taken care of
by the company upon retirement, the employer presumably is making the as-
surances for its own self-interest-to promote contentment among the
itself contains a plethora of gap fillers and other means to supply missing details. For example, in
a suit to recover pension benefits under an indefinite plan, it is not necessarily a fatal objection
that the employer never specified what the amount of pension benefits would be. One solution is a
restitutionary approach, discussed below. See infra note 294. Alternatively, courts could supply a
gap filler through custom and evidence of what is reasonable. In defined benefit plans (which an
unfunded pension plan would have to be deemed to be), pension benefits frequently are calculated
through a formula of the character Y x F x P, where "Y" refers to years-of-service credits, "F"
refers to final pay or average pay over a several-year period, and "P" refers to a percentage,
generally in the range of one to two percent. See, e.g., Canan, supra note 255, at 150-51. ERISA
itself constrains the allowable forms for these variables, ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1988);
any residual uncertainty may be cured through application of a reasonableness standard. Cf.
U.C.C. § 2-305 (implying a "reasonable price" where contract for sale of goods omits price term).
293. Curiously, the Dillingham court itself recognized that ERISA must be construed so as to
apply to informal unwritten plans. As the court explained:
[B]ecause the policy of ERISA is to safeguard the well-being and security of working
men and women and to apprise them of their rights and obligations under any em-
ployee benefit plan . . . it would be incongruous for persons establishing or maintain-
ing informal or unwritten employee benefit plans . . . to circumvent the Act merely
because an administrator or other fiduciary failed to satisfy reporting or fiduciary
standards.
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11 th Cir. 1982). Precisely this reasoning can be
applied to the court's ascertainability-of-terms test to show it to be inappropriate.
294. A further flaw in the Dillinghan test is its implication that a program whose terms are
not communicated to employees cannot be a plan subject to ERISA. See, e.g., Molyneux, 616 F.
Supp. at 244. This is obviously fallacious, since ERISA is deeply concerned with plans that do not
adequately disclose information to employees. See Brown v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d
546, 551 (6th Cir. 1989). Moreover, Congress ultimately rejected provisions in several precursor
bills that had defined "benefit plans" for purposes of coverage as "any plan, fund, or program
which is communicated or its benefits described in writing to the employees." See, e.g., H.R. 2,
supra note 163, § 3(l), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 6,
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workforce, for example-and is creating expectations among the employees to
further that goal. Such an informal employer practice generates precisely the
same concerns as does a large, systematically administered plan, the terms of
which can be ascertained from "the surrounding circumstances." Indeed, it
may present even greater risks of defeating employee expectations, precisely
because the terms cannot be ascertained and because of the lack of reasonably
definite mechanisms for ensuring that expectations are fulfilled.
This consideration points to a still deeper fallacy that underlies the Dilling-
ham test-the focus on activity relating to benefit payment as the kind of
activity to which the criteria for the existence of a plan relate. The Dillingham
test really seeks to determine whether the activity in question is benefit pay-
ment activity. But as the legislative history of ERISA makes clear, the focus
of regulatory concern is benefit representation activity, because that is the
source of risk and harm. Whether a plan exists-whether ERISA regulation is
necessary and appropriate-must be made to depend on employer representa-
tions and employee expectations, not on the benefits that may or may not be
provided. A properly operating plan, of course, involves both benefits and ben-
efit expectations, but it is the expectations, not the benefits, that serve as the
primary trigger for ERISA regulation.
Of course, where programs are highly informal, practical difficulties may
arise when an employee seeks benefits. It is here that the Dillingham ap-
proach, which implicitly is concerned with problems of enforcement, has a
point: The terms of an unwritten plan may have to be ascertained circumstan-
tially by examining the employer's practice and other material features of the
surrounding circumstances. But use of this approach is appropriate only after
a prior determination, on other grounds, that a plan does exist. 5
B. The Functional Approach
A sounder approach to the question, What is a plan? has been taken by the
Supreme Court in two recent cases. 96 The approach is functional. Rather
295. It is also important to recognize that the Dillingham approach, even when used in this
evidentiary way, has its limits. There may be times when the terms of a plan cannot be ascer-
tained with any specificity, not even from the surrounding circumstances. But this does not mean
that there is no plan and it does not mean that an employee cannot recover expected benefits. To
so hold would again permit employer disregard of ERISA to justify defeat of employee expecta-
tions. All that the unascertainability of terms from surrounding circumstances means is that other
methods must be relied upon to fill in the missing terms. ERISA itself may sometimes supply
them, at least for pension plans, through its minimum standards. Cf Nedrow v. McFarlane &
Hays Co. Employees' Profit Sharing Plan & Trust, 476 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (supply-
ing terms through minimum vesting standards where plan's stated vesting schedule violated
ERISA); see also supra note 292. In other cases, a different approach may be necessary. For
pension plans, if the key term-level of benefits-must be supplied, a restitutionary measure may
be appropriate based on ERISA's recognition of the pension in some respects as deferred
compensation.
296. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. I (1987).
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than listing mechanical criteria, it straightforwardly considers whether the em-
ployer practice in question is of a kind that reasonably calls for the type of
regulation provided by ERISA.
Massachusetts v. Morash297 is one example of this approach. There, the
Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether a company's policy
of paying discharged employees for their unused vacation time from the gen-
eral assets of the employer constituted a benefit plan subject to ERISA. The
Court held that it did not. Although it agreed that the policy probably would
have been held subject to ERISA had the benefits been paid from a separate
fund, it concluded that the program as structured did not create any of the
risks that ERISA was enacted to reduce. In particular, the plan did not pre-
sent any risk of defeated employee expectations of the kind with which ERISA
was concerned:
In enacting ERISA, Congress' primary concern was with the mismanage-
ment of funds accumulated to finance employee benefits and the failure to
pay employees benefits from accumulated funds. To that end, it established
extensive reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duty requirements to insure
against the possibility that the employee's expectation of the benefit would
be defeated through poor management by the plan administrator. Because
ordinary vacation payments are typically fixed, due at known times, and do
not depend on contingencies outside the employee's control, they present
none of the risks that ERISA is intended to address. If there is a danger of
defeated expectations, it is no different from the danger of defeated expecta-
tions of wages for services performed-a danger Congress chose not to regu-
late in ERISA. " 8
Thus, because the question of what a plan is really is the question of what
kinds of activity ERISA should govern, a functional approach that closely con-
siders ERISA's purposes and policies is required.
Because ERISA is based on several purposes and policies, a functional ap-
proach to coverage likely would lead to a large and heterogeneous class of
activities being deemed plans. But that is precisely what should result: ERISA
on its face intends to deal with a large and heterogeneous class of programs,
ranging from informal severance pay arrangements to highly structured, mul-
tibillion dollar pension plans. Indeed, in light of this diversity, there is no rea-
son to suppose that a single black-letter definition or a single list of factors
could ever hope to capture the many varieties of employer activity that are of
concern for ERISA. 99
It also follows that one cannot provide much refinement for such a test in
vacuo. Common law development is essential. Still, it is possible to sketch
some basic considerations that can help clarify the test and make it more
297. 490 U.S. 107 (1989).
298. Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
299. Of course, patterns emerge and rules develop for evaluating certain categories of benefit
programs. See, e.g., Brundage-Peterson v. Compcare Health Serv. Ins. Corp., 877 F.2d 509 (7th
Cir. 1989) (health insurance plan).
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effective.
1. An Employment-Based Practice that Relates to Benefits for Employees
As a purely descriptive matter, there is no plan unless there is an employ-
ment-based practice or course of conduct that relates to benefits for employ-
ees. This basic requirement has three components: that there be a practice,
that it relate to benefits, and that it be employment-based. The third require-
ment is reasonably straightforward,300 but the first two demand some elabora-
tion. Let us take them in turn.
a. A practice
For there to be a plan, there must be a practice. In particular, there must be
some employer activity that can potentially give rise to employee expectations
about pensions or other benefits. "Practice" here means expectation-generat-
ing activity. Some courts, following Dillingham, have treated the requirement
of a practice as a requirement that "the decision to extend benefits has become
a reality,"' ' but this is clearly improper. Whether there is a practice should
not depend on the concreteness of the employer's intention to extend benefits
through the activity. Rather, the focus should be on the employees' under-
standing of the employers' activity as a holding out of the prospect of benefits.
A program or practice exists where there is activity creating expectations that
may be disappointed.
To require a practice, in this sense, is also to require something other than
an employment contract or a series of employment contracts.302 There are fun-
damental differences between plans and contracts, which the law of plans must
recognize. This is not to say that a plan cannot be established pursuant to a
contract; however, as an employer business program, it must also be some-
thing else.
Finally, the practice must be one addressed to a group of employees, not
just to a single employee in isolation. The benefit expectations to be protected
under ERISA are group expectations, ones arising from programs that make
use of the prospect of a benefit to induce conduct beneficial to the enterprise.
An isolated representation about benefits made to an employee is not a prac-
tice and it does not invoke the group-expectation concerns of ERISA 303 Of
course there are bases for enforcing individualized representations under the
common law of plans, but the rationale for enforcement is different from the
300. See, e.g., Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Ins. Trust v. Iowa State Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 804 F.2d
1059 (8th Cir. 1986); Baucom v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 674 F. Supp. 1175 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
301. Ed Miniat, Inc. v. Globe Life Ins. Group, Inc., 805 F.2d 732, 739 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987).
302. See Lackey v. Whitehall Corp., 704 F. Supp. 201 (D. Kan. 1988); McQueen v. Salida
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 652 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Colo. 1987).
•303. Failure to recognize this difference vitiates the argument in Loretta R. Richard, Note,
ERISA: Enforcing Oral Promises To Pay Employee Benefits, 28 B.C. L. REv. 723 (1987).
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rationale for ERISA regulation.
b. Benefits
Not only must there be a practice; the practice must relate to benefits. Two
points merit attention here. First, as explained above, this cannot be treated as
a requirement that the practice ever result in the actual payment of benefits.
The relevant concern is employee expectations of benefits.
Second, ERISA is affected by a view of benefits as compensation. It mainly
seeks to protect employee rights to benefits that have a monetary or compensa-
tory character and that are payable on an individualized basis. Thus, for ex-
ample, an employer's regular practice of extending to employees protection
against arbitrary dismissals after one year of service would not constitute an
employee benefit plan for purposes of ERISA because of the noncompensatory
character of the benefits offered. Of course, in a more generalized sense of the
term "plan" there may well be plans that offer such benefits to employees. But
while some of the principles and rules governing ERISA plans might sensibly
be applied to such programs, those rules would have to be made applicable as
part of a more general, not exclusively ERISA-based, plan common law.
2. The Regulatory Concerns of ERISA
A second, more substantive, set of considerations to be taken into account in
determining whether something is a plan are functional considerations. For an
employment-based practice relating to benefits to constitute a plan, it must not
only satisfy the descriptive criteria just discussed, it must also present some of
the risks and concerns that Congress intended ERISA to address.
To a great extent, the test has already taken into account these risks and
concerns. Both the requirement that the practice be of a kind giving rise to
group expectations and the requirement that the benefits in question be of a
compensatory character do just that. Yet, as Morash demonstrates, even if a
practice satisfies these descriptive criteria, there still may be reasons not to
deem it a plan. There is an independent, exclusionary role for this functional
requirement to play, particularly with respect to practices and programs relat-
ing to employee welfare benefits.
It is easy to see why this requirement is more important in dealing with
putative welfare benefit plans. The concerns of ERISA differ greatly, depend-
ing on whether a plan is a pension plan or a welfare benefit plan. 304 Pension
plans are the primary interest of ERISA, because disappointed pension expec-
tations can wreak the greatest private and public harm. Pension expectations
usually operate over a very long time and require complex mechanisms to en-
sure their fulfillment. Threats to the realization of those expectations abound,
both because of the multiplicity of ways in which they .may be defeated and
the long period in which they may be at risk. Programs creating pension ex-
304. See supra note 2 explaining pension plans and welfare plans.
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pectations normally invoke the full panoply of risks and concerns addressed by
ERISA, and most of ERISA's provisions apply to any pension plan. It would
thus be reasonable for the law of plans to presume that any employment-based
practice (in the sense just described) relating to retirement benefits is a plan
subject to ERISA.
But the situation is otherwise with welfare benefit plans. For welfare bene-
fits, the harm from defeated expectations ordinarily is less severe than in the
case of pension benefits and, absent a fund for the plan, there is less opportu-
nity for abuse and mismanagement. As a result, ERISA regulates welfare
benefit plans less extensively than it does pension plans. A presumption such as
the one suggested for pension plans would be highly inappropriate. For a puta-
tive welfare benefit plan, careful evaluation may be necessary to confirm that
the practice, even though it systematically creates benefit expectations, is one
with which ERISA is genuinely concerned. As Morash makes clear, it may
make a difference for one's conclusion about the existence of a welfare benefit
plan whether the plan is funded or unfunded. It might also make a difference,
for example, whether the welfare benefits are benefits for current employees or
retirees.
CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed a framework of basic concepts and guiding princi-
ples for courts to use in developing plan common law. The key parts of that
framework are as follows.
First, the factual premise of both ERISA and plan common law is that
employee benefit plans are employer business programs. Different employers
may have different uses for their plans, but the common material characteris-
tic is that the plans are of value to the employers because of their effect on
employees.
Second, these programs generate both employer interest and employee inter-
est in them-employer interest in business uses of the plan and employee in-
terest in having the plan-induced expectations of benefits fulfilled. There are
legal bases for the protection of these interests, but the respective bases are
different. The employer interest may be protected on proprietary grounds
while the employee interest may be protected on grounds of public policy and
the basic principle that reasonable expectations ought to be enforced.
Third, contract principles are not needed to explain or describe the employ-
ers' and employees' respective rights in plans. The existence and scope of the
rights do not depend on the existence of a bargain or even on the existence of
a promise. Furthermore, there is nothing to be gained by treating plans as
contracts. Plans should be treated as the unique kinds of entities that they are
rather than as analogies of some more familiar kind of legal thing. Indeed,
ERISA compels one to treat plans as unique, functionally defined entities-as
precisely those kinds of programs with which the statute is concerned.
Fourth, plan common law is necessarily heterogeneous. In that part of it
subject to the exclusive-benefit rule, which commands that employee interests
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exclusively be advanced, plan common law must rigorously advance employee
interests in receiving benefits. In this part of the law, care must be taken not
to undermine that purpose through importation of pre-ERISA rules and con-
cepts that ERISA has rejected. But in the part of plan common law not sub-
ject to the exclusive-benefit rule, courts may work out rules that balance em-
ployer and employee interests. Here, parts of pre-ERISA law may well be
appropriate, at least as starting points for the process of common law
development.
Fifth, ERISA treats benefits as compensation-like, but only to a limited ex-
tent. ERISA is concerned almost exclusively with benefits that are similar to
wages and other forms of individual remuneration and limits its scope accord-
ingly. However, it makes little further use of the concept of benefits as com-
pensation. ERISA's recognition of benefits as compensation-like is a change
from pre-ERISA pension plan law, and it permits adoption of rules-such as
rules of restitution-that pre-ERISA law did not. However, reliance on this
view of benefits for purposes of common law development must be constrained
by recognition that ERISA's main purpose is protection of employee benefit
expectations, not just protection of employee benefits.
This framework emerges from the factual and historical bases of benefit
plans; from an understanding of the basic legal problems to which plans give
rise; from recognition of the failures of the pre-ERISA framework; and from
appreciation of ERISA as a source of direction for the ongoing historical pro-
cess of developing plan common law. This Article supplies only the framework
for benefit plan law. It is for courts to use in developing the substance.
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